Ramey v. Rizzuto, CIV. A. 98-WM-1261.
| Decision Date | 01 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 98-WM-1261.,CIV. A. 98-WM-1261. |
| Citation | 72 F.Supp.2d 1202 |
| Parties | Lory Ann RAMEY and Renee M. Farmer, Plaintiffs, and Sherry S. Shupe, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. James T. RIZZUTO, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
R. Eric Solem, David F. Steinhoff, Solem, Mark & Steinhoff, P.C., Englewood, CO, for Lory Ann Ramey, Renee M. Farmer.
Ann Hause, Attorney General's Office, Denver, CO, for Barbara McDonnell, Colorado Dept. of Health Care Policy and Financing.
Mary Helen Miller, Boulder, CO, for Sherry S. Shupe.
ORDER ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before me on the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Coan, issued June 1, 1999, and July 6, 1999. The parties have filed objections to the recommendations.2 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). I have reviewed de novo the parties' motions and briefs, the recommendations, and the parties' objections and responses thereto.
The June 1, 1999 recommendation addresses the following motions for summary judgment:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed August 28, 1998;
2. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment, filed September 30, 1998;
3. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed October 20, 1998;3 and 4. Plaintiff-Intervenor's cross-motion for summary judgment, filed November 19, 1998.
I address the issues presented in these motions as they are presented in the recommendation.
I agree with the recommendation that plaintiffs' claims are properly presented pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that defendant correctly analyzed plaintiffs' trusts under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) (repealed), that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(17)(b) and 1396c do not preempt 10 C.C.R. 2505-10, § 8,110.52; and that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar relitigation of the Shupe trust.4
I also agree that Ramey and Shupe, as recipients of Social Security benefits, are categorically eligible for Medicaid benefits without regard to the terms of their trusts. Because I accept the recommendation on this issue, I do not reach the question of whether the Ramey and Shupe trusts are Medicaid qualifying trusts (MQTs) for purposes of determining their eligibility for Medicaid benefits.5
With regard to the claims asserted by plaintiff Farmer, I agree that there are factual issues regarding the termination of the trust and transfer of assets that preclude summary judgment.
Finally, I observe that the Magistrate Judge did not reach Shupe's claim that the administrative law judge's finding the Shupe trust to be a MQT was erroneous as a matter of law and arbitrary and capricious in violation of due process because the summary judgment record was incomplete. With its objections to the recommendation, defendant provides a copy of the ALJ's order and requests that I grant summary judgment in his favor on this claim. Although I have agreed with the recommendation that the denial of benefits to Shupe did not comply with federal law, I leave the due process/arbitrary and capricious issues to be resolved on a more complete record.
The recommendation does not clearly address plaintiffs' claims that administrative proceedings provided by defendant violated their due process rights to a fair hearing. In the later recommendation, discussed below, Magistrate Judge Coan asserts summary judgment should be denied on due process issues due to an incomplete record. I accept the June 1, 1999 recommendation on this issue, as clarified by the later recommendation.
The July 6, 1999 recommendation covered the plaintiff class's motion for summary judgment on class claims, filed May 13, 1999; defendant's motion for summary judgment on amended complaint, filed May 17, 1999; and the parties' stipulation regarding the order of reference and conduct of class action, filed June 17, 1999. The recommendation adopts the conclusions from the June 1, 1999 recommendation, as adapted to the class claims. The parties filed timely objections to this recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
After review of the underlying motions, the recommendation, and the objections, I conclude the recommendation should be accepted except for its conclusion that the plaintiffs' ninth claim for relief (preemption) should be granted. Recommendation, at 9. I find that this conclusion is most likely a clerical error; elsewhere in the recommendation and in the cited portions of the June 1, 1999 recommendation, Magistrate Judge Coan determined that plaintiffs' preemption claims should be dismissed.6 See Recommendation at 7; June 1, 1999 recommendation at 23-24, 30.
Accordingly, it is ordered:
1. The June 1, 1999 recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Coan is accepted, except that I do not reach the issue of whether the Ramey and Shupe trusts are Medicaid qualifying trusts (MQTs) for purposes of determining their eligibility for Medicaid benefits.
