Ramsey v. City of N. Las Vegas

• Decision Date: 13 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 68450,68450
• Citation: 392 P.3d 614
• Parties: Honorable Catherine RAMSEY, North Las Vegas Municipal Judge, Appellant, v. The CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS ; Barbara A. Andolina, City Clerk of North Las Vegas ; Betty Hamilton ; Michael William Moreno; and Bob Borgersen, Individually and as Members of "Remove Ramsey Now," Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

392 P.3d 614

Honorable Catherine RAMSEY, North Las Vegas Municipal Judge, Appellant,
v.
The CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS ; Barbara A. Andolina, City Clerk of North Las Vegas ; Betty Hamilton ; Michael William Moreno; and Bob Borgersen, Individually and as Members of "Remove Ramsey Now," Respondents.

No. 68450

Supreme Court of Nevada.

APRIL 13, 2017

Mueller Hinds & Associates, Chtd., and Craig A. Mueller and Steven M. Goldstein, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Snell & Wilmer, LLP, and Patrick G. Byrne, Richard C. Gordon, and Daniel S. Ivie, Las Vegas, for Respondents the City of North Las Vegas and Barbara A. Andolina, City Clerk of North Las Vegas.

Gentile, Cristalli, Miller, Armeni & Savarese and Dominic P. Gentile, Colleen E. McCarty, and Ross J. Miller, Las Vegas, for Respondents Betty Hamilton, Michael William Moreno, and Bob Borgersen, individually and as members of Remove Ramsey Now.

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg, Reno, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Judges of Limited Jurisdiction.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.¹

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In 1976, amid growing concern that no central administrative authority existed to unify Nevada courts and that this state's judges were not being held to uniform and consistent standards, Nevada's voters approved the creation of the Commission on

392 P.3d 616

Judicial Discipline (the Commission) through constitutional amendment to provide for a standardized system of judicial governance. This amendment provides for the removal of judges from office as a form of discipline. Thus, in conjunction with the Commission's creation, a new Code of Judicial Conduct was developed with the expectation that these measures would promote judicial independence and political neutrality, while at the same time improving the public's ability to hold judges accountable for their conduct in office.

A group of individuals within the City of North Las Vegas seeks to remove a municipal judge, not through the system of judicial discipline established by the majority of voters in 1976, but through a special recall election. Whether the existing state constitutional provision providing for the recall of "public officers," Article 2, Section 9, applies to judges has not been previously considered by this court. However, even if the recall of public officers provision is interpreted to include judges, we conclude that the voters' subsequent approval of the system for judicial discipline, which plainly grants the Commission the exclusive authority to remove a judge from office with only one exception, the legislative power of impeachment, supersedes any provision that would allow for judges to be recalled by other means.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the 2011 local election, City of North Las Vegas voters elected appellant Catherine Ramsey to a six-year term as a municipal judge. Before Ramsey's term expired, a group called "Remove Ramsey Now"² created a recall petition seeking to force an election to remove her from office. The group alleged that Ramsey improperly used city assets for personal use, was excessively absent from work, and mistreated staff and other people in her courtroom.³ After gathering signatures, Remove Ramsey Now submitted the recall petition for verification to respondent Barbara Andolina, city clerk for respondent City of North Las Vegas. Sufficient signatures were certified, and the Secretary of State deemed the petition qualified.

Ramsey sought an emergency injunction from the district court and also later filed a complaint challenging the legal sufficiency of the recall petition. Ramsey argued that judges are not "public officers" subject to recall under Article 2, Section 9 of the Nevada Constitution, and that even if they once were, the voters' approval of the judicial discipline process in 1976 superseded all other forms of judicial removal except legislative impeachment. She also asserted that various issues with respect to notice of the signature verification process and the form of the petition violated her constitutional rights and invalidated the petition.

The district court consolidated the two actions. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district court denied all of Ramsey's claims, concluding that judges were public officers subject to recall under the Nevada Constitution and that Ramsey's rights ultimately were not violated. Ramsey now appeals.

