Ramsay v. Maryland American General Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. B--5514,B--5514
• Citation: Ramsay v. Maryland American General Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 19 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 27 (Tex. 1976)
• Parties: Rotha RAMSAY, Petitioner, v. MARYLAND AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 344

533 S.W.2d 344

Rotha RAMSAY, Petitioner, v. MARYLAND AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. B--5514.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Feb. 4, 1976.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1976.

Morrill & Patton, William R. Pemberton, Beeville, for petitioner.

Cullen, Carsner & Williams, Richard D. Cullen, Victoria, for respondent.

DANIEL, Justice.

The question on this appeal is whether the term 'commercial automobile' as used in an exclusionary clause of an insurance policy applies to a Navy-owned pickup truck being operated by a Navy civilian employee in the course of his employment on Navy housing units.

In a suit by Rotha Ramsay, widow of Scott Ramsay, against Maryland American General Insurance Company to recover death benefits under a policy which named her Navy-employed husband as the insured, the trial court rendered a summary judgment for the plaintiff. A divided court of civil appeals reversed and rendered for the insurance company defendant, holding that Ramsay's accidental death occurred while he was engaged in duties incident to the operation of a 'commercial automobile,' and that this excluded his death from converage under the policy. Tex.Civ.App., 526 S.W.2d 138. The plaintiff insisted that the term 'commercial automobile' in the policy exclusion did not apply to the Navy-owned vehicle being operated by her deceased husband solely for governmental and military purposes, or in the alternative that the term was so uncertain and ambiguous that she should recover under the rule of law which resolves such ambiguities in favor of the insured. We agree with plaintiff's alternative argument and reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are undisputed. They are fully and accurately detailed in the majority and dissenting opinions of the court of civil appeals, from which we borrow freely, and sometimes verbatim, in our summary of the facts and nature of the case.

On June 26, 1973, Scott Ramsay, while driving a pickup truck which was owned by the United States Navy, collided with an automobile on a public highway in Bee County. He sustained serious injury in the accident and died the same day. At the time Ramsay was a civil service employee of the United States Navy at Chase Field Naval Air Station in Bee County. He was classified as an air-conditioning mechanic. On the day of the accident he and Rosendo Gonzales, a co-worker, left Chase Field in the pickup truck and proceeded to Capehart, a government-owned housing project for Navy personnel stationed at Chase Field. There they installed a compressor on an air-conditioning unit in one of the houses. When the accident occurred they were returning to Chase Field to pick up another compressor, which was also to be installed on an air-conditioning unit at Capehart.

The pickup was used solely for transporting Navy crews, tools, equipment and supplies (pertaining to air-conditioning and heating installation, repairs and maintenance) from Chase Field to Capehart, and for work at Capehart. It was a one-half ton vehicle, and had a utility bed with cabinets on each side which contained parts, tools, equipment and supplies used to service and work on refringeration, air-conditioning and heating units. It was licensed by the United States Navy. Ramsay had a federal driver's license, and his use of the truck at the time of the accident was solely in connection with his governmental employment.

The main policy in this case is a 'Family Combination Automobile Policy' with liability coverages relating to damages arising out of the ownership and use of the Ramsays' personal automobiles. Attached to the policy was an endorsement (157P), entitled 'Automobile Death Indemnity, Total Disability and Specific Disability Benefits', which, among other provisions, insured Ramsay for $10,000 in the event he was killed in an accident and his death occurred 'directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury caused by accident and sustained by the insured while in or upon, or while entering into or alighting from, or through being struck by, an automobile . . .' The endorsement contained the following exclusion 'This insurance does not apply:

(a) to bodily injury or death sustained in the course of his occupation by any person while engaged (1) in duties incident to the operation, loading or unloading of, or as an assistant on, a public or livery conveyance or commercial automobile, or (2) in duties incident to the repair or servicing of automobiles . . ..'

The term 'automobile' is defined in the endorsement as 'a land motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer not operated on rails or crawler-treads,' and thus clearly includes a pickup truck. The controlling term, 'commercial automobile,' is not defined in the main policy or the endorsement. As heretofore indicated, the sole question presented in this appeal relates to whether the United States Navy-owned pickup is a 'commercial automobile' within the meaning of the above quoted exclusion. With no definition in the policy, we must first determine whether the term has a readily ascertainable meaning in the plain, ordinary and popular sense of the words themselves. When terms of an insurance policy are unambiguous, they are to be given their plain, ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the instrument itself shows that the terms have been used in a technical or different sense. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America v. Scott, 405 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.1966); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d 554 (1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 928, 74 S.Ct. 531, 98 L.Ed. 1081 (1954).

Both parties argue that the term 'commercial automobile' has a plain and generally accepted meaning, but they are at opposite poles as to what that meaning is. Neither has presented a Texas case that bears directly on the question, and we have found none. Neither have we been cited to any cases from other jurisdictions which apply the term as used in this policy exclusion to military or federally owned and operated vehicles. Some cases from other states have analogies helpful to the contentions of both parties, but none are directly in point.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Ramsay, resorts to the aid of dictionaries, as courts often do in seeking plain, ordinary and generally accepted meanings of undefined terms in insurance policies. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Scott, supra. Plaintiff insists that dictionary definitions of commerce, commercial, and commercial vehicles, relate to private transactions and transportation, and none mention 'government,' 'military,' or enterprises and operations conducted by governmental or military agencies. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged, 1971) is cited for the following definition of commercial: 'of, in, or relating to commerce . . . from the point of view of profit; having profit as the primary aim . . .' ¹ Most of the insurance cases from other states involving this same exclusionary provision apply this meaning of 'commercial.' In Peterick v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 9 Wash.App. 721, 514 P.2d 188 (1973), the exclusion was applied to a pickup in which the deceased was killed because he was engaged in the scope of his employment for Explosives Corporation of America, a private company. In stating the meaning of the term 'commercial automobile,' the court said:

'Although there is some authority that 'commercial automobile' means one utilized in the transporting of goods for sale or exchange, the more prevalent view is that an automobile is a 'commercial automobile' if it is a tool of commerce, used in a trade, business or enterprise that has financial profit as its primary aim.'

In Dilley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 249 Cal.App.2d 385, 57 Cal.Rptr. 195 (1967), the court said, 'The word commercial usually describes commerce, trade, business, industry or enterprise having financial profit as a primary aim.' It applied the exclusion because 'the truck upon which Dilley worked was an integral part of Southern California Edison's commercial enterprise, a basic tool used in building, expanding and servicing the transit of power over power lines.'

Mrs. Ramsay argues, and all members of the court of civil appeals agreed, that the Navy was not engaged in business or commerce or operating for a profit. She contends that under the plain meaning of 'commercial' the Navy pickup was not a vehicle owned or used at the time of the accident for any commercial enterprise or purpose; that it was Navy-owned, federally licensed, and driven by her husband as a full-time Navy civilian employee with a federal driver's license;...