Ramirez v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm'rs
Decision Date | 21 February 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 1-20-0240,1-20-0240 |
Citation | 2020 IL App (1st) 200240,151 N.E.3d 206,440 Ill.Dec. 170 |
Parties | Jay RAMIREZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The CHICAGO BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, as a Duly Constituted Electoral Board and Its Members, Chair Marisel A. Hernandez, Commissioner William J. Kresse, and Commissioner Jonathan T. Swain; The Chicago Board of Election Commissioners in Its Capacity as Election Authority for the City of Chicago; and Lauren Weber, Objector, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Pericles C. Abbasi, of Chicago, for appellant.
Adam W. Lasker, of Chicago, for appellee Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.
Lauren Weber, of Chicago, objector-appellee pro se.
¶ 1 Petitioner Jay Ramirez appeals the February 7, 2020, order of the circuit court of Cook County that affirmed the January 21, 2020, decision of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners (the board). The board had ordered petitioner's name not to "be printed on the official ballot for the General Primary Election to be held on March 17, 2020." For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 In its memo1 to this court, the board stated that it "concurs with the factual and procedural background" provided by petitioner in his brief; and objector Lauren Weber also stated in her memo that she likewise "agrees" with petitioner's statement of facts. Thus, the facts are not in dispute, and we summarize them below.
¶ 4 On December 2, 2019, petitioner filed his nomination papers for the office of Democratic Ward Committeeperson of the First Ward of the City of Chicago. On December 9, 2019, Lauren Weber filed a petition challenging the sufficiency of his papers, alleging that he had not submitted the legally required number of signatures. The board determined that petitioner had submitted 896 valid signatures; and the board's determination of the number of valid signatures that he submitted is not in dispute on appeal. What is in dispute is the number of valid signatures that are required. The board determined that the minimum number of valid signatures required is 1032, while petitioner argues that the minimum number is only 599. Their respective arguments, based on their interpretations of the relevant statute, are discussed below.
¶ 5 In its January 21, 2020, decision, the board rejected petitioner's argument and found that, as a result, he had an insufficient number of valid signatures, which barred his placement on the ballot. On January 27, 2020, he filed a petition for judicial review. On February 7, 2020, after briefing and oral argument, the circuit court affirmed the board's decision. On the same day as the circuit court's decision, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. On February 11, 2020, this court granted his motion for an expedited appeal and to allow the parties to file memoranda in lieu of briefs.
¶ 8 Where an electoral board's decision has been reviewed by a circuit court, the appellate court generally reviews the decision of the electoral board, rather than the decision of the circuit court. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board , 228 Ill. 2d 200, 212, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011 (2008) (); Cortez v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board , 2013 IL App (1st) 130442, ¶ 14, 369 Ill.Dec. 376, 986 N.E.2d 689 ; Pascente v. County Officers Electoral Board , 373 Ill. App. 3d 871, 873, 311 Ill.Dec. 789, 869 N.E.2d 802 (2007) ; Rita v. Mayden , 364 Ill. App. 3d 913, 919, 301 Ill.Dec. 568, 847 N.E.2d 578 (2006).
¶ 9 We review questions of fact deferentially and will disturb factual determinations only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Anderson v. McHenry Township , 289 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832, 225 Ill.Dec. 56, 682 N.E.2d 1133 (1997). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion is readily apparent, or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary or not based upon the evidence. Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. , 172 Ill. 2d 213, 242, 216 Ill.Dec. 703, 665 N.E.2d 1260 (1996).
¶ 10 When the dispute concerns whether a candidate's nominating papers complied substantially with the Election Code, then the question is purely one of law and our standard of review is de novo . Pascente , 373 Ill. App. 3d at 873, 311 Ill.Dec. 789, 869 N.E.2d 802 ; Salgado v. Marquez , 356 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1075, 293 Ill.Dec. 495, 828 N.E.2d 805 (2005) "); Heabler v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board , 338 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1060, 273 Ill.Dec. 680, 789 N.E.2d 854 (2003) ().
