Ramirez v. Arlequin
| Citation | 357 F.Supp.2d 416 |
| Decision Date | 23 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 03-2376(SEC). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | Reinaldo RAMÍREZ, et al., Plaintiffs v. Edgardo ARLEQUÍN, et al., Defendants. |
Pedro R. Vazquez, III, Pedro R. Vazquez Law Office, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Gina Ismalia Gutierrez-Galang, Johanna M. Emmanuelli-Huertas and Jorge Martinez-Luciano, Pedro Ortiz Alvarez Law Offices, Ponce, PR, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is Co-defendant Edgardo Arlequn-Vlez's motion to dismiss in his individual capacity (Docket # 5). Also is pending Co-defendants Arlequn-Vlez's in his official capacity and the Municipality of Guayanilla's motion to dismiss (Docket # 8).1 Plaintiffs filed a consolidated opposition to Defendants' motions (Docket # 10). Thereafter, Defendants filed separate reply briefs to Plaintiffs' consolidated opposition (Dockets 11 & 15). Co-defendant Arlequn-Vlez in his individual capacity filed a supplemental reply to Plaintiffs' opposition (Docket # 21) and Plaintiffs sur-replied (Docket # 24). After carefully examining the parties' arguments, the case record and the applicable law, Defendants' motions will be GRANTED.
Co-plaintiff Reinaldo Ramrez is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and sole owner of Remexcel Managerial Consultants, Inc. ("RMC"), a corporation which renders accounting and managerial professional services (Docket # 1 at 3.1). Co-plaintiff Maria S. Kortright-Soler is an attorney at law. Co-plaintiffs RMC and Kortright entered into respective professional services contracts with the Municipality of Guayanilla in order to aid the Municipality with the identification and recovery (legal action) of monies associated with a series of deficiencies in the payment of municipal taxes for commercial activities (herein the "tax deficiency litigation") (Docket # 1 at 4.8, 4.15). At that time, the Mayor in the Municipality of Guayanilla was a member of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"). Both contracts of professional services stipulated that payment for the services rendered would be made on a contingency-fee basis. Pursuant to their agreement, Co-plaintiff RMC would recover ten percent (10%) "of the revenues received under the concept of additional funds obtained due to the efforts and endeavors of the Firm." (Docket 1 at 4.7). Co-plaintiff Kortright agreed to represent the Municipality in the tax deficiency litigation in the Commonwealth's courts for a fixed amount of $1,000/month for expenses and ten percent (10%) of the monies collected as a result of her work (Docket # 1 at 4.14 & 4.34).
Before the tax deficiency litigation concluded,2 the general elections of 2000 were held and a new Mayor was elected for the Municipality of Guayanilla. Subsequently, Co-defendant Arlequn-Vlez of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") took office. Thereafter, Plaintiffs' professional services contracts were terminated and other professionals were retained to continue to work in the tax deficiency litigation (Docket # 1 at 4.17 & 4.23). After the tax deficiency litigation concluded favorably for the Municipality, Plaintiffs approached the Municipality in order to collect the contingency fee agreed upon in their respective contracts (Docket # 1 at 4.30, 4.31 & 4.37). The Municipality refused to pay Plaintiffs and instead, paid the contingency fee to the professionals who replaced Plaintiffs (Docket # 1 at 4.38).
In assessing whether dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate, "the trial court, must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determine whether the complaint, so read, limns facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable theory." LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir.1998) (citations omitted). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), quoted in Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999). See also Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1990) ().
But "[a]lthough this standard is diaphanous, it is not a virtual mirage." Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must set forth `factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.'" Id.
In judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must "differentiate between well-pleaded facts, on the one hand, and `bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution, and the like,' on the other hand; the former must be credited, but the latter can safely be ignored." LaChapelle, 142 F.3d at 508 (quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)). See also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1999). Moreover, Courts "will not accept a complainant's unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law." Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993).
Plaintiffs filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to costs, interests, and attorneys' fees, for the alleged political discriminatory actions taken against them by Defendants in refusing to honor their obligations under their respective professional services contracts in violation of their First Amendment rights. Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that they have been deprived of their property rights without due process of law. Plaintiffs have also included a claim for violation to their substantive due process rights and supplemental causes of action under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
Defendants have presented a plethora of arguments in their request for dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, namely: (1) Co-defendant Arlequn-Vlez in his individual capacity is entitled to qualified immunity; (2) lack of standing of Co-plaintiff Ramrez to sue under Section 1983; (3) Plaintiffs have no property interest; (4) a mere breach of contract is not a deprivation of property without constitutional due process; (5) political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the professional services contracts at issue; (6) Plaintiffs have failed to state a prima facie case of political discrimination; (7) Plaintiffs' claims under Section 1983 are time-barred; (8) the Court should abstain under the Younger doctrine; and (9) Plaintiffs' supplemental law claims should be dismissed. See Dockets 5, 8, 11 & 15. We will address these arguments in natural order to the extent that it is necessary.
I. Section 1983
Section 1983 in itself does not confer substantive rights, but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In order to establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must first show that "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989); Saugus v. Voutour, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir.1985).
Second, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908; Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 559. This second prong has two aspects: (1) there must have been an actual deprivation of the plaintiff's federally protected rights; and (2) there must have been a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights. Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 559; Voutour, 761 F.2d at 819. In turn, this second element of causal connection requires that the plaintiff establish: (1) for each defendant, that the defendant's own actions deprived the plaintiff of his/her protected rights, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 562; Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir.1989); and (2) that the defendant's conduct was intentional, Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 185 (1st Cir.1986), grossly negligent, or amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 562.
Defendants challenge Co-plaintiff Ramrez's standing to sue under Section 1983. Co-plaintiff Ramrez is the sole owner and President of Co-plaintiff RMC (Docket # 1 at 3.1). By Plaintiffs' own assertions, the two professional services contracts at issue in the instant case were executed between RMC and the Municipality of Guayanilla, and between Co-defendant Kortright and the Municipality of Guayanilla. See Docket # 1 at 4.5 & 4.15. The First Circuit case law is crystal clear to the effect that only the party whose civil rights have been violated may bring a claim pursuant to that Section. See Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 76 n. 15 (1st Cir.1998)( "A...
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Ramirez v. Arlequin
...claim because the only injury was to Remexcel and Ramírez did not have standing to assert the corporation's claim. Ramírez v. Arlequín, 357 F.Supp.2d 416, 421 (D.P.R. 2005). The district court next considered whether Remexcel and Kortright were entitled to First Amendment protection against......