Ramos v. Drews
| Decision Date | 16 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-CV-2556 |
| Parties | ARTURO RAMOS et al., Plaintiffs, v. OFFICER ROBERT DREWS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Horacio Vazques-Perez ("Perez") bought a house in the Village of Carpentersville, Illinois ("the Village" or "Carpentersville") and held a housewarming party on the night of May 26, 2012. Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Am. Rule 56.1 Stmt. Material Facts ( ) ¶ 110, ECF No. 312. Carpentersville police officer and defendant Donald Wells ("Wells") went to the home in response to a noise complaint. See id. ¶ 56 (partially disputed fact). The parties dispute nearly every important aspect of what happened next. Defendant Wells and defendant Robert Drews ("Drews") ultimately arrested Perez, plaintiff Arturo Ramos ("plaintiff Ramos"), and plaintiff Maria Rentaria ("Rentaria") and charged them variously with felony battery of a police officer and resisting arrest. See Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' L.R. 56.1(a)(3)(B) Am. R. 56.1 Stmt. Add'l Facts ( ) ¶¶ 1-3, ECF No. 309; see also 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i). Each pleaded guilty, with a plea agreement, to misdemeanor battery, see 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2), in February 2014. Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' ASAF ¶¶ 4-6.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in April 2014, alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case proceeded through extensive discovery and precipitated the filing of six amended complaints.
The court has before it defendants' motion for summary judgment and a motion made by plaintiffs to strike portions of defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of facts. Defendants primarily contend that plaintiffs' excessive force claims are barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because a favorable judgment here would imply the invalidity of their convictions. Much of the balance of the briefing raises allegations of skullduggery and litigation misconduct. Defendants ask the court to dismiss this action as a sanction for plaintiffs' alleged misconduct. For the following reasons, the court grants the motion for summary judgment in part and denies it in part.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "The underlying substantive law governs whether a factual dispute is material: 'irrelevant or unnecessary' factual disputes do not preclude summary judgment." Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In resolving summary judgment motions, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to," and all reasonable inferences from that evidence must be drawn in favor of, "the nonmoving party [but] only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007);Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016)).
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) (). After "a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must" go beyond the pleadings and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quotation omitted); see also Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169 () (citations and quotations omitted). Summary judgment is warranted when the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element of its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012).
Local Rule 56.1 creates a procedure for presenting facts that a party contends are material at summary judgment. Specifically, Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law." Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting L.R. 56.1(a)(3)). Each paragraph of the movant's facts must include "specific references to the affidavits, parts of therecord, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that paragraph." L.R. 56.1(a). The "[f]ailure to submit such a statement constitutes grounds for denial of the motion." Id. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving party to submit a response to each statement of fact provided by the movant, "including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). The nonmoving party may also present a separate statement of additional facts "consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C). "All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party." Id. Similarly, "[i]f additional material facts are submitted by the opposing party . . ., the moving party may submit a concise reply in the form prescribed in that section for a response." L.R. 56.1(a). If the movant fails to respond properly to the opposing party's statement of additional facts, those facts will be deemed admitted. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) allows "[a] party [to] object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." As this language makes clear, "[t]he evidence need not be admissible in form, but must be admissible in content" to be considered at summary judgment. Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 2014). Because the parties are in a better position to know what evidence can be produced in anadmissible form at trial, the court does not ordinarily raise objections to summary judgment exhibits on its own initiative. See Wheatley, 826 F.3d at 420; Olson, 750 F.3d at 714; Lockwood v. McMillan, 237 F. Supp. 3d 840, 848 n.3 (S.D. Ind. 2017) ().
Certain facts about the events of the night of May 26, 2012, are undisputed. Except where otherwise noted, the following recitation takes the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.
Plaintiff Perez had recently bought a house in Carpentersville and was holding a get together. Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' ASOF ¶ 110. Plaintiffs Ramos and Rentaria, who are married, attended the get together. Ramos Dep. 7:14-17, 11:5-12, ECF No. 300-28. Plaintiff Ramos had consumed at most "four" beers before the police arrived. Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' ASOF ¶ 112 (quoting Ramos Dep. 16:24). Defendant Wells went to the house in response to a noise complaint, though whether it was the first or second such complaint made that evening is unclear. See id. ¶ 56. Wells arrived at the home first. See id. ¶ 125. Drews arrived a bit later. Id. At least one other officer, defendant Ramos, was present, but plaintiffs have no complaint with his conduct. See id. ¶117.
Wells arrived at the home around 11:00 p.m. He saw three women standing at the corner of the house and asked to speak with the homeowner. Id. ¶ 57 (undisputed fact). "Immediately before the police arrived, plaintiff Ramos went to his car to retrieve a karaoke CD and walked to his car with a beer in his hand." Id. ¶ 112. He got out of his car and began walking toward the garage, still carrying a beer. Id. ¶ 113. For the most part, the parties' deposition testimony about what happened next diverges at this point.
Ramos testified that he did not at any time "resist arrest physically." Ramos Dep. 61:13-16. According to his deposition, he saw "the police arrive" as he was stepping out of his car with the CD. Id. at 13:4-21. He "had the CD in [his] pocket and had the beer in [his] hand" as he approached Wells. Id. at 15:8-9. Wells "became very angry and aggressive" and asked to speak with the homeowner. Id. at 16:13-14; see also id. at 16:8-19. Wells spotted Ramos approaching carrying a beer and demanded to know "who he was," asked for his identification, and "accused" him of driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 17:16-18:4. Ramos produced his identification and "tried to explain" that he had gone to his car to get a CD, but Wells "wouldn't let [Ramos] explain anything," called him "stupid," and "took [him] to the [police] car and arrested [him] right away." Id. at 18:11-18. In response to specific questioning, Ramos stated that he never...
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