Ramirez v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 17 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-376-J-39JRK |
| Parties | BENITO RAMIREZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Benito Ramirez maintains in his Second Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 7) that he has been convicted in violation of his constitutional rights. The record shows he was convicted of first degree murder and is serving a life sentence. He challenges this 2012 Duval County conviction through his pro se Petition and raises seven grounds for post conviction relief. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. 16) addressing the seven grounds.1 Petitioner opted to file a Reply (Doc. 35). See Order (Doc. 11).
The seven grounds of the Petition are: (1) the Florida standard jury instruction on reasonable doubt and burden of proof is unconstitutional due to the probability that the jurors misunderstood the instructions, likely employing a lesser degree of certainty to find the Defendant guilty of murder, in violation of Petitioner's right to due process of law; (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to ensure Petitioner was able to communicate with his counsel during trial by either obtaining Spanish speaking counsel or an interpreter for trial; (3) the involuntariness of Petitioner's statement during an interrogation based on the detective's failure to give Petitioner the time or opportunity to read the Miranda form, Petitioner could not read the form because it was written in English and he did not read or write English at that time, and the detective's insistence that Petitioner sign the form, although Petitioner did not understand its contents; (4) the involuntariness of Petitioner's statement during an interrogation based on the detective's actions of reading the Miranda form in Spanish, but changing the words, obfuscating the clarity of the warnings and resulting in an involuntary act; (5) the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to provide Petitioner with an interpreter so as to adequately advise Petitioner concerning his right to testify, resulting in Petitioner electing to testify without making a conscious choice to do so; (6)the denial of Petitioner's confrontation rights through the trial court's restriction of cross examination of Detective Bodine regarding his conversations with Jacob Smock and Nicholas Doland; and (7) the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the claim on appeal that the jury was given an erroneous instruction and not given a corrective instruction on manslaughter, eliminating the intent element.
In this case, the pertinent facts are fully developed in the record or the record otherwise precludes habeas relief; therefore, the Court is able to "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004). Thus, the Court will not conduct an evidentiary hearing as the record refutes the asserted factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Since Petitioner has not met the burden to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing, the Court will address the Petition without further factual development. Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1120 (2012).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). "AEDPA limits the scope of federal habeas review of state court judgments[.]" Pittman v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 871 F.3d 1231, 1243 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 102 (2018). This narrow scope of review under AEDPA provides for habeas relief only if there are extreme malfunctions, certainly not to be used as a means to correct state court errors. Ledford, 818 F.3d at 642 (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). "Under AEDPA, error is not enough; even clear error is not enough." Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 900 F.3d 1330, 1344 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Indeed, federal courts may grant habeas relief:
only when the adjudication of a federal constitutional claim "on the merits in State court proceedings" either "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "This narrow evaluation is highly deferential, for a state court's determination that a claim lacksmerit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Morrow v. Warden, 886 F.3d 1138, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)). The decision of a state court is "contrary to" federal law only if it "contradicts the United States Supreme Court on a settled question of law or holds differently than did that Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Cummings v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1355 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The decision of a state court "involves an unreasonable application of federal law if it identifies the correct governing legal principle as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case, unreasonably extends the principle to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend it to a new context where it should apply." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The question ... is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was correct but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 898 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).
This Court will not "flyspeck the state court order or grade it." Id. at 1345. Instead, the Court is charged with reviewing the conclusions of the state court, deferring to the state court decisions, and granting habeas relief only if the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involvedan unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Morrow v. Warden, 886 F.3d 1138, 1147 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 19, 2018) (No. 18-6409). Additionally, "[t]his presumption of correctness applies equally to factual determinations made by the state trial and appellate courts." Pope v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1233 (2013).
In this regard:
"Deciding whether a state court's decision 'involved' an unreasonable application of federal law or 'was based on' an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal habeas court to 'train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims.'" Wilson v. Sellers, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1191-92, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2018) (). The Supreme Court recently held that, when the relevant state court decision is not accompanied by a reasoned opinion explaining why relief was denied, "the federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale" and "presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Id. at 1192. "[T]he State may rebut the presumption by showing that theunexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision." Id.
Johnson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 737 F. App'x 438, 441 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
Bearing in mind this guidance from the Supreme Court, this Court undertakes its review of Petitioner's seven claims. If the last state court to decide a federal claim provides an explanation for its merits-based decision in a reasoned opinion, this Court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons, if they are reasonable. On the other hand, if the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied by a reasoned opinion, simply stating affirmed or denied, this Court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that provides relevant rationale. This Court presumes the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning as the lower court; however, the presumption is not irrebutable, as strong evidence may refute the presumption. See Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S.Ct. 1603, 1606 (2016) (per curiam). Thus, the state may rebut the presumption by showing the higher state court relied or most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court, "such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to...
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