Ramos v. Armstrong
| Decision Date | 17 November 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 72--147,72--147 |
| Parties | Albert RAMOS and Robert Martel, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Dallas ARMSTRONG and Thomas Nielsen, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Franklin S. Wallace, Rock Island, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Robert J. Noe, Moline, for defendants-appellees.
Albert Ramos and Robert Martel, the plaintiffs, filed a complaint against Dallas Armstrong and Thomas Nielsen, the defendants, wherein it was alleged that the defendants as police officers arrested them without probable or reasonable cause and then unlawfully struck and injured them. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiffs were later tried by the circuit court of Rock Island County and found not guilty on the charges of aggravated battery and resisting or obstructing a peace officer. The complaint charges the defendants with false arrest, malicious prosecution, battery and prays for an award of monetary damages.
The complaint also sets forth that in compliance with the statute regarding notices to municipal corporations that notice was served upon the defendants, the city clerk and city attorneys for the cities of East Moline and Moline. The notice was signed on behalf of the plaintiffs by their attorneys and listed the address and phone number of said attorneys. The notice did not list the address of the plaintiffs. Based upon this omission the trial court found the notice to be defective and dismissed the plaintiffs' action. This appeal stems from the order of dismissal.
The precise issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court was correct in dismissing the plaintiffs' action because the notices given failed to include all statutory elements, to-wit, the plaintiffs' address as required by Chapter 85, Section 8--102, Illinois Revised Statutes.
In order to determine this issue we must first direct our attention to the applicable statutes which are as follows:
'Within 6 months from the date that the injury or cause of action, referred to in Sections 8--102 and 8--103, was received or accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil action for damages on account of such injury against a local public entity, or against any of its employees whose act or omission committed while acting in the scope of his employment as such employee caused the injury, must personally serve in the Office of the Secretary or Clerk, as the case may be, for the entity against whom or against whose employee the action is contemplated a written statement, signed by himself, his agent or attorney, giving the name of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location where the accident occurred, the general nature of the accident, the name and address of the attending physician, if any, * * * (Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 85, Sec. 8--102.)
'If the notice under Section 8--102 is not served as provided therein, any such civil action commenced against a local public entity, or against any of its employees whose act or omission committed while acting in the scope of his employment as such employee caused the injury, shall be dismissed and the person to whom such cause of injury accrued shall be forever barred from further suing.' (Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 85, Sec. 8--103.)
The plaintiffs stress the fact that their complaint was directed against the defendants individually and not against any municipality and therefore strict compliance with the 'notice' statute is not essential. The plaintiffs' reasoning in support of this contention is that the defendants were directly involved in the incident which was the subject of the complaint and therefore had full knowledge of all facts which were necessary to effect a defense or settlement. They also argue that the names, addresses, and phone numbers of their attorneys were listed who could well have been contacted for the purpose of obtaining requisite information. The plaintiffs cite the case of King v. Johnson, 47 Ill.2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874, wherein it is stated that the purpose of the statute involved is to furnish timely notice of injury so that there can be an investigation and prompt settlement of meritorious claims. That the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants individually and not against a municipality we hold to be of no consequence since the statute specifically provides:
'* * * (a) local public entity, or * * * Any of its employees whose act or omission committed while acting in the scope of his employment as such employee caused the injury * * * must personally serve * * *.' (Ch. 85, Sec. 8--102, Ill.Rev.Stat.)
We believe that the statute is crystal clear and we would be engaging in a distortion of it to hold that any of its requirements were waived because the defendants served were individuals rather than a municipality. In the case...
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Mui v. Dietz
...in notice). And the failure to include the plaintiff's address in the notice was also held to violate § 8-102. Ramos v. Armstrong, 8 Ill.App.3d 503, 289 N.E.2d 709 (1972). As that court the courts of Illinois have traditionally held that statutes requiring the giving of notice to municipali......
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