Ramirez v. City Wings, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 August 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2020-0024
• Parties: ANA RAMIREZ and MARGARET LOUIS THOMAS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY WINGS, INC. d/b/a Seaflight, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

ANA RAMIREZ and MARGARET LOUIS THOMAS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY WINGS, INC. d/b/a Seaflight, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2020-0024

United States District Court, D. Virgin Islands, St. Croix Division

August 20, 2021

Pamela L. Colon, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I. For Plaintiff Ana Ramirez

Trudy Fenster, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I. For Plaintiff Margaret Louise Thomas

Charles E. Lockwood, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I. For Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILMA A. LEWIS, DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the “Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. No. 13) filed by Defendant City Wings Inc. d/b/a Seaflight (“Defendant” or “City Wings”); Plaintiff Ana Ramirez and Plaintiff Margaret Louise Thomas' (collectively “Plaintiffs”) “Opposition to Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. No. 21) and Defendant's Reply (Dkt. No. 27). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter seeking damages allegedly resulting from an engine failure and emergency landing of a flight operated by Defendant on which Plaintiffs were passengers. (Dkt. No. 1). The Complaint alleges negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 5-8.

Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss seeking to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). (Dkt. No. 13 at 1). Defendant states that although the Complaint alleges that Defendant is incorporated in the State of Georgia, it is incorporated in Puerto Rico and has its principal place of business in the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 13 at 1-2, 5-6). Thus, Defendant argues that no diversity of citizenship exists. Id. at 2. Additionally, Defendant argues that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over the action as the Complaint only brings claims under territorial law. Id. at 6.

Plaintiffs oppose Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Complaint establishes federal question as well as diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiffs argue that if the Court determines that Plaintiffs have not established either federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the Court should permit them to conduct jurisdictional discovery or to amend their Complaint. Id. at 10.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts possess subject matter jurisdiction only over cases that present a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when diversity of citizenship exists and the value of the claim exceeds $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

An attack under Rule 12(b)(1) to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be either a facial or factual attack. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). A facial attack- as it is denominated-challenges the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint on their face. Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006). In contrast, a factual attack disputes “the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, ” and involves the presentation of competing facts. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack requires that a court “only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs., Inc., 220 F.3d at 176. On the other hand, a court may consider evidence beyond the complaint in reviewing a factual attack. Id. In so doing, “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case” and “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Diversity Jurisdiction

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” The statute is generally understood as requiring complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants, meaning that, “unless there is some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.'” Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010)) (alteration in original); see also Johnson v. Smith Kline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Jurisdiction under § 1332(a) requires ‘complete diversity,' meaning that ‘no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants.'” (quoting Grand Union Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003))). “The key inquiry in establishing diversity is . . . the ‘citizenship' of each party to the action.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. Inc., 592 F.3d at 419.

“A natural person is deemed to be a citizen of the state where she is domiciled.” Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2008). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are both “residents” of the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1). Defendant has not disputed that Plaintiffs are citizens of the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 13 at 4). However, residence and domicile are not synonymous terms. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). “[T]he domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting McCann v. George W. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pierro v. Kugel, 386 Fed. App'x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To acquire a domicile, a person must be physically present in a state and intend to remain in that state.” (citing Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972)) (emphasis in original)). A complaint that alleges only the residency, but not citizenship or domicile, of a party is “jurisdictionally inadequate in [a] diversity of citizenship case.” McNair v. Synapse Group, Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 219 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012); see also GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 888 F.3d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Alleging residency alone is insufficient to plead diversity of citizenship.”); Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1300 (“[M]ere residency in a state is insufficient for purposes of diversity.”). Because the Complaint only alleges Plaintiffs' residency, it is facially deficient in pleading diversity jurisdiction. See McNair, 672 F.3d at 219 n.4.

Even assuming that Plaintiffs can amend the Complaint to allege that they are citizens, not simply residents, of the Virgin Islands, Defendant has submitted evidence challenging the jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint related to Defendant. The Complaint alleges that Defendant is incorporated in the State of Georgia and does business in the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1).^[1] Defendant disputes this allegation and has submitted a declaration from Donald Lewis, President of City Wings, which asserts that Defendant is incorporated in Puerto Rico-not Georgia-and operates solely in the Virgin Islands. (Dkt. No. 13-1 at ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7). Plaintiffs have failed to overcome Defendant's challenge to diversity jurisdiction.

First, the Court finds that Defendant has made a factual attack on the ability of the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity as it has submitted a declaration disputing the citizenship allegations in the Complaint. See Const. Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that in a factual attack, for example, “while diversity of citizenship might have been adequately pleaded by the plaintiff, the defendant can submit proof that, in fact, diversity is lacking”); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[Defendant's] motion was supported by a sworn statement of facts. It therefore must be construed as a factual, rather than a facial attack on the court's subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).”). Thus, in considering Defendant's attack on subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may consider evidence outside the Complaint and need not take the allegations in the Complaint as true. See GBForefront, L.P., 888 F.3d at 35 (“To resolve a factual challenge, the ‘[c]ourt may look beyond the pleadings to ascertain the facts[.]'” (quoting Const. Party of Pennsylvania, 757 F.3d at 357)).

“Once a factual challenge has been raised, the plaintiff then has the burden of proof to establish diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” GBForefront L.P., 888 F.3d at 35 (citing McCann, 458 F.3d at 288-89). “[I]n reviewing a factual attack, ‘the court must permit the plaintiff to respond with rebuttal evidence in support of jurisdiction, and...