Ramirez v. Kingman Hosp. Inc.

Decision Date15 March 2019
Docket NumberNo. CV-17-08026-PCT-BSB,CV-17-08026-PCT-BSB
Citation374 F.Supp.3d 832
Parties Eddie RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, v. KINGMAN HOSPITAL INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Jeffrey A. Silence, Kraig J. Marton, David N. Farren, Jaburg & Wilk PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.

Catherine Christine Burns, David T. Barton, Alison Pulaski Carter, Burns Barton LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

Bridget S. Bade, United States District JudgeDefendant Kingman Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Kingman Regional Medical Center ("KRMC") moves for summary judgment on the following claims in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"): (1) discriminatory termination in violation of Title VII–Religion (Count Two); (2) discriminatory termination in violation of the ADEA (Count Three); and (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADEA (Count Five).1 The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 67, 74.) For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion, in part, and denies it, in part.

I. Factual Background

KRMC is a non-profit regional trauma center based in Kingman, Arizona. (DSOF ¶ 1.)2 Plaintiff is an ear, nose and throat physician and surgeon ("ENT"). (PSSOF ¶ 1.) On November 1, 2008, Plaintiff entered into a three-year employment contract with KRMC (the "first agreement"). (DSOF ¶ 2.) Plaintiff's base salary was $ 434,693 and was later increased to $ 550,000, with a bonus based on revenue generated from physician-related services. (PSSOF ¶¶ 5-6; Ramirez Decl., Ex. 1.)3

During September 2012, Plaintiff and KRMC began discussing a new employment contract. (PSSOF ¶ 48.) On July 31, 2013, Plaintiff entered into a new three-year contract ("Agreement") with KRMC. (DSOF ¶ 3; PSSOF ¶ 50.) Plaintiff's base salary remained $ 550,000. (DSOF ¶ 3, PSSOF ¶¶ 57-60.) Schedule A of the Agreement provided for a potential bonus based on Plaintiff's work relative value units ("RVUs"). (DSOF ¶ 3; PSSOF ¶¶ 70-72.) Schedule A of the Agreement also provided that if Plaintiff's total RVUs in any given fiscal year were less than the 7,500 RVUs required to cover Plaintiff's base salary, his base salary would "be reduced by an amount proportionate to the deficit in work RVUs required to cover" his base salary and the RVUs produced. (DSOF ¶ 3, DSOF, Ex. 21; PCSOF ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff asserts that when he signed the Agreement he thought that his bonus remained a "collections bonus" that was based on revenues from all physician-related services, as it had been in Schedule A of the first agreement. (PSSOF ¶ 60.) Plaintiff alleges that at the time he signed the Agreement, Tim Blanchard, KRMC's CFO, did not tell him that the first agreement's "Schedule A" collections bonus had been replaced by a new "Schedule A" that was attached only to the signed original Agreement that Blanchard kept for his file. (Id. at ¶ 62.) Plaintiff alleges that he would not have signed the Agreement if he had been told about the new Schedule A. (Id. at ¶¶ 67-69.) Plaintiff asserts that Schedule A was not attached to the signed original of the Agreement that he was provided. (PSSOF ¶ 62.) Plaintiff asserts that he did not notice that Schedule A was missing from his copy of the Agreement because Blanchard had not mentioned the change to the bonus structure during their negotiations. (Id. at ¶¶ 61-75). During his deposition, Blanchard stated that he does "not recall" telling Plaintiff about the new Schedule A. (Id. at ¶ 64; Blanchard Depo. at 25.)4

Plaintiff alleges that KRMC is a "Mormon-run" hospital that is controlled by CEO Brian Turney, a Mormon.5 (PSSOF ¶¶ 170-94.) Plaintiff alleges that his immediate supervisor, Stacy McDaniel (now Stacy Merritt), also had "deep ties to the Kingman area Mormon Church and community." (Id. at ¶¶ 172-74.) Plaintiff alleges that Turney and Merritt cultivated a "Mormon Mafia" culture and power structure that favored Mormons over non-Mormons. (Id. at ¶¶ 175-84.) Plaintiff asserts that he is Christian and that he regularly complained to Merritt about the Mormon culture and power structure. (Id. at ¶¶ 183-84.)

Defendant states that in January 2014, Blanchard and Merritt, who was then Director of Surgical Specialties, decided to terminate Plaintiff's employment based on Plaintiff's poor job performance and bad attitude. (DSOF ¶ 4.) Blanchard and Merritt informed Turney of their decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment, and Turney supported that decision. (DSOF ¶ 5; PSSOF ¶¶ 99-109.) On January 31, 2014, KRMC terminated Plaintiff's employment pursuant to the "without cause" clause of the Agreement. (DSOF ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was the only physician terminated for "performance reasons" between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014. (PSSOF ¶ 117; Turney Depo. at 112.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was "blindsided" by his termination because he had not been warned, disciplined, or informed that any serious issues related to performance or other issues might put his job at risk. (PSSOF ¶¶ 17, 90, 108; Turney Depo. at 102, 105, 114, 162-63; Blanchard Depo. at 33-35, 42, 64-65; Merritt Depo. at 31-22; but see Merritt Depo. at 37.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has a policy of documenting disciplinary or important meetings with physicians. (PSSOF ¶ 18; Turney Depo. at 104-05; Blanchard Depo. at 34; but see Merritt Depo. at 32-33.) Turney testified the he deferred to KRMC's human resources officer on the issue of KRMC's policy, but that his "recollection of the policy" was that anything "disciplinary in nature" "should be documented and kept on file." (Turney Depo. at 104.)

