Ramsay v. Pierre
Decision Date | 15 April 2003 |
Citation | 822 A.2d 85,2003 PA Super. 148 |
Parties | Rudolph RAMSAY, Appellee, v. Renold PIERRE, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Alex H. Pierre, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Virginia M. Dias, Glen Mills, for appellee.
Before: KLEIN and BOWES, JJ. and McEWEN, P.J.E.
¶ 1 Appellant, Renold Pierre, appeals from the judgment entered July 30, 2002, on the verdict of $3,595.68. We affirm.
¶ 2 The facts of record are as follows. On January 7, 1998, Appellant collided with a parked vehicle owned by Appellee, Rudolph Ramsay. Appellant was operating an uninsured vehicle owned by his wife, Lisette Voltaire. Appellee had parked his vehicle, a 1987 Buick Skylark, on the right shoulder of the southbound lane of Concourse Drive in Philadelphia County to await his daughter's return from jogging in a nearby park. While driving north on Concourse Drive, Appellant applied his breaks to avoid a collision with the vehicle in front of him, which caused his vehicle to veer to the left, cross the southbound lane, and collide with Appellee's vehicle. Appellee's vehicle sustained severe damage but neither party was injured physically.
¶ 3 This subrogation action was instituted by Appellee on behalf of his insurance carrier, Erie Insurance Group, ("Erie"). Appellee presented the following evidence in support of his claim. Erie declared the vehicle a total loss and paid Appellee $2,284.68 for the value of the vehicle. Appellee was responsible for a $500.00 deductible under the terms of the insurance policy. In addition, Erie paid Tri-state Auto Auction $811.00 for towing and storage of the vehicle. Based on this evidence, the trial court, sitting without a jury awarded Appellee a sum totaling $3,595.68. Appellant filed post-trial motions which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
¶ 4 On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in denying Appellant's preliminary objections in which he alleged a lack of personal jurisdiction by reason of improper service. Similarly, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment based on Appellee's failure to toll the statute of limitations. Finally, Appellant argues that the municipal court violated the doctrine of the law of the case by permitting alternate service after it previously dismissed the action.
¶ 5 Since Appellant's arguments all relate to the action's procedural posture, we begin with an overview of the procedural history. On January 4, 2000, three days before the running of the two-year statute of limitations,1 Appellee commenced this action in the Philadelphia Municipal Court by civil complaint for property damage. Appellee attempted, without success, to serve Appellant at 6323 Callowhill Street, Philadelphia, Appellant's last-known address. On February 15, 2000, the municipal court dismissed the action without prejudice for "No Service." Thereafter, on February 24, 2000, Appellee was informed by the U.S. Postmaster that Appellant resided at 7120 Penarth Avenue, Upper Darby, Pennsylvania. Appellee caused the matter to be re-listed for trial on May 24, 2000, and enlisted the assistance of a constable to attempt service upon Appellant at the new address; however, the constable returned service with the notation "Not Found." Again, the claim was dismissed for "No Service."
¶ 6 On July 26, 2000, Appellee made a second request for information from the U.S. Postmaster, and on August 2, 2000, he was informed that Appellant still received mail at 7120 Penarth Avenue. Thereafter, Appellee applied for alternate service of the complaint. On September 26, 2000, the Municipal Court granted alternate service of the complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested and by first class mail with a certificate of mailing. Finally, on October 5, 2000, Appellee caused alternate service upon Appellant at 7120 Penarth Avenue. On November 11, 2000, Appellee received a return receipt executed by Appellant.
¶ 7 Having effected service, the municipal court listed the matter for trial on December 8, 2000. Prior to trial, Appellant filed objections to the complaint wherein he asserted that the court was without personal jurisdiction for improper service and that Appellee failed to toll the statute of limitations. The municipal court overruled the objections. Similarly, the municipal court denied Appellant's subsequent motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that Appellee had failed to toll the statute of limitations. Following the April 10, 2001 trial, the municipal court entered an award for Appellee in the amount $2,876 plus court costs of $65.50.
¶ 8 Appellant filed a de novo appeal to the common pleas court. After Appellee filed a complaint with the trial court, Appellant filed preliminary objections raising improper service and the expiration of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the objections. Thereafter, Appellant filed new matter asserting, inter alia, the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Subsequently, Appellant moved for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and consequently, the parties tried the case as discussed supra.
¶ 9 Appellant's first argument concerns the trial court's denial of Appellant's preliminary objections challenging the court's personal jurisdiction based on the assertions that Appellee delayed serving the complaint beyond the statute of limitations2 and failed to deputize a Delaware County Sheriff to effect service.
¶ 10 We review the denial of preliminary objections challenging personal jurisdiction to determine whether the record evidence fairly supports the trial court's disposition. Barr v. Barr, 749 A.2d 992 (Pa.Super.2000). Regardless of whether the action is commenced by writ of summons or where, as here, the action is commenced by a complaint, service of process is essential to commencing the action. Proper service is a prerequisite to a court acquiring personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Cintas Corporation v. Lee's Cleaning Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 700 A.2d 915 (1997).
¶ 11 For the following reasons, we conclude that the record supports the trial court's denial of Appellant's preliminary objections. As the action originated in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, we must examine the propriety of service in light of the rules employed by that court. See Leight v. Lefkowitz, 419 Pa.Super. 502, 615 A.2d 751 (1992)
(. )
¶ 12 Philadelphia Municipal Court Rule of Civil Procedure 111 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
....
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Phila.M.C.R.Civ.P. 111, 42 Pa.C.S.
¶ 13 Thus, pursuant to Rule 111, service of process can be effected within Philadelphia by a writ server or outside the city by writ servers or constables. In addition, the rules provide for alternate service outside of Philadelphia County without enlisting the assistance of the sheriff of the county in which service is sought. A complaint may be served by regular and certified mail, return receipt requested, if a writ server has returned the complaint without service or where the last known address is outside Philadelphia County. Id. If the complaint is returned without service, the action is dismissed without prejudice and may be re-listed at a later date. See Phila.M.C.R.Civ.P. 120.
¶ 14 Herein, Appellee initiated the action by filing a complaint in the municipal court on January 4, 2000, three days prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The writ server could not effect service at Appellant's last known address and returned the writ marked "No Service" on February 14, 2000. After obtaining Appellant's new address, Appellee re-listed the action and employed a constable to attempt to effect service at 7120 Penarth Avenue in Upper Darby, Delaware County. Again, the writ was returned. After verifying Appellant's address, Appellee obtained leave to effect alternate service via first class mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, pursuant to Rule 111(c). Upon receiving the certified...
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