Ramos v. C. Ortiz Corp.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CV No. 15-980 MV/CG |
| Parties | REFUGIO RAMOS, Plaintiff, v. C. ORTIZ CORP., FOAM AMERICA, INC., GREAT NORTHERN BUILDING PRODUCTS, GREAT NORTHERN HOLDING, LLC, REEVES ROOFING EQUIPMENT CO., INC., REEVES ROOFING COMPANY, LLC, and NOVA GROUP HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion to Remand ("Motion to Remand"), (Doc. 14), filed November 23, 2015; Defendant C. Ortiz[ ] Corp[.]'s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand ("Response"), (Doc. 16), filed December 7, 2015; Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 14) ("Reply"), (Doc. 21), filed December 22, 2015; and Defendant C. Ortiz[ ] Corp[.]'s Surreply to Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. 21) ("Surreply"), Doc. 32), filed January 20, 2016. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Opposed Motion to Stay Ruling on Defendant C. Ortiz Corp.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), Pending the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand ("Motion to Stay"), (Doc. 13), filed November 23, 2015, and Defendant C. Ortiz[ ] Corp[.]'s Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Ruling on Defendant C. Ortiz Corp.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7), Pending the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, (Doc. 17), filed December 7, 2015.1
United States District Judge Martha Vazquez referred Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Motion to Stay to Magistrate Judge Carmen E. Garza to perform legal analysis and recommend an ultimate disposition of the case. (Doc. 23). Because Defendant's Notice of Removal was timely and any other procedural defect has been cured, and because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand be DENIED. The Court further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay be DENIED AS MOOT.
On August 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Original Complaint for Personal Injuries (the "Complaint"), (Doc. 1-1 at 2-13), in the Third Judicial District Court in Dona Ana County, New Mexico. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered severe injuries while working as a master roofer for Defendant C. Ortiz Corp., and alleges claims against several defendants. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff asserts that the defendants' intentional and negligent conduct proximately caused his injuries, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 4-8).
The state court record reflects that Defendant C. Ortiz Corp. was served with the Complaint on September 23, 2015. Defendant Foam America appeared and answeredthe state court action on September 25, 2015. The remaining defendants had not yet appeared or otherwise entered the suit.2
On October 29, 2015, Defendants C. Ortiz Corp. and Foam America ("Defendants") filed their Notice of Removal ("Notice of Removal"), (Doc. 1), on the basis of federal enclave jurisdiction. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Remand, arguing that this case should be remanded to state court on several procedural and jurisdictional grounds. (Doc. 14). Defendant C. Ortiz Corp. ("Defendant") responded in opposition, arguing that any procedural defects had been cured, and that this Court otherwise has jurisdiction over the case. (Doc. 16).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), a defendant may remove a state civil action "to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending," if the federal district court has original jurisdiction over the matter. Given the federal court's role as a limited tribunal, there is a presumption against removal jurisdiction. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 1284, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995)). Indeed, "[r]emoval statutes are to be strictly construed, and all doubts are to be resolved against removal." Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982) (internal citations omitted). As a result, "[t]he removing party bears the burden of establishing the requirements for federal jurisdiction." Aranda v. Foamex Int'l, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1198 (D.N.M. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The removal statute requires that the notice of removal of a civil action be filed within thirty days after either: (1) "the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading;" or (2) if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, "the receipt of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." Id. at § 1446(b)(1), (3). A defect in the removal procedure or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is grounds for remanding the case to the State court from which is was removed. Id. at 1447(c).
Plaintiff argues that this case should be remanded to state court on several grounds. First, Plaintiff contends that the Notice of Removal filed on October 29, 2015, is procedurally defective, as it is untimely and does not contain a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon Defendants as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Second, Plaintiff maintains that this Court does not have original jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff's claims arise from New Mexico state law, and not the law of the United States. Finally, Plaintiff argues that his claims against Defendant arise under state workmens' compensation laws, and therefore may not be removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1445(c). (Doc. 14 at 1-2).
Defendant responds that this case was properly removed and thatPlaintiff's Motion to Remand should be denied. As to Plaintiff's procedural arguments, Defendant maintains that the Notice of Removal was timely filed, as it was filed within thirty days after receiving notice that this case was removable. (Doc. 16 at 4-7; Doc. 32). Defendant further argues that the failure to attach any state court records to the Notice of Removal was an inadvertent error and a technical defect, which is curable under Tenth Circuit precedent. (Id. at 7-8). As to Plaintiff's jurisdictional arguments, Defendant contends that the Court has original jurisdiction over this matter, as Plaintiff's claims arise from incidents occurring on a federal enclave. (Id. at 8-11). Finally, Defendant maintains that 28 U.S.C. 1445(c) does not preclude removal in this case, as Plaintiff's claims are grounded in negligence and intentional torts, rather that the New Mexico state workers' compensation laws. (Id. at 11-14).
Plaintiff also moves this Court to stay ruling on Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss"), (Doc. 7), until the Court rules on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. In response, Defendant states that it does not dispute that the Court may rule on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand before considering any other dispositive motions. Defendant further argues that, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking an extension of briefing deadlines for the Motion to Dismiss, that request should be denied.
Plaintiff's Motion to Stay, however, does not request, or even mention, an extension of briefing deadlines for Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Because of this, and because the Court will rule on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand before it considers Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as Plaintiff has requested, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Opposed Motion to Stay Ruling on Defendant C. Ortiz Corp.'s Motion toDismiss (Doc. 7), Pending the Court's Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, (Doc. 13), be DENIED AS MOOT. In the event Plaintiff would like to seek an extension of the briefing deadlines for Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, he should do so in an appropriate motion.
Plaintiff first argues that Defendant's Notice of Removal is procedurally defective, as it is untimely and did not include all papers required under 28 U.S.C. 1446(a). The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
Plaintiff first contends that Defendant's Notice of Removal is untimely. Plaintiff argues that, to be timely, a notice of removal must be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant of the initial pleading setting forth the claims for relief upon which the action is based. (Doc. 14 at 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a))). Plaintiff asserts that the state court record reflects that Defendant was served with Plaintiff's Complaint on September 23, 2015. Thus, Defendant's Notice of Removal, filed on October 29, 2015, was not filed within the thirty-day period.
Defendant responds that the Notice of Removal was timely filed, as it was filed within thirty days after receiving notice that this case was removable. (Doc. 16 at 4-8). Defendant maintains that this Circuit requires clear and unequivocal notice of removability from the initial pleading, or subsequent other paper, to trigger the thirty-day removal period. Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff's Complaint does not provide clear and unequivocal notice that the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred on White Sands Missile Range ("WSMR"), and because Defendant relies on this fact to establishfederal jurisdiction, the thirty-day period for removal did not begin to run upon service of the Complaint. Rather, Defendant argues, the thirty-day period was triggered by service of Plaintiff's Motion to...
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