Ramos v. State
| Decision Date | 06 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 1282S477,1282S477 |
| Parties | Israel RAMOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Ricardo B. Casas, East Chicago, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Joseph N. Stevenson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant Ramos was charged by grand jury indictment with the crime of rape, a class B felony. After a jury trial he was convicted and sentenced to prison for a period of fourteen years. He asks that his conviction be reversed because of the introduction of evidence against him at trial in his absence and because the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
Appellant contends that the evidence serving to prove that the intercourse was compelled by force or imminent threat of force was insufficient to support the jury verdict. In determining this question we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility but look to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction will be affirmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Taking the evidence most favorable to the determination reached by the jury it reveals that at the time of the alleged offense the prosecuting witness Mary Camargo was living in an apartment with her small child, Victor Quintanilla, Darlene Castro and Alex Castile. She was acquainted with appellant through his association with Victor Quintanilla and Darlene Castro. He would sometimes drop by the apartment in the morning and ask to take Quintanilla to work, and at other times of the day to visit Darlene Castro. On one occasion prior to the alleged criminal attack he slept overnight in the apartment with Castro.
On July 24, 1979, Camargo was asleep alone in her bedroom between seven and eight in the morning. She heard someone knock at the window, and then the curtain and a mirror fell. She saw appellant standing outside. He said he would put the things back if she would let him in. She admitted him to the apartment through the door and he then replaced the curtain and mirror.
Upon completing this restoration appellant attempted to embrace Camargo, and she told him not to and moved away. According to her testimony he then said that he was not going to do anything, "but then got strong with me, and then I started fighting, and then I was pulling his hair and that, he told me I should never have done that." He also said that he was going to teach her a lesson. He then grabbed her arms and sat on top of her on the bed, and as she struggled and cried, he moved her dressing gown up, and forced her legs apart as she twisted to avoid him, and succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. He then withdrew, stationing himself so as to block her exit from the room, and in a short time repeated the process while she again tried to fight him off.
Following the second act of intercourse, appellant asked Camargo whether he could use her shower. She replied in the affirmative and when he was in the bathroom, she pulled on a pair of jeans and ran barefoot to a neighbor's house. She was observed upon arrival there to be nervous and hysterical. Her hair was messed and her face showed "dried tears." She immediately declared that "he" had made her do it. Ten minutes later she stated that appellant had raped her. A little more than an hour had elapsed since appellant had entered the apartment. At noon she went to her mother's house and the police were called. Camargo further testified that appellant had had no weapon, did not threaten her with bodily harm, but that she was in fear of being harmed by him. This ends the recitation of evidence tending to support the verdict.
A few days after the date of the alleged offense appellant gave a statement to the police in which he described this same encounter with Camargo. It corresponds to her version in most respects; however, he contended that she had enthusiastically engaged in caressing him and invited him to have sexual intercourse...
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