Ramsey v. City of Lake Elsinore

Citation270 Cal.Rptr. 198,220 Cal.App.3d 1530
Decision Date04 June 1990
Docket NumberNo. E005878,E005878
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesJoseph RAMSEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The CITY OF LAKE ELSINORE, Defendant and Respondent.

Fogel, Feldman, Ostrov, Ringler & Klevens and Michael R. Nebenzahl and Jerome L. Ringler, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Smith & Peckham and George Bruggeman, Jr., Rancho Cucamongo, for defendant and respondent.

OPINION

DABNEY, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Joseph Ramsey has appealed from a judgment and an award of costs and attorney's fees in favor of defendant City of Lake Elsinore (City) following the granting of the City's motion for summary judgment. The City's motion was granted on the ground that there was no triable issue of fact as to the City's ownership and control of the property on which Ramsey had been injured.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While crossing Riverside Drive in the City, Ramsey, a pedestrian, was struck by an automobile driven by Randall Gray. Ramsey brought an action against Gray for damages for personal injuries caused by Gray's negligence. Ramsey also sued the City, the County of Riverside (County) and the State of California (State). Ramsey alleged that each public entity owned, maintained or controlled the property where the accident occurred, in a dangerous condition, thus causing Ramsey's injuries. Gray filed a cross-complaint against the City, the County and the State for indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief.

The City moved for summary judgment. 1 The City contended that it was undisputed that Ramsey's injuries occurred as he was crossing Riverside Drive near Joy Street, the site alleged to be in a dangerous condition, and that the City did not own or control Riverside Drive at or near that intersection. To support its motion, the City attached the declaration of Ron Kirchner, the City's engineer and director of public services. Kirchner stated that he was responsible for the design, construction and inspection of all public works projects and for maintenance of public works, including streets, and for signing, marking and lighting streets. Kirchner asserted that from his examination of City records, his experience and his knowledge of matters within his responsibility, he could state that the City did not own or maintain Riverside Drive at its intersection with Joy Street and did not own or maintain the street lighting there. Kirchner declared that Riverside Drive, also known as State Route 74, is exclusively under the jurisdiction of the State.

The City also requested sanctions, alleging that Ramsey's action against the City was not brought with reasonable cause or in good faith. To support its request for sanctions, the City attached a copy of a letter from the City's claims administrators advising Ramsey's former attorneys that the City rejected Ramsey's claim because the State, not the City, owned and maintained State Highway 74 at the intersection of Joy Street. The letter warned Ramsey's attorneys that if they chose to pursue litigation against the City, the City would seek sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038. 2 , 3 The City also attached Soon after the City served its motion, Gray dismissed his cross-complaint against the City. Ramsey and the City stipulated to continue the hearing on the City's motion to allow discovery. Ramsey then brought his own motion for summary adjudication of issues against the State. Ramsey alleged that it was undisputed that the State owned Riverside Drive at its intersection with Joy Street and that the State's ownership extended a certain distance beyond the paved roadway. To establish that these issues were undisputed, Ramsey referred the City's and County's motions for summary judgment and the declarations and exhibits attached to those motions. Ramsey set this motion to be heard at the same time as the City's motion for summary judgment.

a second letter addressed to Gray's attorney, [220 Cal.App.3d 1535] with Ramsey's present attorney shown as the recipient of a copy. That letter stated that the City did not own or control the roadway on which the accident occurred and that the roadway was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State.

In opposition to the City's motion, Ramsey filed a statement of disputed facts. Ramsey disputed the City's statements that it did not own or control the subject property. Ramsey objected to Kirchner's declaration on the grounds that the basis for Kirchner's knowledge could not be ascertained, and that Kirchner had made inconsistent statements in his deposition. Ramsey also filed the declaration of Robert Crommelin, a licensed civil and traffic engineer, whom Ramsey had retained as an expert. Crommelin stated that based on his experience and on the documents he had reviewed in this case, he felt "that there is a reasonable likelihood that the intersection in question constituted a dangerous condition of public property at the time of the accident. However, until I have completed my investigation, ... I must reserve my final judgment on this subject." Crommelin also stated that the State generally enters into maintenance agreements with local cities for State highways which pass through the cities. Crommelin was "surprised" to read in the City's response to Ramsey's request for production of documents that the City had no such agreement. Finally, Crommelin stated that he could not render an opinion as to whether the State or the City controls the subject intersection.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The trial court also granted Ramsey's motion for summary adjudication of issues against the State.

DISCUSSION

Contentions on Appeal. Ramsey now concedes that the State owns Riverside Drive. 4 He contends, nonetheless, that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the City controlled Riverside Drive at the intersection of Joy Street, whether the intersection was in a dangerous condition which the City could have prevented through its ownership and control of Joy Street, and whether the City had the power to prevent, remedy or guard against the dangerous condition of its own property or that of the State. Ramsey also contends that the action was brought in good faith, and that even if the summary judgment is upheld, the award of sanctions should be reversed.

Standard of Review. Summary judgment is proper if the supporting papers are sufficient to sustain the judgment in favor of the moving party as a matter of law, and the opposing party presents no evidence which gives rise to a triable issue as to any material fact. (§ 437c.) When reviewing a grant of summary judgment Liability of a Public Entity for a Dangerous Condition of Public Property. Public liability for personal injuries is defined and limited by statute. Government Code section 835 states: "[A] public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury...." Public property includes "... real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity...." (Gov.Code, § 830, subd. (c).)

                we independently analyze the construction and effect of the supporting and opposing papers.  (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203.)   A defendant who moves for summary judgment must either disprove at least one essential element of every cause of action or prove an affirmative defense that would bar every cause of action in the complaint.  (Conn v. National Can Corp.  (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 630, 637-639, 177 Cal.Rptr. 445.)   A defendant may properly rely on the plaintiff's pleadings to supply essential factual elements.  (Id., at p. 638, 177 Cal.Rptr. 445.)  "If any triable issue of fact exists, it is error for the trial court to grant a party's motion for summary judgment."  (Schrimsher v. Bryson (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 660, 663, 130 Cal.Rptr. 125.)   To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must point to some evidence which supports his claims.  (City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 395, 406, 182 Cal.Rptr. 443.)   What facts are material depends upon the allegations of the complaint.  (IT Corp. v. Superior Court (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 443, 451-452, 147 Cal.Rptr. 828.)   Because of the drastic nature of the procedure, "... all doubts should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion."  (Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co.  (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 357, 362, 212 Cal.Rptr. 395.)
                

Under the Tort Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 810 et seq.), to establish the liability of a public entity for a dangerous condition of public property a plaintiff must prove that: the property was in a dangerous condition when the injury occurred; the dangerous condition was a proximate cause of the injury; the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which occurred; and the public entity had sufficient prior notice of the dangerous condition to enable it to have undertaken measures to protect against such condition. (County of Ventura v. City of Camarillo (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1024-1025, 144 Cal.Rptr. 296.) Even though an injury occurs on one piece of property, one who owns or controls an adjacent property may be liable if a dangerous condition on the adjacent property caused the accident. (Ibid.)

The Issues Framed by the Complaint. Ramsey's first amended complaint alleges that Ramsey was walking across Riverside Drive near its intersection with Joy Street when the accident occurred, that Gray was driving "along and upon" Riverside Drive when he collided with Ramsey, and that the City and other public entities "designed, owned, possessed, maintained, occupied, controlled, leased and cared for ... Riverside Drive near the intersection with Joy Street." Finally, Ramsey alleged...

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