Ramont K., In re

• Decision Date: 01 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 102,102
• Citation: 505 A.2d 507,305 Md. 482
• Parties: In re RAMONT K. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 482

305 Md. 482

505 A.2d 507

In re RAMONT K.

No. 102, Sept. Term, 1985.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 6, 1986.

David L. Addison, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Ronald M. Levitan, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (retired), Specially Assigned.

SMITH, Judge.

We shall here hold that a grandmother does not come within the term "parent" as used in Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) § 3-829, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, pertaining to restitution on behalf of children involved in certain delinquent acts. Hence, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The facts are not in dispute. In fact, in the Court of Special Appeals the parties filed a statement of the case pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Rule 1026(e). The appellant, Darnzella Stewart, is the grandmother of Ramont K. She has reared him since he was three years old. Both of his parents are deceased. Ramont was found to be a delinquent on the basis of an assault. The State claimed restitution in the amount of $455 on behalf of the victim pursuant to the provisions of § 3-829. The juvenile master found Mrs. Stewart was not a parent within the meaning of the statute. The State excepted. The then juvenile judge filed an opinion finding the grandmother to be a parent and remanded the case to the master. He relied upon our decision in In Re: James D., 295 Md. 314, 455 A.2d 966 (1983). The master was not convinced but recognized the determination. He then recommended restitution in the amount of $45. Exceptions were filed before the successor juvenile judge who overruled the exceptions and ordered restitution. An appeal to the Court of Special Appeals followed. We issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion prior to hearing in the intermediate appellate court in order that we might address the statutory issue here involved.

Section 3-829 provides in pertinent part:

"(a) The court may enter a judgment of restitution against the parent of a child, or the child in any case in which the court finds a child has committed a delinquent act and during the commission of that delinquent act has:

"(1) Stolen, damaged, or destroyed the property of another;

"(2) Inflicted personal injury on another, requiring the injured person to incur medical, dental, hospital, or funeral expenses."

In City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283, 477 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1984), we repeated a number of the rules for statutory construction set forth in Police Comm'r. v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418-19, 379 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (1977). We summarize the rules pertinent to this controversy. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent. In determining that intent, the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. A court may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form. The legislative body is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law. Finally, absent a clear indication to the contrary, a statute, if reasonably possible, is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.

In James D., 295 Md. 314, 455 A.2d 966, a constitutional attack was mounted on § 3-829. In that instance the juvenile in question was under commitment to "the Juvenile Services Administration and the Montgomery County Board of Education" for placement at a particular school at the time he broke into and set fire to a model home. He escaped from that facility and was absent without leave at the time of the incident. He had no contact with his mother and father from the time of his escape until his arrest for the incident. An order of restitution was entered against his parents.

We began our analysis in that case by noting that at common law parents were generally not liable for the tortious acts of their children unless they had directed, encouraged, or ratified the child's act by accepting benefits from such act, citing Lanterman v. Wilson, 277 Md. 364, 354 A.2d 432 (1976); Kerrigan v. Carroll, 168 Md. 682, 179 A. 53 (1935); and Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 A. 645 (1922). We pointed out that we traced the history of § 3-829 from the enactment of Ch. 151 of the Acts of 1955, applicable only to Montgomery County, on down to the then present time in In Re John H., 293 Md. 295, 300-01, 443 A.2d 594, 596-97 (1982). We reviewed cases from around the country that had considered the issue of constitutionality of statutes similar to § 3-829. We noted that in Piscataway Tp. Bd. of Ed. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 431 A.2d 799, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025, 102 S.Ct. 560, 70 L.Ed.2d 470 (1981), the New Jersey court "construe[d] the statute more narrowly than its literal wording," and held that there could be no claim against parents under the statute absent a showing "that the parents charged with liability had legal custody and control of the pupil at the time of his unlawful conduct."

We pointed out that where a statute is subject to two constructions, one of which will result in the legality and effectiveness of the statutory provisions being construed and the other of which might make it illegal and nugatory, courts will prefer the construction which will result in its legality and effectiveness. We further pointed out that statutes are construed so as to avoid a conflict with the Constitution whenever that course is reasonably possible. We then said:

"We note that in statutes of five states, Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming, no liability is placed on a father or mother where the juvenile is in the custody of others, and that New Jersey by statutory construction has reached a similar result. The term 'parent' is commonly understood to mean a father or a mother, but Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1947) is authority for the fact that the term 'is sometimes used popularly and in statutes to include persons standing in loco parentis other than the natural parents.' In fact, an earlier edition (1930) goes on to add 'as in Lord Campbell's Act, where it is defined to include father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepfather, or stepmother ....' Problems of constitutionality would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Maryland Declaration of Rights Art. 24 were we to interpret the statute here as applying to a father or a mother who did not have actual custody and control over a child at the time of the act in question. Accordingly, we prefer to follow the lead of the New Jersey court and 'take this opportunity to construe the statute more narrowly than its literal wording.' We hold that the General Assembly when it enacted this law could not have intended to place liability upon a mother or a father for an act of the child committed while in the custody of the State." 295 Md. at 327-28, 455 A.2d at 972.

Our reference to the definition in Webster pertaining to persons standing in loco parentis other than the natural parents and the further reference to the term "parent" in Lord Campbell's Act as including grandfather and grandmother was seized upon by the first juvenile judge. In fact, he said, "In...