Ramos v. Dejoy
| Decision Date | 31 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 20-1163 (PAD) |
| Parties | NILDA RAMOS Plaintiff, v. LOUIS DEJOY, in his official capacity as Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Plaintiff, an employee of the U.S. Postal Service, sued the Postmaster General of the United States in his official capacity claiming that she was discriminated and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e, et seq. (Docket No. 1).1 The Postmaster General contends the case should be dismissed because, among other things, plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies (Docket No. 6). Because plaintiff did not exhaust those remedies, the case must be, and is hereby DISMISSED.
Plaintiff, Nilda Ramos, is a postal carrier with the U.S. Postal Service in the Cupey Station, in Puerto Rico (Docket No. 1, ¶ 3). She alleges that on November 2, 2019, a co-worker "grabbed her buttocks when she passed near him;" her supervisor, Mrs. Awilda Rodríguez, took no action despite having been told of the incident; and when plaintiff inquired as to the cameras supposedlyinstalled in the work area, she was initially told they were not working but later was told that the video did not show any conclusive misconduct. Id. at ¶ 5.
On December 30, 2019, plaintiff filed an initial administrative complaint, stating that her supervisors, including Mrs. Rodríguez, had taken no action. Id. at ¶ 6.2 That same day, she completed Form 1221 and requested 40 hours of advanced sick leave, which she claims were approved. Id. at ¶ 8.3 On January 10, 2020, she got paid but not for the requested 40 hours. Id. She maintains that Mrs. Rodríguez knew that she "had made an administrative complaint against her and she knew [plaintiff] was going on vacation and denied her the right to have the 40 hours." Id.
On March 30, 2020, plaintiff initiated this action against the Postmaster General alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII (Docket No. 1, ¶ 2). On September 14, 2020, defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and or in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Docket Nos. 6 and 7). He asserted that while plaintiff initiated the administrative process by filing an informal complaint, she later failed to continue and complete the process (Docket No. 7, pp. 7-8). As support, he submitted as exhibits the declaration under penalty of perjury of Ms. Yvonne Sze, the Equal Employment Officer counselor and Alternative Dispute Resolution ("EEO ADR") specialist for the Northeast Area of the Postal Service, and a copy of the Notice of Right to File that Ms. Sze sent to plaintiff on March 13, 2020 (Docket Nos. 7-1 and 7-2).
The Notice of Right to File advised plaintiff, in detail, of her options regarding her claim and the course of action for each option (Docket No. 7-2). In the event plaintiff wished to move her case forward, she had to file a formal complaint through the EEO process. Id. To that end, she had to "complete, sign, and date PS Form 2579-A and PS Form 2565 and return them" to the National Equal Employment Opportunity Investigative Service Office ("NEEOSIO"). The Notice of Right to File was sent to plaintiff's address as well as to her attorney of record. Id.
On October 9, 2020, plaintiff responded to the dismissal request (Docket No. 9). She argued that the Complaint was timely filed because on February 10, 2020, she presented a retaliation claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which her counsel later sent to Ms. Sze and discussed with her. Id. From her perspective, this constituted a formal administrative complaint, given that Ms. Sze did not deny receipt of the claim. Id.4 On April 6, 2021, defendant answered the Complaint, reiterating plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Docket No. 14). On May 6, 2021, he filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings predicated on the substance of plaintiff's claims (Docket No. 19), which plaintiff opposed (Docket No. 23).
Defendant has challenged the Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6)) and 12(c). Rule 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which according to defendant is the situation in this case because plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies (Docket No. 7, p. 1). But the rule does not apply here, for "[T]itle VII's charge-filing requirement is a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of the courts." Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139S.Ct. 1843, 1850 (June 3, 2019); Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 182 (2nd Cir. 2001)(while weighty, the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional).
A motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the allegations, that is, whether the complaint raises a plausible entitlement to relief. See, Rodríguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps., 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir. 2014) (examining standard); Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013)(same). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in "the pleader's favor." Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 52-53. In its evaluation of the motion, the court may consider implications from documents attached to or fairly incorporated into the complaint, facts susceptible to judicial notice, and concessions in plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss. See, Nieto-Vicenty v. Valledor, 984 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R. 2013)(so stating).5 A motion under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed as if it were a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See, Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (). Dismissal is appropriate on the basis of Rule 12(b)(6).
Title VII precludes discrimination "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). The "because of . . . sex" requirement prohibits, among other things, sexual harassment. See, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)(discrimination based on sex includes sexual harassment). In addition, Title VIImakes it unlawful for the employer to retaliate against those who complain about discriminatory employment practices. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)( prohibition). The substantive aspect centers on preventing injury to individuals based on who they are, whereas the anti-retaliation facet looks to prevent harm to those based on their conduct. See, DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008)(articulating proposition).
As originally enacted in 1964, "Title VII did not apply to the federal government." Rodríguez v. United States, 852 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2017). This was accomplished by excluding the federal government from the definition of "employer." Id. As a result, each of the substantive provisions of Title VII prohibiting employment discrimination applied at that time only to non-government employers, including employment agencies, labor organizations, and various types of training programs. Id.
In 1972, Congress enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Title VII to extend its coverage to federal employees. See, Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 825-835 (1976)(examining amendment).6 Rather than simply amend the definition of "employer" to include the United States, "Congress created an entirely new section," Section 717(a), 86 Stat. at 111 (). Rodríguez, 852 F.3d at 77. The Section is specifically - and only - applicable to federal employment. Id. With the amendment, Congress intended to accord aggrieved federal applicants and employees the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under Title VII. Id.
With this in mind, an aggrieved federal employee may now file a Title VII action in federal district court. See, Vera v. McHugh, 622 F.3d 17, 29 (1st Cir. 2010)(so acknowledging)(quoting Brown, 425 U.S. at 832). Yet, prior to doing so, "the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against [her]." Vera, 622 F.3d at 29; Showalter v. Weinstein, 233 F.App'x 803, 804 (10th Cir. 2007)(federal employees who allege discrimination or retaliation as proscribed by Title VII must comply with specific administrative procedures to properly exhaust remedies before filing suit in federal court). A federal court will not entertain a federal employee's discrimination claim brought under Title VII "unless administrative remedies have first been exhausted." Rodríguez, 852 F.3d at 78.
The procedure to seek relief is not statutorily prescribed. See, Román-Martínez v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 1996)(discussing topic). Nonetheless, Title VII grants to the EEOC authority to "issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out" its enforcement responsibilities under the federal-employment section of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -16(b). Pursuant to this authority, the EEOC issued regulations setting forth the procedure to be followed in seeking EEO relief. This procedure must be carefully pursued. See, II Barbara T. Lindemann, Paul Grossman & C. Geoffrey, supra at p. 32-20 () (citing in part Brown, 425 U.S. at 833)).
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