Turney stated that he had discussions with Plaintiff about his productivity, but he was not aware of any written warning that had been issued to Plaintiff. (Id. at 105.) Blanchard testified that KRMC had a policy of documenting conversations with doctors about "employment problems." (Blanchard Depo. at 34.) Blanchard testified that he talked to Plaintiff about his RVUs and told Plaintiff that his productivity needed to increase to match his compensation, but Blanchard stated that he did not tell Plaintiff that there would be any "consequences" or that Plaintiff "was subject to termination if he did not improve his RVUs." (Blanchard Depo. at 36, 63-65.) Blanchard stated that he did not document his meetings with Plaintiff. (Id. at 34, 63-64.) Blanchard stated that, other than Plaintiff's productivity, he did not discuss any issues with Plaintiff before his termination. (Id. at 65.) Merritt testified that she was unaware of a KRMC policy that required documentation of meetings with physicians regarding performance or disciplinary matters. (Merritt Depo. at 33.)

Plaintiff, who was 60 years old in October 2013, alleges that KRMC hired Dr. Bernadette Braze, a much younger physician, to replace him. (PSSOF ¶¶ 1, 77-85.) Dr. Braze was between 42 and 45 years old when she was hired. (DSOF ¶ 85, PSSOF, Ex. G.) Dr. Braze began working at KRMC in December 2013. (Ramirez Decl. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff alleges that KRMC stated that Dr. Braze was hired to help with his clinical patient workload, but she did not help and instead used "his office equipment and staff and otherwise ignored him." (Id. ) During proceedings before the EEOC, KRMC initially stated that Dr. Braze was hired to replace Plaintiff. (PSSOF ¶¶ 81, 83; PSSOF, EX. G.) In a subsequent letter to the EEOC, KRMC stated that because Plaintiff was not terminated until 2014 (effective March 31, 2014), Dr. Braze, who was hired in 2013, was not hired to replace him. (PSSOF, Ex. H.) KRMC states that it has not hired an ENT doctor to replace Plaintiff. (Id. ) As set forth below, Defendant provides several reasons for terminating Plaintiff, which the parties dispute. (Doc. 56 at 2.)

A. Defendant's Stated Reasons for Terminating Plaintiff's Employment
1. Plaintiff's Productivity

Defendant asserts that in 2013, based on a "pool of data of similarly situated ENT doctors in similar practices from the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA)," Blanchard discovered that Plaintiff generated less revenue than most doctors in the pool. (DSOF ¶¶ 9, 10.) Based on a review of KRMC's physician's RVUs, Blanchard discovered that Plaintiff's productivity fell beneath his compensation level. (DSOF ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Blanchard had no reason to scrutinize his productivity and had not done so in the past. (PSSOF ¶¶ 20-22.) Plaintiff asserts that Blanchard did not tell him that he was compiling this data to compare it to Plaintiff's RVU numbers and salary. (PSSOF ¶¶ 32-37, 42-47.)

Defendant asserts that starting in late 2012 Blanchard and Plaintiff "met multiple times to discuss his productivity." (DSOF ¶ 11.) In his deposition, Plaintiff admits that during two meetings in late 2013 Blanchard informed him that his salary needed to be reduced, but Plaintiff refused to accept a reduction in his pay. (DSOF ¶ 12; Ramirez Depo. at 277-78.)6 Blanchard testified that he talked to Plaintiff about his RVUs and told Plaintiff that his productivity needed to increase to match his compensation, but Blanchard did not tell Plaintiff that there would be any "consequences" or that Plaintiff "was subject to termination if he did not improve his RVUs." (Blanchard Depo. at 36, 63-65.)

2. Plaintiff's Use of Operating Room Block Time

Defendant asserts that in December 2013 it learned that more than twenty percent of the time Plaintiff was starting late in his morning operating room ("OR") block time. (DSOF ¶ 15; DSOF, Exs. 23, 29.) KRMC revoked Ramirez's morning block time. (DSOF ¶ 15.) Plaintiff denies this assertion and asserts that KRMC falsely stated that he referred to himself as a "chronic late starter." (PSOF ¶ 15; PSSOF ¶ 168.) Plaintiff, however, does not offer any evidence disputing that he started late in his OR block time.

3. Plaintiff's Resistance to KRMC's Implementation of Electronic Medical Records

By January 1, 2014, KRMC was required to meet a federal mandate that required medical institutions and physicians to use electronic medical records ("EMR") or incur financial penalties....

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