Ramirez v. Yates

• Decision Date: 10 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-15087.,07-15087.
• Citation: 571 F.3d 993
• Parties: Anthony RAMIREZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. YATES, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

571 F.3d 993

Anthony RAMIREZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. YATES, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-15087.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 8, 2009.

Filed July 10, 2009.

Maitreya Badami, San Francisco, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.

Juliet B. Haley, Office of the Attorney General of the State of California, San Francisco, CA, for the respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-03-01817-RMW.

Before: PROCTER HUG, JR., B. FLETCHER and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

Anthony Ramirez ("Ramirez") appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely, arguing that he is entitled to both statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and equitable tolling that together would render his petition timely filed; or, in the alternative, to the commencement of a new limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) because he was denied access to library materials, which new commencement would also render his petition timely filed. Rejecting his § 2244(d)(1)(B) claim, but concluding that the district court must undertake further factfinding to resolve whether Ramirez is entitled to equitable tolling, we vacate and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Ramirez was charged and convicted in a jury trial of residential burglary. He was sentenced to fifty-years-to-life in state prison on the basis of his three prior convictions for first degree burglary, one prior conviction for attempted first degree burglary, one prior conviction for attempted second degree burglary, and one prior conviction for the sale of narcotics. Direct appeals were unsuccessful, and the state court judgment became final on May 21, 2002.

Absent any tolling, the limitations period for a timely federal habeas corpus petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") would have expired on May 21, 2003. Ramirez filed his first federal habeas petition on June 16, 2004, or 391 days past the running of the untolled limitations period.

A range of dates are relevant to determining whether the limitations period was sufficiently tolled to render Ramirez's petition timely. The time line is as follows:

• On April 4, 2002, Ramirez delivered his first post-conviction state habeas petition. The petition was filed on April 9, 2002.¹

• On May 8, 2002, the California Superior Court denied Ramirez's first state habeas petition. Ramirez alleges he did not receive notice of the denial of his first habeas petition until either July 22, 2002 or August 1, 2002.

• On May 21, 2002, Ramirez's conviction became final.

• On December 28, 2002, Ramirez delivered his state coram nobis petition attacking a prior 1983 conviction used to enhance his sentence. The petition was filed on January 6, 2003.

• On February 5, 2003, the California Superior Court denied the coram nobis petition.

• On February 13, 2003, Ramirez delivered his appeal of the denial of the coram nobis petition. The appeal was filed on February 18, 2003.

• On February 26, 2003, Ramirez was attacked in prison and taken to the hospital, from which point forward he alleges he was denied access to his legal materials.

• On March 17, 2003, the California Court of Appeal dismissed Ramirez's appeal of the denial of his coram nobis petition as unappealable.

• On March 22, 2003, Ramirez was discharged from the infirmary and placed in protective administrative segregation, during which time he alleges he had no access to his legal materials.

• On April 14, 2003, Ramirez delivered a letter to the federal district court requesting an order that would require prison officials to return Ramirez's legal work to him. The letter was filed on April 24, 2003 and docketed by the court clerk as a "complaint."

• On July 11, 2003, Ramirez was given back his legal work.²

• On July 31, 2003, Ramirez delivered an extensive fifteen-page motion and four-page declaration in federal district court seeking equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period from the time of his attack forward. The motion was filed on August 5, 2003.

• On September 30, 2003, Ramirez filed a successful discovery motion in the California Superior Court.

• On October 1, 2003, Ramirez was released from administrative segregation and returned to the general prison population.

• On December 28, 2003, Ramirez filed a second state habeas petition in California Superior Court. The petition was filed on January 2, 2004 and remained pending in the California courts until March 2, 2005, when the California Supreme Court denied the petition.

• On June 14, 2004, Ramirez filed the present § 2254 federal habeas petition.³

• On September 28, 2006, the district court denied the petition as untimely, rejecting Ramirez's claims for equitable and statutory tolling; Ramirez timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the denial of a § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. See, e.g., Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.2005), amended by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2006). Underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA sets a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition seeking relief from a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This limitations period is subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir.2006). To receive equitable tolling, "`[t]he petitioner must establish two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.'" Bryant v. Arizona Atty. Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.2006)). The petitioner must additionally show that "`the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness,'" id. (quoting Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.2003)), and that the "`extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition on time,'" Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (quoting Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997)).

1. May 21, 2002 to August 1, 2002

Ramirez first argues he is entitled to equitable tolling during the 73-day period between May 21, 2002, when his state court conviction became final, and August 1, 2002, the latest date on which he was allegedly notified by the state courts of the denial of his state habeas petition.

We agree with our sister circuits that "a prisoner's lack of knowledge that the state courts have reached a final resolution of his case can provide grounds for equitable tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently in the matter." Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.), amended in part, 223 F.3d 797 (5th Cir.2000)); see also Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits "have concluded that prolonged delay by a state court in sending notice of a ruling that completes exhaustion of state court remedies can toll the AEDPA limitations period," and citing cases). To determine whether Ramirez is entitled to such tolling between May 21, 2002 and August 1, 2002, we remand to the district court to determine (1) on what date Ramirez actually received notice; (2) whether Ramirez acted diligently to obtain notice, Woodward, 263 F.3d at 1143; and (3) whether the alleged delay of notice caused the untimeliness of his filing and made a timely filing impossible, Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted).

2. February 26, 2003 to July 11, 2003

Ramirez claims equitable tolling for 135 days between February 26, 2003 (when he was attacked by a fellow inmate, taken to the hospital, and subsequently placed in administrative segregation and not allowed access to his legal materials) and July 11, 2003 (when Ramirez claims he regained access to his legal materials).

While the district court is correct that Ramirez did "not identify a single document in storage without which he could not file a habeas petition," we have previously held that a complete lack of access to a legal file may constitute an extraordinary circumstance, and that it is "unrealistic to expect a habeas petitioner to prepare and file a meaningful petition on his own within the limitations period without access to his legal file." Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1027-28 (9th Cir.2005) (internal alteration and quotations omitted). Because, according to Espinoza-Matthews, Ramirez's lack of access to his legal file may warrant equitable tolling during this period, we remand to the district court to determine whether: (1) the lack of access to his legal file made a timely filing impossible, and (2) Ramirez pursued his rights diligently.

3. July 11, 2003 to October 1, 2003

We have little difficulty determining that Ramirez is not entitled to equitable tolling from July 11, 2003 through October 1, 2003, simply because he remained in administrative segregation and had limited access to "the law library [and] copy machine." Ordinary prison limitations on Ramirez's access to the law library and copier (quite unlike the denial altogether of access to his personal legal papers) were neither "extraordinary" nor made it "impossible" for him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most common day-to-day security restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit the exception to swallow the rule—according to Ramirez's theory, AEDPA's limitations period would be tolled for the duration of any and every prisoner's stay in administrative segregation, and likely under a far broader range of circumstances as well.

Our conclusion here finds substantial support in the observation that during the same period of time Ramirez claims that he was "unable to prepare" his federal habeas...