DISCUSSION

This court reviews questions of constitutional interpretation de novo. Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 127 Nev. 390, 393, 254 P.3d 606, 608 (2011). In interpreting an amendment to our Constitution, we look to rules of statutory interpretation to determine the intent of both the drafters and the electorate that approved it. Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 180, 251 P.3d 163, 166 (2011) ;

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Hal verson v. Sec'y of State, 124 Nev. 484, 488, 186 P.3d 893, 897 (2008). We first examine the provision's language. Landreth, 127 Nev. at 180, 251 P.3d at 166. If plain, we look no further, but if not, "we look to the history, public policy, and reason for the provision." Id. When so doing, we keep in mind that "a contemporaneous construction by the [L]egislature of a constitutional provision is a safe guide to its proper interpretation and creates a strong presumption that the interpretation was proper," because it is likely that legislation drafted near in time to the constitutional provision reflects the constitutional drafters' mindset. Halverson, 124 Nev. at 488–89, 186 P.3d at 897 (internal quotations omitted); Porch v. Patterson, 39 Nev. 251, 260, 156 P. 439, 442 (1916) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (same).

I.

Voter recall of "public officer[s]" has been available in Nevada since Article 2, Section 9 of the Nevada Constitution was adopted in 1912. In its current form, the article provides, in part, that

[e]very public officer in the State of Nevada is subject, as herein provided, to recall from office by the registered voters of the state, or of the county, district, or municipality which he represents.

To force a recall election, at least 25 percent of the number of voters voting in the election in which the subject official was elected must sign a petition demanding the public officer's recall and setting forth the reasons therefor. Nev. Const. art. 2, § 9. If the public officer does not resign, a special election must be held. Id.

The term "public officer" is not expressly defined in the Nevada Constitution, and no prior judicial decision by this court has considered whether judges are within the scope of Article 2, Section 9. However, other states with similar constitutional provisions have decided, either expressly or impliedly, that "public officers" include judges.

Idaho and Washington each added amendments providing for the recall of "public officers" at around the same time Nevada adopted Article 2, Section 9. See Idaho Const. art. VI, § 6 (added 1911, ratified 1912); Wash. Const. art. I, § 33 –34 (adopted by amendment 1911, approved 1912). Article VI, Section 6 of Idaho's constitution provides that "[e]very public officer ..., excepting the judicial officers, is subject to recall." Similarly, Article I, Section 33 of Washington's constitution provides that "[e]very elective public officer in the state of Washington expect [except] judges of courts of record is subject to recall." (Alteration in original). Idaho's and Washington's explicit exclusion of judges from their respective recall provisions implies that judges are included in the term "public officer."

Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon also adopted constitutional recall provisions around the same time as Nevada, which also use the term "public officer," but did not specifically exclude judicial officers. See Ariz. Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 ; Colo. Const. art. XXI, § 1 ; Or. Const. art. II, § 18 (1). In each of these states, the courts implicitly concluded that members of the judiciary were considered public officers and thus subject to recall pursuant to their constitutions. See Abbey v. Green, 28 Ariz. 53, 235 P. 150, 152 (1925) ; Marians v. People ex rel. Hines, 69 Colo. 87, 169 P. 155, 155 (1917) ; State ex rel. Clark v. Harris, 74 Or. 573, 144 P. 109, 110 (1914).

We, like our sister states, believe that judges are public officers for purposes of Nevada's constitutional recall provision adopted in 1912. However, even if judges originally could be recalled, Ramsey argues that the creation of the Commission in 1976 superseded any such recall authority over judges. We agree.

II.

A.

Nevada voters entrusted the Commission with the power to remove judges from office under Article 6, Section 21. In 1967, the Nevada Legislature convened a commission to complete a comprehensive study of the organization and structure of the Nevada court system. Legislative Commission of the Legislative Counsel Bureau, Nevada's Court Structure, Bulletin No. 74, at 23 (1968) (citing

392 P.3d 618

S. Con. Res. 18, 54th Leg. (Nev. 1967)).⁴ In exploring the election and removal of judges with a view toward promoting an...