¶ 11 In addition, since the resolution of this appeal requires us to interpret a section of the Election Code, it presents a question of statutory interpretation that we also review de novo . Maschek v. City of Chicago , 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 42, 399 Ill.Dec. 524, 46 N.E.3d 843 ; Metzger v. DaRosa , 209 Ill. 2d 30, 34, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165 (2004). De novo consideration means that we perform the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578, 350 Ill.Dec. 63, 948 N.E.2d 132 (2011).
¶ 13 When we construe the meaning of a statute, "the primary objective of this court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and all other rules of statutory construction are subordinated to this cardinal principle." Metzger , 209 Ill. 2d at 34, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165 ; see also Lacey v. Village of Palatine , 232 Ill. 2d 349, 361, 328 Ill.Dec. 256, 904 N.E.2d 18 (2009) (). "The plain language of the statute is the best indicator of the legislature's intent." Metzger , 209 Ill. 2d at 34-35, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165. "When the statute's language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids of statutory construction." Metzger , 209 Ill. 2d at 35, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165. "Each word, clause and sentence of the statute, if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous." People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns , 203 Ill. 2d 264, 280, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003).
¶ 14 "When interpreting legislative enactments, we must read the statute as a whole and not as isolated provisions." Metzger , 209 Ill. 2d at 37, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165. In this endeavor, we consider both any stated purpose of the particular code, as well as what Illinois courts have previously determined the purpose of the code to be. Metzger , 209 Ill. 2d at 37, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165. We view the code "as a whole" in order to determine the purpose that the code was "primarily designed" to accomplish. Metzger , 209 Ill. 2d at 38, 282 Ill.Dec. 148, 805 N.E.2d 1165.
¶ 15 When a statute or code fails to define a word or phrase, then it is the job of the courts to ascertain its meaning. Brandt Construction Co. v. Ludwig , 376 Ill. App. 3d 94, 104-05, 315 Ill.Dec. 890, 878 N.E.2d 116 (2007) .
¶ 17 The parties agree that the minimum signature requirement for the office of ward committeeperson is determined by section 7-10 of the Election Code. ( 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2018) ), as modified by Gjersten v. Board of Election Commissioners , 791 F.2d 472, 473 (7th Cir. 1986). Section 7-10(i) provides, in relevant part, that, "[i]f a candidate seeks to run for ward committeeperson, then the candidate's petition for nomination must contain no less than the number of signatures equal to 10% of the primary electors of his or her party of the ward." 10 ILCS 5/7-10(j) (West 2018). The "10%" requirement mentioned in the statute was reduced to 5% by Gjersten , 791 F.2d at 473. Thus, a candidate needs only the number of signatures equal to 5% of the ward's primary electors.
¶ 18 To determine the number of the ward's primary electors, section 7-10(k) provides, in relevant part:
"For wards or districts of political subdivisions, the number of primary electors shall be determined by taking the total vote cast for the candidate for that political party who received the highest number of votes in the ward or district at the last regular election at which an officer was regularly scheduled to be elected from that ward or district." 10 ILCS 5/7-10(k) (West 2018).
¶ 19 The parties disagree about which election is "the last regular election" to be used in calculating the vote count. See 10 ILCS 5/7-10(k) (West 2018).
¶ 21 "The position at issue, ward committeeman, is a creation of statute much like that of a university trustee." Graves v. Cook County Republican Party , 2019 IL App (1st) 181516, ¶ 63, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––. The Election Code provides that each primary elector may vote for one candidate of his or her party, in his or her ward, for ward committeeperson; and that each candidate must be a resident of that ward. Graves , 2019 IL App (1st) 181516, ¶ 63, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d –––– (discussing 10 ILCS 5/7-8(b) (West 2016)).
¶ 22 "[O]ne of the most important functions" of a committeeperson is "voting for...
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