2. The July 6, 1999 recommendation is accepted, with the correction noted above.
3. Defendant's motions for summary judgment, filed August 28, 1998, and October 20, 1998, are granted in part and denied in part.
4. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, filed September 30, 1998, is granted in part and denied in part. This motion is denied with regard to Farmer's claim of improper assessment (third claim for relief) because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
5. Plaintiff-intervenor's cross-motion for summary judgment, filed November 19, 1998, is granted in part and denied in part.
6. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues of whether the ALJ's decisions were arbitrary and capricious or otherwise violated plaintiffs' due process rights (sixth claim for relief) are denied due to the insufficient record before the court.
7. The Class motion for summary judgment on class claims, filed May 13, 1999, is granted in part and denied in part.
8. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on amended complaint, filed May 17, 1999, is granted in part and denied in part.
9. Judgment shall enter:
a. declaring that the class may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for termination of Medicaid benefits (fifth claim for relief of amended complaint and fourth claim for relief of complaint in intervention);
b. declaring that, as recipients of SSI benefits, Ramey, Shupe, and members of subclass (b) are categorically eligible for Medicaid benefits (second claim for relief of amended complaint and complaint in intervention);
c. declaring that the state correctly found plaintiff Farmer's trust to be a countable resource;
d. declaring that defendant shall reimburse Ramey, Shupe, and any class members for Medicaid benefits wrongfully terminated, as provided in the June 1, 1999 recommendation (and shall reinstate Shupe's home care services, if terminated);
e. dismissing the amended complaint's first (repealed law), fourth (preemption), and eighth (countable resource) claims for relief with prejudice; and
f. dismissing plaintiff-intervenor's third (preemption) and fifth (estoppel and waiver) claims for relief with prejudice.7
10. Ramey, Shupe, and the class members may recover their reasonable costs and attorneys' fees for their claims on which they were successful pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
11. This case remains pending on the third (Farmer) and sixth (due process) claims for relief of the amended complaint and plaintiff-intervenor's sixth claim for relief (arbitrary and capricious).
12. The injunctive language recommended by Magistrate Judge Coan covers issues not reached and therefore is not necessary to this order.
13. The parties shall file statements regarding whether plaintiffs' first and ninth claims are rendered moot, with regard to these plaintiffs, by the finding that Ramey, Shupe and members of Subclass (b) are categorically eligible for Medicaid benefits.
The matters before this court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [filed August 28, 1998]; Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [filed September 30, 1998]; Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [filed October 20, 1998]; Plaintiff-Intervenor's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [filed November 19, 1998]; and Supplemental Authority in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [filed March 8, 1999]. A Special Order of Reference under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) and (b) referred the motions to the undersigned magistrate judge on November 18, 1998 to issue a recommendation regarding disposition. The motions were fully briefed and the court has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the recommendation.
Lory Ann Ramey, Renee M. Farmer and Sherry Shupe all suffer from multiple sclerosis and are permanently disabled citizens of the State of Colorado ("state" or "Colorado"). Amended Comp. ¶ 2; Comp. in Intervention, ¶ 1. Ramey has been on medical assistance since 1992, currently resides in an assisted living facility and receives benefits under the Social Security Act ("SSI").1 Amended Comp. ¶¶ 2, 12A. Ramey has been the recipient of SSI benefits and Medicaid benefits since 1992. Id, ¶ 17B. Shupe has been the recipient of SSI benefits and resides in a home in Boulder assisted by a live-in aide. Comp. in Intervention, ¶ 13.
On July 22, 1992, Ramey's father, Donald Ramey, established an irrevocable trust with $50 for the benefit of his daughter and for the express purpose of protecting Ramey from losing Social Security and Medicaid benefits. In dissolution of marriage proceedings between Ramey and her spouse. Ramey's ex-husband was ordered to pay maintenance of $50 per month into the trust. Amended Comp. ¶ 38 and Exs. C, D. Ramey was given a life estate in the home and...
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