Ramonett v. Industrial Commission
| Decision Date | 09 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-IC,1 |
| Citation | 558 P.2d 923,27 Ariz.App. 728 |
| Parties | David M. RAMONETT, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, Magma Copper Company, Respondent Employer, State Compensation Fund, Respondent Carrier. 1463. . Filed |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
The issue in this case is whether the petitioner employee's anxiety neurosis is a compensable result of his industrially related injury.
Petitioner, David M. Ramonett, had been employed three months as an electrician's helper underground when he accidentally pricked his finger on some wires, fainted, and went into convulsions. He recovered with seemingly nothing more major than a slightly cut finger and a minor head laceration which he sustained when he fell, but because of the fainting and convulsions he embarked on a series of medical tests. It was feared he might have epilepsy. The tests eventually led to a diagnosis of 'vasovagal bradycardia', a condition which would cause slowing of petitioner's heart-beat, fainting, and seizures, if he sustained even a minor injury. The exact medical etiology of vasovagal bradycardia is unknown; painful physical or mental stimuli seem to bring on the attacks. There is no contention that the condition itself is in any way work related.
Petitioner was dismissed by his employer because his tendency to faint made him dangerous to himself and his co-workers in his type of employment.
The discovery that he had this physical condition, coupled with the dismissal from employment and its resulting financial problems, led to a loss of self-esteem and the development of an anxiety neurosis, which petitioner claims is compensable as a result of the industrial injury. To support this contention petitioner constructs a causal chain: if not for the accident, however minor, he would not have fainted; had he not fainted, his underlying condition of vasovagal bradycardia would not have been discovered; had the underlying condition not been discovered, he would not have been dismissed from employment and so not suffered financial problems; without the anxiety and loss of self-esteem evoked by his physical, employment, and financial problems petitioner would not have developed his disabling anxiety neurosis.
To support this causal chain petitioner relies on testimony by a neurologist, Dr. Masland, who felt that the industrial episode was 'contributory' to the anxiety, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Schorsch, who testified that the industrial episode was 'a precipitant or stimulus to his loss of self-esteem and his following anxiety.'
The hearing officer, however, denied compensation because he found that the only function played by the industrial episode was to focus attention on the petitioner's physical condition. The hearing officer therefore found that the compensable effects of the industrial accident were limited to the minor finger and head injuries.
If the industrial episode, however minor, is in any meaningful way a contributing cause of the petitioner's mental condition, then treatment for this mental condition should be covered under workmen's compensation. It is well established in the law that the industrial accident does not have to be the sole cause of an injurious result, it is sufficient if it can be shown to be 'a producing cause'. Nelson v. Industrial Commission, 24 Ariz.App. 94, at 96, 536 P.2d 215 at 217 (1975). Petitioner's predisposition toward his mental condition also would not defeat his claim; the employer 'takes his employees as he finds them', Tatman v. Provincial Homes, 94 Ariz. 165, 382 P.2d 573 (1963), in mental as well as physical condition. Arizona has allowed recovery for mental disability if it is caused, precipitated, or aggravated by an industrial incident. Tatman v. Provincial Homes, supra, (fall from 15 foot scaffold, precipitating preexisting mental instability); Murray v. Industrial Commission, 87 Ariz. 190, 349 P.2d 627 (1960) (); Brock v. Industrial Commission, 15 Ariz.App. 95, 486 P.2d 207 (1971), (preexisting depressive anxiety and manic-depression aggravated by incident in which truck driver caused death of pedestrian). However, the industrial incident must in some way 'produce' the injurious result. As stated in Murray, supra:
'The injury need not be the sole cause of disability, if it is a Producing cause.' (Emphasis added.) 87 Ariz. at 199, 349 P.2d at 633
'In legal contemplation, if an injury, operating on an existing bodily condition or pre-disposition, Produces a further injurious result, that result is caused by the injury.' (Emphasis added). 87 Ariz. at 199, 349 P.2d at 633
There is no contention in this case that petitioner's industrial accident had any aggravating effect on his underlying vasovagal bradycardia, nor that the accident itself caused his unemployment. The only role played by the accident was to focus attention--to initiate the investigation which eventually diagnosed the problem.
There was undisputed testimony that, while the precise stimuli, physical or mental, which will start a vasovagal bradycardia attack are unknown, petitioner had suffered similar attacks before the industrial episode and continued to experience similar fainting problems 'every week' after the episode. The stimulating events seem to be so minor that it is not probable that petition...
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