Ramirez v. United States, 17434.

• Decision Date: 15 April 1959
• Docket Number: No. 17434.,17434.
• Citation: 263 F.2d 385
• Parties: Sergio Ruvalcaba RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

263 F.2d 385 (1959)

Sergio Ruvalcaba RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 17434.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

February 18, 1959.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1959.

Hector Yznaga, Brownsville, Tex., for appellant.

Brian S. Odem, Asst. U. S. Atty., Brownsville, Tex., William B. Butler, U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BROWN and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-appellant was indicted for, and convicted on a trial before the court without a jury of, violating Sec. 4744(a) (2), Title 26, in that he transported and concealed approximately 24 pounds of marihuana without having paid the transfer tax.

Appealing from the judgment and sentence, he is here presenting a single question for decision. This is whether his motion to suppress and exclude evidence, of the marihuana and the circumstances of the seizure, as the product of an unreasonable and therefore a forbidden search and seizure, was incorrectly denied.

After a full hearing, the evidence on which was briefly but correctly summarized¹ by him, the district judge, declaring that the search was not unreasonable, thus correctly, we think stated his reasons for so concluding:

"As to the reasonableness of the search: Ramirez conceded that the immigration authorities had a right under 118 U.S.C.A. § 1357 to interrogate defendants as to their citizenship and to require the opening of the trunk for the purpose of seeing whether any alien was concealed therein. Defendant insisted, however, that when the trunk was opened and the officers could see that there was no alien concealed therein, their right to search further ended; that they had no right to search for contraband; that there was no probable cause to believe that customs, or any other offense was being committed. These contentions overlook the realities of the situation.

"The immigration officers were also acting as customs inspectors. The right of customs officers to search at points of entry are much broader and in a separate category from searches generally. King v. United States, 5 Cir., 258 F.2d 754, and cases there cited. In addition, I think the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that a customs offense was being committed even though the checking point was, of necessity, somewhat removed from the border. Defendants were nervous and evasive; they were reluctant to have the trunk of the automobile opened at all. While the result of the search cannot justify an arrest, the search here, in my opinion, was not unreasonable. Cf. Flores v. United States, 5 Cir., 234 F.2d 604; Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533."

Because the guiding principles have been fully stated and discussed in the cases, we do not further discuss them here but, adding to those cited by the district judge in support of his view the cases cited in the margin,² we order the judgment affirmed.

1 Immigration Border Patrol inspectors, who also were authorized to act as Customs officers, established a checking point on U. S. Highway 281, about four miles south of Fulfurrias and about 75 miles north of the Rio Grande River. Two main highways lead out of the Rio Grande Valley north and away from the border and ports of entry; (1) U. S. Highway 281, leading due north from Hidalgo, Texas, via Pharr and Edinburg; and (2) U. S. Highway 77, leading north out of Brownsville via Harlingen. Any other routes are generally through ranch country, fenced and locked. By the establishment of these checking points as far north as...