Ramirez v. Decoster, Civil No. 98-186-P-H (D. Me. 10/15/2001)

• Decision Date: 15 October 2001
• Docket Number: Civil No. 98-186-P-H.
• Parties: LUIS RAMIREZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. AUSTIN J. DECOSTER, D/B/A DECOSTER EGG FARM, ET AL., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

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LUIS RAMIREZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. AUSTIN J. DECOSTER, D/B/A DECOSTER EGG FARM, ET AL., Defendants.

Civil No. 98-186-P-H.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

October 15, 2001.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON PENDING MOTIONS

D. BROCK HORNBY, Chief District Judge.

The Republic of Mexico and a number of private plaintiffs, migrant workers of Mexican descent, filed this lawsuit on May 18, 1998. Their primary claim was ethnic/racial discrimination by the defendants, owners and operators of an egg farm in Maine. Essentially, the plaintiffs asserted that the DeCoster egg farm purposefully recruited Mexican laborers under false pretenses, prompted them to travel a great distance to Maine, and then discriminated against them onsite in the terms and conditions of employment and housing. The plaintiffs requested certification of a class. See Class Action Complaint at 12, 19, 26, 32 (May 18, 1998) (hereafter "Complaint").

On August 9, 1999, I dismissed the Government of Mexico as a party plaintiff. See Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 59 F. Supp.2d 120 (D.Me. 1999). Mexico appealed the ruling. On March 31, 2000, I denied class certification on the private plaintiffs' racial discrimination, fraud, and contract claims; I declared moot the request for certification of claims under a federal statute, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1994) (hereafter "AWPA"). See Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348, 354-55 (D. Me. 2000). On October 11, 2000, the First Circuit affirmed my ruling dismissing Mexico as a party plaintiff. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 2000).

I later learned that just before I issued the rulings of March 31, 2000, the plaintiffs? Mexico included?and some of the defendants had actually entered into a settlement agreement as to all claims. After extensive argument and an evidentiary hearing, I ruled as a matter of federal settlement law that there was, as of February 21, 2000, an enforceable agreement, notwithstanding my later ruling of March 31, 2000 on the merits of part of the dispute. See Ramirez v. DeCoster, 142 F. Supp.2d 104, 114-15 (D.Me. 2001).

Now, in accordance with the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs want me preliminarily to certify a class for settlement, make a preliminary determination of fairness under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), and approve the distribution of notice to the class in preparation for a final fairness hearing on the settlement. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 2 (July 9, 2001). The proposed class under the settlement agreement is: "All current and former Hispanic employees of any of the Defendants and/or their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, predecessors, successors, principals, agents and assigns who worked at the DeCoster Egg Farm between January 1, 1988 and February 21, 2000." Id. The defendants remaining in the case,¹ having lost their argument that they never entered into an enforceable agreement, contend that, as a result of my March 31, 2000, ruling, a settlement class can no longer be certified; that the plaintiffs therefore cannot perform an essential part of the agreement (binding the class to the compromise through res judicata); and that the defendants are therefore excused from performance of their agreement to pay the plaintiffs $6 million in exchange for settlement. See Defs.' Opp'n at 8-9. The plaintiffs reply that, although I ruled that the matter could not proceed to trial as a class action, certification of a settlement class is appropriate and the settlement agreement therefore still is possible to perform. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Brief Pursuant to the Court's September 7, 2001 Procedural Order (Sept. 17, 2001).

The Supreme Court has spoken definitively about the certification of settlement classes. To certify such a class, "a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems. . . . But other specifications of [Rule 23]-those designed to protect absentees by Blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions-demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context." Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). These specifications "focus court attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement, rather than trial, is proposed." Id. at 621. I must, therefore, analyze the request for certification of a settlement class in light of Amchem's demands.² To do so, I must revisit my earlier Order denying class certification when the request was for a class that would proceed to trial.³

ANALYSIS

It should be clear that neither my ruling that the AWPA claim failed, nor the First Circuit's affirmance of my ruling dismissing Mexico as a party plaintiff, is an obstacle to certifying a settlement class⁴ and enforcing the settlement. After all, settlements are designed to resolve doubtful claims; doubtful claims (Mexico's status as a party plaintiff and the viability of the AWPA claim were both doubtful at the time of settlement) can go either way. There is no reason to upset the parties' earlier assessment of their respective risks on these issues, notwithstanding the fact that, later, I and the Court of Appeals entered definitive rulings. Indeed, the AWPA ruling still is subject to appeal and therefore still could be vacated.

RULE 23(a)

I start, therefore, with the specific requirements of Rule 23(a). First, "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). The number of workers who potentially are members of the class is in the vicinity of 1,000. See, e.g., 1 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3.05 (3d. ed. 1992) ("In light of prevailing precedent, the difficulty inherent in joining as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is impracticable . . . .").⁵

Second, "there are questions of law or fact common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).⁶ To state just a few, some of the common questions of fact have to do with the harboring of discriminatory motives by Austin DeCoster and his agents and their ensuing conduct; recruitment techniques the egg farm used; the general conditions in the DeCoster workplace and in the employer-provided housing; rates of pay and pay scales. Common questions of law include the applicability of the AWPA to the DeCoster egg farm operations and these workers from distant states or countries; the elements of common law fraud and contract under Maine law as they apply to migrant labor and temporary housing; and the determination whether DeCoster's treatment of Hispanic employees in the terms and conditions of employment was discriminatory under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.⁷

Third, the "claims . . . of the representative parties are typical of the claims . . . of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). The defendants make no serious argument here, and there is nothing about these named plaintiffs that suggests that the nature of their claims against DeCoster is atypical of those of other migrant workers of Hispanic origin.

Fourth, "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4).⁸ The defendants concede that class counsel is adequate. See Defs.' Opp'n at 15. I reject the argument that the adverse partial summary judgment necessarily makes the named plaintiffs inadequate representatives. Amchem teaches that the underlying purpose of the fair and adequate representation requirement is "to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent." Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (citing General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n. 13 (1982)). The problem in Amchem was that one portion of the class consisting of injured plaintiffs wanted immediate payments, while those class members who had been exposed to the toxic substance but were not yet symptomatic wanted funds preserved for the future. Id. at 626. That was a direct conflict of interest, but "[t]he settling parties . . . achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected." Id. at 627. That is just not the case here. There is no divergence between the interests of a portion of the class and the named plaintiffs. All want monetary compensation as soon as possible for the treatment DeCoster accorded to his migrant Hispanic laborers. The named plaintiffs are adequate and fair representatives for both the claims that survived my March 31, 2000, ruling and the claims that, but for the settlement, were terminated.⁹ The damages on the fraud, contract, and AWPA claims (gone but for the settlement) as pleaded are basically the same as the damages on the discrimination claims (still alive).

Are these conclusions inconsistent with my earlier ruling when I denied class certification? See Ramirez, 194 F.R.D. at 351. Not as to the discrimination or AWPA claims, for on those claims I did not even address these issues. See id. at 351-55. It does appear to be inconsistent, at least in spirit, with my earlier ruling concerning the fraud and breach of contract claims. At that time, I had ruled for different reasons that the federal discrimination and AWPA claims could not proceed as a federal class action, and I therefore had to determine whether the state common law fraud and breach of contract claims would proceed alone as a federal class action. I said "no" for two reasons: first, that on the summary judgment record those claims could not survive at all as to the named plaintiffs and therefore the named plaintiffs could not represent a class litigating those issues; second, that the fraud and contract claims presented alone did not satisfy the commonality and...