Ramirez v. United States Park Police

Decision Date01 February 2023
Docket Number22-cv-187 (CRC)
PartiesEDWIN RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES PARK POLICE, et al, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In the days following George Floyd's death in May 2020, racial justice protests sprang up across the country, including in Lafayette Square adjacent to the White House. Photojournalist Edwin Ramirez filmed the Lafayette Square demonstrations on behalf of two European-based news agencies. In this suit Ramirez alleges that he suffered injuries at the hands of law enforcement officers who responded to the protests. He sued three sets of defendants for violations of his civil and constitutional rights, and negligence: (1) the United States and the U.S. Park Police, a component of the National Park Service (“Federal Defendants); (2) the Arlington County Government and the Arlington County Police Department (“Arlington Defendants); and (3) the District of Columbia Government and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“D.C. Defendants). Ramirez has since voluntarily dismissed the D.C. Defendants. The Federal and Arlington Defendants now move to dismiss the claims against them. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant both motions and dismiss the case.

I. Background

The Court draws this factual background from Mr. Ramirez's complaint and, as it must on a motion to dismiss, assumes the truth of all well-pled allegations. See Sissel v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Ramirez recorded the Lafayette Square protests on the evening of May 31, 2020. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 14. While there, he alleges that both protestors and members of the press were subjected to excessive force by law enforcement, including “violence, rubber bullets, horns, gas, and other physical force” as police officers worked to “reclaim ground in the park.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 18, 22, 25. Ramirez recalls being trampled and shot by “five to seven rubber bullets.” Id. ¶ 37. Ramirez does not specify who harmed him or their governmental affiliation, but alleges generally that the U.S. Park Police, Arlington Police Department, and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department all took part in the violence. As a result of his injuries, Ramirez required knee surgery, counseling, and other medical treatment. Id. ¶ 40.

In January 2022, Ramirez filed a four-count complaint against the United States, the United States Park Police, the Arlington County Government,” the Arlington County Police Department, the District of Columbia, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department-but none of their officials or employees, either by name or as John Doe defendants. The complaint alleges (1) a conspiracy to interfere with Ramirez's civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (2) failure to prevent said conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (3) deprivation of civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) negligence under both common law and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346. Ramirez seeks three million dollars for his injuries, lost wages, pain, and suffering. Id. ¶ 83.

Ramirez voluntarily dismissed the D.C. Defendants. Pl.'s Mot. Dis., ECF 7 (Mar. 14, 2022); Min. Order (Mar. 15, 2022). The Federal Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims against them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (May 11, 2022) (“Fed. Mot.”). And the Arlington Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims against them for improper venue and failure to state a claim. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (Mar. 18, 2022) (“Arl. Mot.”).

II. Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requires “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court “must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. It also must “constru[e] the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006). That said, “conclusory statements” and “threadbare recitals of the elements” do not suffice. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

The Federal Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Fed. Mot. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion.

A. Civil Rights Claims

The Federal Defendants move to dismiss Ramirez's civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that those statutes do not waive federal sovereign immunity. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).

Section 1983 establishes a cause of action against persons who act under the color of state law to deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1985(3), meanwhile, prohibits conspiracies among two or more people to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, and section 1986 criminalizes knowingly failing to prevent such a conspiracy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986. As the Federal Defendants correctly assert, the United States and its agencies have not waived sovereign immunity with respect to any of those statutes. See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 245 n. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ([42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986], by their terms, do not apply to actions against the United States”), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987); Faller v. DOJ, Civ. A. No. 20-1597 (ABJ), 2021 WL 4243384, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2021) (holding that sections 1983, 1985 and 1986 do not waive federal sovereign immunity). Ramirez offers no law to the contrary.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Ramirez's claims against the Federal Defendants for violating his civil rights (§ 1983), conspiring to interfere with his civil rights (§ 1985(3)), and neglecting to prevent said conspiracy (§ 1986).

B. Negligence Claim

The only remaining claim against the Federal Defendants is Ramirez's negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).[1]Compl. ¶¶ 80-83. The FTCA permits suit against the federal government for allegedly negligent or wrongful conduct by its employees acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. But Ramirez's FTCA claim suffers from both jurisdictional and procedural flaws that require its dismissal.

1. Ramirez Cannot Sue the United States Park Police Under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

The United States Park Police is entitled to dismissal of Ramirez's FTCA claim because only the United States, and not its agencies, may be sued under that statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (“The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall be exclusive.”); see also Goddard v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343, 345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (affirming dismissal on same grounds); Coulibaly v. Kerry, 213 F.Supp.3d 93, 125 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing on same grounds). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Ramirez's negligence claims against the Park Police.

2. Exhaustion of FTCA Claim Against the United States

As to Ramirez's negligence claim against the United States itself, the Federal Defendants maintain that Ramirez failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. The FTCA bars plaintiffs from suing in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). The administrative process gives the accused agency an opportunity to investigate and evaluate the strength of the claim and determine if settlement is appropriate. See GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1987). To properly exhaust, an FTCA claimant must “first present[] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and have that claim denied by the agency in writing or remain unresolved for at least six months. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Filing an FTCA complaint with an agency not accused of the alleged wrongdoing does not meet a plaintiff's burden to administratively exhaust with the “appropriate” federal agency. See Norton v. United States, 530 F.Supp.3d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2021) (dismissing FTCA claim on exhaustion grounds because plaintiff filed it with an unrelated agency). Failure to properly exhaust warrants dismissal of the claim. Henderson v. Ratner, No. 10-5035, 2010 WL 2574175, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jun. 7, 2010) (per curiam).

Here Ramirez filed an FTCA administrative claim with the “White House Counsel.” Fed. Mot., Ex. A at 5 (Pl.'s SF 95). The United States asserts that the White House cannot be considered the “appropriate Federal agency for purposes of exhaustion because it is not alleged to have engaged in any wrongdoing in this case. Id. at 13-16. While the complaint alleges the conduct occurred near the White House, to the extent the “White House Counsel is an agency at all, the complaint does not identify any misconduct by the White House as an...

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