Ramirez v. Sanchez Ramos

• Decision Date: 21 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-1798.,05-1798.
• Citation: 438 F.3d 92
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
• Parties: Miriam J. RAM&#205;REZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Roberto S&#193;NCHEZ RAMOS, in his Capacity as Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico,<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> Defendant, Appellee.

438 F.3d 92

Miriam J. RAMÍREZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v.Roberto SÁNCHEZ RAMOS, in his Capacity as Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico,^*Defendant, Appellee.

No. 05-1798.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard January 13, 2006.

Decided February 21, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David W. Roman, with whom José Luis Ubarri and Brown & Ubarri were on brief, for appellant.

Eduardo Vera Ramírez, with whom Roberto Sánchez Ramos, Secretary of Justice, Salvador Antonetti Stutts, Solicitor General, Eileen Landrón Guardiola, Courtney R. Carroll, and Landrón & Vera, LLP were on brief, for appellee.

Before SELYA, LIPEZ and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Following her failed efforts to force an agency of the Puerto Rican government to display the American flag in its central office, plaintiff-appellantMiriam J. Ramírez found herself on the wrong end of criminal charges brought pursuant to the Riot Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4522.Claiming that the Riot Act impermissibly infringed her First Amendment right to political expression and that the party in power was using it as a tool to harass political opponents, the plaintiff mounted a constitutional challenge.¹After the criminal charges were dropped, the district court determined that the plaintiff no longer had an adequate stake in the action and dismissed her constitutional claims as moot.Ramírez v. Rodríguez,389 F.Supp.2d 143, 147(D.P.R.2005).This appeal followed.

We conclude that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a facial challenge to the Riot Act.While she had standing to mount an as-applied challenge, that claim became moot upon the termination of the criminal charges.Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.

I.BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is a member of the New Progressive Party(NPP) and a former legislator.In 2002, the NPP's main rival, the Popular Democratic Party(PDP), controlled the Puerto Rican government.On June 20, 2002, after learning that a government agency, the Office of the Women's Advocate (OWA), was not displaying the American flag alongside the Puerto Rican flag, the plaintiff joined a group of NPP adherents who marched, flag in hand, to the OWA's headquarters in an effort to rectify the situation.The marchers were denied entry when they reached their destination.Carlos Pesquera, then the president of the NPP, met with OWA representatives to explain the group's objective.Pesquera's entourage waited outside in hopes that they would be allowed to enter the building and hoist the American flag.Over the course of the afternoon, the large crowd attracted attention from both the media and the police.

After many hours, the doors to the OWA's headquarters were finally unlocked.The plaintiff claims that she was swept inside when the crowd rushed to enter the ground-level vestibule.The influx did not proceed very far; OWA personnel used physical force to prevent the marchers from ascending the stairs to the reception area (where they wished to place the flag).

Throughout, the plaintiff remained on the ground floor, seeking refuge in a side stairwell.While waiting for the frenzy to abate, she grabbed a man to prevent him from climbing over peoples' heads as he attempted to ascend the staircase.The man (later identified as an OWA hierarch) turned and struck her.The plaintiff subsequently left the building.

No one was arrested or charged on the date of the incident.In its aftermath, however, the Puerto Rico Department of Justice appointed an independent prosecutor(the Prosecutor).The Prosecutor secured affidavits stating that the plaintiff had (i) directed threatening gestures at OWA officials while awaiting ingress to the building and (ii) used physical force against an OWA official once she was inside.Armed with these affidavits, the Prosecutor filed criminal charges against the plaintiff under the Riot Act.The Prosecutor charged several other prominent NPP members for their roles in the incident.No charges were lodged against anyone from the OWA.

On February 6, 2003, a local court dismissed the charges against the plaintiff for want of probable cause.Later, however, the court agreed to reconsider its decision and scheduled a hearing for March 19, 2003.Shortly before the appointed date, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.In that action, she sought to enjoin the pending prosecution and to secure a declaration of the Riot Act's unconstitutionality.

