Ramirez-Baker v. Beazer Homes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-F-008-601 LJO DLB.,CV-F-008-601 LJO DLB. |
| Parties | Donna RAMIREZ-BAKER, Plaintiff, v. BEAZER HOMES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Jacob J. Rivas, Law Offices of Jacob J. Rivas, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiff.
R. Read Gignilliat, Phv, Tracy Lynn Glanton, Elarbee Thompson Sapp and Wilson, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, STAY, AND COMPEL ARBITRATION
(Doc. 8)
Defendants Beazer Homes, Inc, Celia Nevarez and Walter Diamond (collectively "Beazer") move to compel Plaintiff Donna Ramirez-Baker ("Ms.Ramirez-Baker") to arbitrate this dispute in accordance with Beazer's alternative dispute resolution program and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. Ms. Ramirez-Baker opposed the motion on June 9, 2008. Beazer replied on June 17, 2008. The Court finds this matter suitable for decision on the pleadings and VACATES the June 24, 2008 oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS Beazer's motion to compel arbitration.
Ms. Ramirez-Baker applied for a position at Beazer on February 22, 2007. The employment application contains an "Applicant Statement," which requires the applicant's signature. In its last paragraph, the Applicant Statement contains information regarding Beazer's alternative dispute resolution program, called "Resolving Concerns at Beazer" ("RCB Program"). A potential employee is informed that:
by signing and submitting this application, [potential employees] agree to the exclusive resolution of all grievances, disputes, and claims arising out of or relating to [his or her] application for employment, [ ] employment, or [ ] termination of employment by Beazer Homes ("Cover Claims") by the terms and conditions set forth in the RCB Program. (Helms Declaration, Ex. 1, Beazer Employment Application, page 4).
An applicant signing the applicant statement is informed further that covered claims, as defined by the RCB Program, "include, but are not limited to, federal, state, and local statutory, common law or contractual claims, or contractual claims for wages, breach of any express or implied promises, torts, and discrimination on any basis." Id. Ms. Ramirez-Baker signed the Applicant Statement.
Ms. Ramirez-Baker accepted Beazer's employment offer, and began her employment at Beazer on March 13, 2007 as a New Home Counselor.1 Beazer terminated Ms. Ramirez-Baker's employment on November 12, 2007.
Ms. Ramirez-Baker filed this action against Beazer on March 3, 2008, alleging: (1) wrongful discharge for reporting improper practices of her employer; (2) wrongful discharge for refusal to commit an unlawful act; (3) retaliation pursuant to California Labor Code § 1102.5(b); (4) religious discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; (5) religious discrimination under California Government Code § 12940; and (6) breach of employment contract. On May 1, 2008, Beazer removed this action to this Court from the Superior Court of Fresno County. Beazer now moves to stay these proceedings and to compel Ms. Ramirez-Baker to submit her claims to Beazer's RCB Program.
Beazer moves to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. ("FAA"). The FAA governs the enforcement of arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce. E.E. O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002). The FAA permits "a party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration [to] petition any United States District Court ... for an order directing that arbitration to proceed in the manner provided for in [the arbitration] agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4. An arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Because Ms. Ramirez-Baker was employed in California, this Court looks to California contract law to determine whether the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable. Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.2002).
If a party fails to comply with the arbitration agreement, this Court will stay the proceedings and issue an order to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. "The standard for demonstrating arbitrability is not a high one; in fact, a district court has little discretion to deny an arbitration motion, since the [FAA] is phrased in mandatory terms." Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 475 (9th Cir.1991). "[W]here a contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability." AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). Under the FAA, "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.1991).
With these standards in mind, the Court turns to whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties and, if so, whether that agreement is enforceable.
The "first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). The FAA "does not apply until the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement is established under state law principles involving formation, revocation, and enforcement of contracts generally." Cione v. Foresters Equity Servs., 58 Cal.App.4th 625, 634, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 167 (1997). Therefore, Beazer first must establish that an arbitration agreement existed between Beazer and Ms. Ramirez-Baker.
Beazer submits that the arbitration agreement between Beazer and Ms. Ramirez-Baker is the provision in the Applicant Statement signed by Ms. Ramirez-Baker and included with Ms. Ramirez-Baker's employment application. Ms. Ramirez-Baker argues that no arbitration agreement exists because: (1) the employment application is not a contract, and (2) the later employment contracts she signed superceded the arbitration agreement, if any.
In support of her position that the Applicant Statement is not a contract, Ms. Ramirez-Baker points to a paragraph, separate from the arbitration paragraph, in the Applicant Statement, which reads:
If I am hired, I understand that I am free to resign at any time, with or without cause and with or without prior notice ... This application does not constitute an agreement or contract for employment for any specified period or duration. I understand that ... no implied oral or written agreements contrary to the foregoing express language are valid unless they are in writing and signed by the "President/CEO of Beazer Homes." (Emphasis added).
Ms. Ramirez-Baker contends that this provision expressly disclaims the creation of a contract.
The language of the Applicant Statement above is limited in scope. The disclaiming sentence is found within a paragraph related to employment only. The provision disclaims an agreement for employment, but does not mention arbitration. Conversely, the language of the arbitration provision establishes an agreement. See Applicant Statement ("by signing and submitting this application, I agree to the exclusive resolution of all grievances ... as set forth in the RCB Program ... I understand that as a result of my and Beazer Homes' mutual agreement to resolve claims exclusively through the RCB Program ...") (emphasis added). Thus, the language of the contract does not disclaim the creation of a contract.
Next, Ms. Ramirez-Baker argues that the written employment agreements signed by Ms. Ramirez-Baker subsequent to her employment application supercede all provisions included in the employment application. (See Declaration of Ramirez-Baker, Exhibits A and B). Ms. Ramirez-Baker contends that each written employment agreement contained an integration clause, which provides:
The foregoing constitutes the entire agreement between New Home Counselor and Broker with respect to the subject matter covered, and supercedes, cancels, and nullifies any and all prior agreements and understandings. It is agreed that all prior understandings and agreements made between the parties respecting this transaction are merged in this Agreement, which may be executed in counterparts and which, along, fully and completely express their agreement, and that there are no representations, warranties or agreements except as herein set forth in this Agreement and in any exhibits annexed thereto.
The integrated clause of the employment contracts is limited to the terms of the employment contracts. "[B]y its terms the scope of the integration clause was `limited to the subject matter contained' in the written employment agreement." Cione, 58 Cal.App.4th at 635, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 (quoting Hayter Trucking Inc. v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., 18 Cal.App.4th 1, 14, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 229 (1993).) As the Cione court, 58 Cal. App.4th at 635, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 167, explained:
Although containing provisions about the length of [ ] employment and methods for its termination, the written employment agreement did not specify any forum for resolving any disputes between the parties whether arising from [ ] separation from employment or otherwise. Neither did the written employment agreement refer to [the separate] arbitration agreement ... or otherwise make any mention of arbitration. In sum, neither in its integration clause nor elsewhere did the written employment contract suggest it stated the parties' entire...
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