Ramirez v. State

Decision Date26 October 1983
Docket NumberNo. PS518,PS518
PartiesPatrick RAMIREZ, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Patrick Ramirez, pro se.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jay Rodia, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHIELDS, Judge.

Patrick Ramirez (Ramirez) appeals pro se his convictions under I.C. 35-48-4-3 (Burns Code Ed., Repl.1979) of dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance. Ramirez raises the following issues:

1) whether the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the information for failure to comply with the agreement on detainers (Agreement), I.C. 35-2.1-2-4 (Burns Code Ed., Repl.1979) (repealed 1982); recodified as I.C. 35-33-10-4 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1982),

2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions;

3) whether the trial court committed fundamental error by ordering Ramirez to serve his sentences consecutively; and

4) whether the court erred in calculating his credit time for the days he spent confined awaiting trial sentencing.

On March 20, 1979, Ramirez was charged by information, Cause 424, with three counts of dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance, a class C felony. The incidents on which the charges were based occurred January 28, 1979, March 9, 1979, and March 12, 1979. Then, by a two-count information dated February 6, 1980, Ramirez was charged under Cause 470 with dealing in marijuana, a class D felony, on December 17, 1979 and December 21, 1979. This appeal concerns Cause 424.

The record reveals Ramirez was serving a sentence in March 1981 in the State of Michigan for dealing in cocaine. On March 16, 1981, the prosecuting attorney for the 62nd Judicial District, Howard County, Indiana mailed the warden of the State Prison of Southern Michigan certified copies of the two-count information in Cause 470, dealing in marijuana, requesting the information be filed as a detainer against Ramirez. On June 23, 1981, the prosecutor followed up by mailing an Agreement on Detainers Form V notifying the State Prison of Southern Michigan that Ramirez was charged in Howard Superior Court II with three counts of dealing in marijuana under Cause 424.

The Michigan warden notified Ramirez by Michigan Department of Corrections Agreement on Detainers Form I that an untried Howard County, Indiana information in two counts of dealing in marijuana had been brought to his attention by the Indiana prosecutor. After he was informed of the provisions of the interstate agreement on detainers, Ramirez signed a waiver form and voluntarily agreed to be returned to Howard County, Indiana to stand trial on two counts of dealing in marijuana.

I.

Ramirez' first issue presents two questions: 1) whether his presence in Indiana was obtained under the Agreement, I.C. 35-2.1-2-4, on the basis of Cause 424, three counts of dealing in a controlled substance, and 2) if not, what remedy exists for the State's failure to follow the provisions of the Agreement.

The Agreement is a uniform law enacted by the majority of the states and the federal government. 1 Its purpose is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges and detainers based on untried indictments and informations against prisoners. I.C. 35-2.1-2-4, Article 1. The Agreement provides a method by which an imprisoned individual may seek final disposition of the charges contained in a detainer filed against him by another jurisdiction. The Agreement also provides a method by which other jurisdictions may gain temporary custody of a prisoner to try him on outstanding charges for which a detainer has been filed.

The State's interest protected by the Agreement, having a simplified procedure for gaining temporary custody of defendants imprisoned in other jurisdictions, is obvious. The Agreement, however, also protects the interests of imprisoned defendants in "removing the difficulties in securing speedy trials" and removing "the uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation" when a prisoner's status is clouded by the existence of untried charges on which detainers have been lodged. I .C. 35-2.1-2-4, Article 1.

Pursuant to the Agreement, after a detainer is filed, 2 the jurisdiction which filed it may present a written request for temporary custody of the prisoner to appropriate authorities of the state in which the individual is incarcerated. The Agreement provides a thirty-day period shall pass after receipt of the request before the request may be honored. The Agreement further provides,

"[T]he appropriate authorities having custody of the prisoner shall, promptly upon receipt of the officer's written request notify the prisoner and the governor in writing that a request for temporary custody has been made and such notification shall describe the source and contents of said request. The authorities having custody of the prisoner shall also advise him in writing of his rights to counsel, to make representations to the governor withing thirty days, and to contest the legality of his delivery."

I.C. 35-2.1-2-4, Article 9(7).

By mandate of the United States Supreme Court, unless waived, the imprisoned defendant must be afforded an extradition-type hearing before the request for temporary custody is honored. Cuyler v. Adams, (1981) 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641. Further, upon request of the state in which the individual is incarcerated, the state requesting temporary custody is required to present a certified copy of the indictment, information, or complaint which forms the basis of the detainer. I.C. 35-2.1-2-4, Article 5(b)(2).

The State contends Ramirez' presence in Indiana was secured under the Agreement on both Cause 424, three counts of dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance and Cause 470, two counts of dealing in marijuana. We disagree.

The certified copy of the two-count information in Cause 470 transmitted to the Michigan authorities was undoubtedly sufficient to serve as a detainer as to that cause. The controversy involves the document subsequently transmitted which incorrectly described the outstanding charge as a three-count information for dealing in marijuana under Cause 424. This document was apparently understood by Michigan authorities to refer to the two-count dealing in marijuana information transmitted earlier. The record shows Ramirez was informed in writing of the following outstanding information against him: "Howard County, Indiana--two counts of delivery of marijuana; bench warrant." Record at 559. Further, there is evidence the Michigan authorities verbally informed Ramirez his return to Indiana was requested to stand trial on charges of dealing in Marijuana, a class D felony.

Based on this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could only conclude Ramirez' presence in Indiana on Cause 424, dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance, was secured outside the terms of the Agreement. The fact the Agreement on Detainers Form V transmitted to Michigan had typed upon it "Cause Number 424" is not sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Ramirez' contention on appeal, as in his motion, is the information in Cause 424 should be dismissed because of the State's violation of the provision of the Agreement providing:

"The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations of [or] complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for the prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction."

I.C. 35-2.1-2-4, Article 5(d). Therefore, Ramirez contends, because the State was unable under the Agreement to try him on a charge not forming the basis of a detainer or arising out of the same transaction, the information in Cause 424 must be dismissed and his conviction reversed.

The interpretation of this provision of the Agreement is an issue of first impression in Indiana. 3 For the purposes of this discussion, we assume, as Ramirez asserts, that the provision was included in the Agreement to protect imprisoned defendants in his position from unwittingly consenting to be returned to another jurisdiction for trial on minor charges only to be tried, once returned, on far more serious outstanding charges.

Nevertheless, there is no merit to Ramirez' argument the information must be dismissed. Jurisdiction over Ramirez' person was not defeated by the manner in which he was brought before the court to stand trial on the charges in Cause 424. The manner in which a defendant is brought before the court has no effect upon the court's jurisdiction over him. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Collins, (1952) 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 511, 96 L.Ed. 541 (footnote omitted).

"This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 [7 S.Ct. 225, 229, 30 L.Ed. 421], that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction'. No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases."

We acknowledge one of the purposes of the Agreement, affording imprisoned individuals certain statutory rights, is not served where a jurisdiction prosecutes an individual outside the Agreement. Nevertheless, we fail to see how the other avowed purpose of the Agreement, providing a simplified procedure whereby individuals imprisoned in one jurisdiction may be brought to trial on outstanding charges in another jurisdiction, would be served by dismissing the charge against Ramirez.

Although we do not countenance the State's failure to comply with the provisions of the Agreement as to Cause 424, the State's failure does not warrant dismissal of this case. See Brown v. District Court, (...

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