Ramirez v. IBP, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-4101-SAC.,94-4101-SAC. |
| Citation | 913 F. Supp. 1421 |
| Parties | Maria F. RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, v. IBP, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
David O. Alegria, McCullough, Wareheim & La Bunker, P.A., Topeka, KS, for plaintiff.
Jack L. Whitacre, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Kansas City, MO, Brian F. Stayton, Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardi, Overland Park, KS, J. Nick Badgerow, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, Overland Park, KS, for defendant.
This retaliatory discharge case comes before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Dk. 34). The plaintiff, Maria F. Ramirez ("Ramirez"), worked for the defendant IBP, Inc. ("IBP") for approximately twenty months. During her employment, Ms. Ramirez sustained work-related injuries to her legs, arms and back. On June 17, 1992, IBP fired Ms. Ramirez telling her that it was due to excessive absenteeism. At the time of her termination, Ms. Ramirez informed IBP's agents that her work-related injuries had caused the attendance problems. According to Ms. Ramirez, she was fired in retaliation for her work-related injuries and her exercise of rights under the Kansas Workers' Compensation Act. According to IBP, Ms. Ramirez was fired for having twelve instances of absences during a twelve-month period.
A court grants a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will ... preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "There are cases where the evidence is so weak that the case does not raise a genuine issue of fact." Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.1988).
The initial burden is with the movant to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). If this burden is met, the nonmovant must "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to elements essential to" the nonmovant's claim or position. Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). The nonmovant's burden is more than a simple showing of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; it requires "`presenting sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury to return a verdict in that party's favor.'" Thomas v. International Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991)). The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. A party relying on only conclusory allegations cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir.1995).
More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion does not empower a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or choose between competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).
For purposes only of this motion for summary judgment, the court finds the following facts, as so stated, to be uncontroverted:
1. On November 5, 1990, Ms. Ramirez began working for IBP at its plant in Emporia, Kansas. IBP terminated her on June 17, 1992.
2. IBP's written employment policy provides: The policy defines an "instance" of absence as "one or more consecutive days of absence for the same reason."
3. The absenteeism policy also specifies the nature and timing of the warnings given: four instances—verbal warning, six instances —white slip, and nine instances—written letter. On the twelfth instance, the policy provides the employee's termination.
4. According to its rules, regulations and practices, IBP does not count as an instance any absence resulting from a work-related injury. Absences caused by illnesses or other injuries are counted as instances.
5. IBP also has a policy requiring an employee to notify management of an absence at least thirty minutes prior to the employee's starting time. If an employee fails to notify the management of the absence, it is treated as an unexcused absence. IBP's policy authorizes an employee's termination for three unexcused absences.
6. Supervisors at IBP maintain written reports on which they record calls from employees for excused absences. The supervisors forward these reports to the personnel department where they are kept for twelve months.
7. Ms. Ramirez testified that she called to give notice of her absences. If she called before her supervisors had arrived at work, her call was forwarded to the personnel department and someone there would take her message.
8. The personnel department uses the supervisors' reports to track an employee's absences on individual "absentee calendars" that are kept in each employee's personnel file. When an employee calls in sick, the personnel department records on the employee's absentee calendar both the absence and a code that describes the nature or cause of the absence. IBP uses codes that differentiate between illnesses and injuries that are work related and those that are not.
9. IBP reported to the Workers' Compensation Director's Office three accidents at work involving Ms. Ramirez. The first accident was that Ms. Ramirez in May of 1991 had developed a tingling pain in both shoulders during the regular performance of her job. The report shows Ms. Ramirez was placed on light duty work. The second accident was reported to have occurred on August 29, 1991, when Ms. Ramirez fell down some stairs while going to her work area. The injury described was pain in "left spine and hip." The third accident was reported to have occurred on May 9, 1992, when Ms. Ramirez developed bilateral pain in both shoulders radiating to her fingers from the repeated performance of her work tasks. This report shows Ms. Ramirez was given light duty work.
10. Ms. Ramirez testified that her second reported accident occurred on or about August 20, 1991.
11. The 1991 and 1992 absentee calendars for Ms. Ramirez display the following instances of absences and the codes describing each of the absences:
1. August 12-14, 1991 Non-Work-Illness
2. August 24 and 26, 1991 Non-Work-Illness
3. August 28-29, 1991 Non-Work-Illness
4. September 25, 1991 Non-Work-Illness
5. November 18, 1991 Non-Work-Illness
6. January 3, 1992 Non-Work-Illness
7. February 11, 1992 Non-Work-Illness
8. March 25-26, 1992 Non-Work-Illness
9. March 30-April 27, 1992 Leave of Absence
10. May 28-June 10, 1992 Leave of Absence
11. June 12-13, 15, 1992 Non-Work-Illness
12. June 17, 1992 Non-Work-Illness
12. The plaintiff admitted in her deposition that the first and second instances were for illnesses unrelated to a work injury.
13. On the third instance of August 28-29, 1991, the plaintiff first testified that the most likely explanation was a "Non-Work-Illness." Later during her deposition, reflected by five transcript pages, the plaintiff corrected herself and said the third instance was due to back and leg pain she experienced as a result of the accident in August of 1991. Ms. Ramirez testified that when she notified IBP of this absence she also told management the reason for her absence was back and leg pain. When asked to identify with whom she had spoken, she answered that she was "pretty sure" it was Lisa Aranda in the personnel department.
14. A nurse at IBP had issued a job activity order on August 27, 1991, to the plaintiff's supervisor that restricted Ms. Ramirez to "sit down work only."
15. On the fourth instance of September 25, 1991, Ms. Ramirez testified that she believes this absence also was due to leg and back pain: "I can't really be sure that this is what happened the 25th of September or what, but it's just that after the accident the pain was so extreme that most of my absences were caused by this extreme pain in my back and my legs following the accident." (Ms. Ramirez Dep. at 149). Ms. Ramirez believes she told Lisa Aranda the reason for this absence.1
16. Ms. Ramirez remembered that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 96-4119-SAC.
...County Comm'rs, 14 Kan.App.2d 206, 215, 787 P.2d 1204, rev. denied, 246 Kan. 768 (1990); and analyzed in Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1421, 1431-37 (D.Kan. 1995), aff'd, 145 F.3d 1346 (10th Cir. May 21, 1998) (table). None of these cases squarely address the unique issues raised ANALYS......
-
Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications
...approach applied in discrimination cases for use in analyzing state-law retaliatory discharge claims. Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1421, 1429 (D.Kan.1995); Huffman v. Ace Elec. Co., Inc., 883 F.Supp. 1469, 1475 (D.Kan.1995); Lawrence v. IBP, Inc., No. 94-2027-EEO, 1995 WL 261144, at *1......
-
Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
...approach applied in discrimination cases for use in analyzing state-law retaliatory discharge claims. Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1421, 1429 (D.Kan.1995); Huffman v. Ace Elec. Co., Inc., 883 F.Supp. 1469, 1475 (D.Kan.1995); Lawrence v. IBP, Inc., No. 94-2027-EEO, 1995 WL 261144, at *1......
-
Bash v. City of Galena, Kan.
...the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach when analyzing state law retaliatory discharge cases. See, e.g., Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1421, 1429 (D.Kan.1995); Robinson v. Wilson Concrete Co., 913 F.Supp. 1476 (D.Kan.1996). Under this approach plaintiff must first present proof o......