At this point, a few words of explanation are in order.The Riot Act defines the offense with which the plaintiff was charged as "[a] use of force or violence to disturb the public peace, or any threat to use such force or violence," so long as that act is "accompanied by immediate power of execution" and is carried out "by two (2) or more persons, acting together and without authority of law."P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4522.The plaintiff's constitutional challenge to this statute has two facets.First, she attacks the Riot Act on the ground that the government was using it selectively to prosecute NPP partisans for their lawful exercise of First Amendment freedoms.Second, she alleges that the Riot Act, on its face, is unconstitutionally vague, overly broad, and incompatible with Fourteenth Amendment protections (e.g., due process and equal protection).In this regard, the plaintiff complains that the Riot Act neither specifies what behavior constitutes a disturbance of the peace nor limits violations to those situations in which the interdicted conduct presents a clear and present danger of actual injury.

The defendants, government officials sued in their representative capacities, moved to dismiss the action based on Younger abstention principles.SeeYounger v. Harris,401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669(1971).The district court prudently stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution.That case terminated on March 25, 2003, when the local court reaffirmed its earlier dismissal of the charges against the plaintiff for want of probable cause.

In short order, the district court jettisoned the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief as moot.The court simultaneously denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the federal action on Younger grounds.Neither of these determinations is at issue in this appeal.

On April 22, 2003, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on her declaratory judgment claim.She argued that she retained a personal stake in the matter because, as an active NPP member, she intended to continue participating in activities critical of the PDP-controlled administration.Specifically, she explained that she planned to participate in the NPP's upcoming "march of indignation" and to continue exercising her rights of peaceful assembly and vocal protest.She worried that these activities might subject her to selective prosecution under the allegedly vague and overbroad language of the Riot Act.She also worried that her fear of future prosecution might, in turn, chill the free exercise of her First Amendment rights.

In response, the Secretary of Justice (the sole remaining defendant) cross-moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the entire case had become moot when the criminal charges were squelched.On March 31, 2005, the district court granted the defendant's motion.The court cited the following uncontested facts: (i) the criminal charges against the plaintiff had been dismissed; (ii) a general election had intervened and a new administration (albeit one headed by a different PDP governor) was in power; (iii)the plaintiff's term of office had expired and she was no longer an elected official; and (iv) the other NPP leaders who had been charged under the Riot Act in connection with the flag incident had all been acquitted in a highly publicized trial.SeeRamírez,389 F.Supp.2d at 146-47.The court found that these changed circumstances rendered it "improbable that the Puerto Rico Department of Justice[would] once again expose itself to public embarrassment and ridicule by selectively prosecuting public officials under the Riot Act for voicing their differences with the government."Id. at 147.Although it dismissed all that remained of the action, the court did not undertake separate analyses of the plaintiff's as-applied and facial challenges.This timely appeal ensued.²

II.ANALYSIS

We review the district court's mootness determination de novo, accepting as true the material factual allegations contained in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor.SeeN.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner,99 F.3d 8, 12(1st Cir.1996).

It is beyond dispute that when a litigant wishes to pursue a claim in a federal court, justiciability principles require the existence of an actual case or controversy.SeeU.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1;see alsoAllen v. Wright,468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556(1984);Osediacz v. City of Cranston,414 F.3d 136, 139(1st Cir.2005).To satisfy the case or controversy criterion, the party alleging the existence of jurisdiction (normally, the plaintiff) must possess a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675(1983).This requirement "subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate."Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp.,494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400(1990).

The doctrine of standing measures whether a plaintiff has satisfied the "personal stake" requirement at the commencement of an action.SeeBaker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663(1962).Thereafter, the doctrine of mootness measures whether the plaintiff's interest remains sufficient to justify continuing federal jurisdiction.SeeU.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63...