Ramos v. Pierce
| Decision Date | 04 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | CV-22-01956-PHX-DJH |
| Parties | Thao Ramos, Plaintiff, v. Avery Brin Pierce, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Defendants Gina Pate Pierce and Stephen R. Pierce (collectively “Gina and Stephen”) have specially appeared to file a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27).[1] The Court must determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). For the following reasons, the Court grants Gina and Stephen's Motion.
This matter concerns a vehicle collision (the “Collision”) between Plaintiff Thao Ramos (“Plaintiff') and Defendant Avery Pierce (“Avery”) that occurred while Avery was driving a 2015 Silverado owned by Gina and Stephen, who are Avery's parents. (Doc. 1-3 at ¶¶ 11-14; 7 ¶¶ 11-14).
Gina and Stephen are married and reside in Wyoming. (Doc. 27-1 at 8, 12). They have three adult children: Avery, Cole, and Grant. (Docs. 27-1 at 19; Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 12).
Gina and Stephen own a vacation home in Arizona located at 10792 E. Sundance Trail Scottsdale, Arizona 85262 (the “Arizona Vacation Home”), which they purchased in May 2018. (Doc. 27-1 at 9, 13). According to Gina and Stephen, they or their children have visited the Arizona Vacation Home on eleven separate occasions from April 2019-April 2021. (Id. at 19-21).
Gina and Stephen also own a 2015 Silverado that is registered in Wyoming and has Wyoming license plates. (Id. at 10, 14). According to Gina and Stephen, they drove the 2015 Silverado to the Arizona Vacation Home in November 2019 and it remained there until the Collision occurred. (Doc. 27-1 at 21). Gina and Stephen permitted their children to drive the 2015 Silverado while it was in Arizona. (Id. at 22). Specifically, Avery was permitted to drive the 2015 Silverado from Arizona to California on the day of the Collision. (Id. at 24).
Gina and Stephen had paid for Avery's flight to Arizona in February 2021. (Doc. 27-1 at 24). Plaintiff and Avery were involved in the Collision on February 22, 2021, while Avery was using Gina and Stephen's 2015 Silverado with their permission. (Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 14-18). The Collision occurred while Avery “passed through Arizona on her way to visit a friend in Palm Springs, California.” (Doc. 27-1 at 10, 14). Plaintiff alleges Avery was “inattentive, failed to control her speed, failed to control her vehicle, and failed to make her left turn from the proper lane and lane position causing a collision with [Plaintiff's] motorcycle.” (Doc. 1-3 at ¶ 20).
Plaintiff brings claims against Avery under A.R.S. §§ 28-701(A), 28-751(2), 28-754(A), negligence, and negligence per se. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-26). She pursues recovery of medical expenses, general and economic damages. (Id. at ¶ A-F). Plaintiff also seeks to hold Gina and Stephen vicariously liable for Avery's actions under the family purpose doctrine. (Docs. 1-3 at ¶ 14-18; 27 at 2).
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over all defendants. Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990)). A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). When a defendant does so, “the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990); see Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)). “In resolving a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits and other materials submitted on the motion.” Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix Int'l, LLC, 198 F.Supp.3d 1127, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 123 (2014)). “[Conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff's] favor for purposes of deciding whether aprima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154.
“Where . . . there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002). Arizona exerts personal jurisdiction to the “maximum extent permitted by the Arizona Constitution and the United States Constitution.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); see also A. Uberti and C. v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Ariz. 1995). Therefore, the analysis of personal jurisdiction under Arizona law and federal law are the same. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the Due Process Clause, “[a]lthough a nonresident's physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the nonresident generally must have certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
The personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right and “there are a ‘variety of legal arrangements' by which a litigant may give ‘express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.'” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n. 14 (1985). Additionally, a court may assert general or specific jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997). General jurisdiction exists when the defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state, whereas specific jurisdiction exists when the controversy arises from or is related to the defendant's specific contact with the forum state. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). The “mere fact that [a defendant's] conduct affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State does not suffice to authorize jurisdiction.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 291. Where neither general nor specific jurisdiction exists, the court must dismiss the defendant under Rule 12(b)(2).
The Court must decide whether it has personal jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen. The parties do not dispute that the Court lacks general personal jurisdiction because Gina and Stephen are residents of Wyoming. (Doc. 27 at 8-9). Gina and Stephen argue personal jurisdiction cannot be established solely under the family purpose doctrine. They further contend they do not maintain sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona to create specific personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff argues Gina and Stephen consented to this Court's jurisdiction under the Arizona Nonresident Responsibility Act, A.R.S. § 28-2321 et seq., because they are liable under the family purpose doctrine. She further asserts they maintain sufficient minimum contacts with the forum by owning their Arizona Vacation Home, furnishing a vehicle to use in Arizona, and directing Avery's travel into Arizona. The Court will assess personal jurisdiction first under the family purpose doctrine, then under the Arizona Nonresident Responsibility Act, and conclude with the minimum contacts test.
First, Gina and Stephen argue the family purpose doctrine serves the basis for liability only, not personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 27 at 6-7) (citing Griffith v. Raper, 2009 WL 10709721, at *2 . Under Arizona's family purpose doctrine, “a head of household who furnishes or maintains a vehicle for the use, pleasure, and convenience of the family is liable for the negligence of family members who have the general authority to drive the vehicle while it is used for family purposes.” Brown v. Stogsdill, 682 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1984); see also Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d 380 (Ariz. 2011). However, “[t]he family purpose doctrine is substantive law that ascribes liability; it does not, and cannot, create personal jurisdiction over non-residents” on the basis of a non-resident defendant's negligent driving in the forum state. Griffith, 2009 WL 10709721 at *2. A court must first find that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum before determining liability under the family purpose doctrine. See id. at *2 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Avery is Gina and Stephen's daughter, that Gina or Stephen is the “head of family,” and that Avery was using the 2015 Silverado with Gina and Stephen's express or implied permission for a family purpose at the time of the Collision. (Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 12-18). Thus, Plaintiff sufficiently claims that Gina and Stephen are vicariously liable for Avery's actions under the family purpose doctrine. However, the Court agrees with Gina and Stephen's invocation of Griffith v. Raper. (See Doc. 27 at 7). Plaintiff cannot rely on the family purpose doctrine alone to confer personal jurisdiction over Gina and Stephen and must first establish they have minimum contacts with the forum. See Griffith, 2009 WL 10709721 at *2; see also Walden, 571 U.S. at 283.
Second the parties disagree on the role that a nonresident motorist act plays in a court's jurisdictional analysis. Arizona enacted its own version of a nonresident motorist act, which is titled the Nonresident Responsibility Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff argues Gina and Stephen consented to this Court's...
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