Ramsey v. Grayland, 39595

• Decision Date: 02 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 39595,39595
• Citation: 567 S.W.2d 682
• Parties: Ex parte David RAMSEY et al., Petitioners, v. Derek GRAYLAND, etc., Respondent. . Louis District, Division Two
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 682

567 S.W.2d 682

Ex parte David RAMSEY et al., Petitioners, v. Derek GRAYLAND, etc., Respondent.

No. 39595.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Two.

May 2, 1978.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer Denied June 8, 1978.

Ruppert & Schlueter, Francis L. Ruppert, Joseph Westhus, Clayton, for appellants.

Andrew Minardi, Assoc. County Counselor, Clayton, Bryan A. Roche, Hussmann Refrigerator, Bridgeton, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners, David Thomas Ramsey and Janet Elise Stone, contest their convictions for criminal contempt in this original habeas corpus proceeding. The convictions are based on the findings of Circuit Judge Robert Lee Campbell that petitioners willfully and deliberately violated a valid restraining order issued by him. ¹ Ramsey was sentenced to five months imprisonment; Stone, sixty days.

The conduct for which petitioners were found to be in violation of the restraining order occurred in conjunction with a strike by members of Local 13889, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, against Hussmann Refrigerator Co. Neither petitioner is a Hussmann employee or a member of the union local, but both are participants in a local effort to organize a so-called National Workers Organization.

On May 4, 1977, the circuit court issued its original restraining order in response to a Petition for Injunction filed that date by Hussmann. The court order limited to two (2) the number of persons allowed to picket at each gate leading to the Hussmann plant, and ordered defendants ² to desist and refrain from:

1. . . . (B)locking or attempting to block in any manner any of the driveways to said Hussmann Refrigerator Co.'s property or from blocking or attempting to block in any manner egress and ingress to said property.

2. Seeking to coerce or intimidate by physical acts or words, plaintiff's employees customers and persons making deliveries or pickups to or from said property from entering or leaving said property and transacting business with Hussmann Refrigerator Co.

3. Damaging in any way any property of Hussmann Refrigerator Co. or property of any person lawfully present at or near Hussmann Refrigerator Co.'s said property.

On May 24, 1977, the temporary restraining order was continued for sixty days by consent of the attorneys for defendants. On June 5, 1977, Judge Campbell visited the Hussmann premises and personally observed numerous violations of the restraining order. A Motion to Expand Temporary Restraining Order was filed on June 6, alleging that on numerous occasions, several dozen individuals had continued to picket in violation of the order, and further alleging numerous acts of violence on June 6, 1977. An amended order was issued that date. In addition to the terms of the previous order, the amended order instructed "defendants and all others " (emphasis added) to desist and refrain from:

4. Assembling, grouping, loitering, standing, congregating, convening, gathering, mustering, meeting, massing, thronging, crowding, rallying or collecting of any person or persons within one-hundred (100) yards of plaintiff's chain link metal fence which extends along the boundaries of plaintiff's property adjacent to Taussig Road, Enterprise Way and St. Charles Rock Road, in the City of Bridgeton, St. Louis County, Missouri.

The amended order was personally read by the Judge to a group assembled near the Hussmann premises on June 6. On July 25, 1977, the amended restraining order was continued on the court's own motion to September 8, 1977. On July 25, the court also issued a temporary restraining order against Hussmann, its agents and employees, ordering them to refrain from driving through gates where lawful pickets were located and to refrain from coercing or intimidating lawfully-present picketers. ³

The events which formed the basis of the contempt prosecutions occurred in the early morning of August 1, 1977. 300-400 people gathered within 100 yards of Hussmann's chain link fence in what appears to have been a loosely organized demonstration against the company and its non-union employees. Evidence of petitioners' involvement in the demonstration was adduced from their own testimony as well as that of several police officers and company employees. Ramsey carried a bullhorn, supplied by Stone, and shouted instructions to the crowd to gather in a circle. One police officer testified: "He was chanting. He was talking to the group trying to get the group to stay there to march around in a circle. (He shouted:) 'Scabs go home . . . (W)e will fight the courts, we will fight Hussmann, we will fight the police.' "

Lieutenant Eugene Hoff of the Bridgeton Police Department arrived between 6:30 and 6:45 a. m., parked his car inside gate # 1 on the Hussmann lot and faced the crowd assembled outside the fence on Taussig Road. On two or three occasions, he read the amended restraining order over the public address system attached to his car and ordered the crowd to disperse. Ramsey and Stone both testified that the noise from the crowd prevented their hearing Lieutenant Hoff, although they both heard amplified sounds from the direction of the Hussmann plant and Stone admitted hearing the words, "You are in violation . . .."

Officer John F. Julian of the Missouri Highway Patrol and Officer William Hencken of the St. Louis County Police both testified the assembly was very loud, and at times unruly. Several rocks and bottles were thrown. The officers stood within 10-20 feet of petitioner Ramsey and observed him, bullhorn in hand, shouting instructions to the crowd and chanting "Scabs go home, scabs go home." Officer Hencken also observed petitioner Stone standing approximately five feet from Ramsey. Both witnesses, though standing in close proximity to the crowd and the petitioners, heard the court order as it was being read over the loudspeaker. Petitioners continued their activities and remained within the 100 yard restricted area after the amended order had been read and they had been warned that they were in violation of the court order and would be arrested if they did not disperse.

Petitioners and other demonstrators were arrested, taken to Bridgeton Police Headquarters, and released the same day. Upon their release, each was given a small piece of paper which indicated they were to appear before Judge Campbell on August 8, 1977. However, on August 4, 1977, in response to a Motion to Cite for Contempt, a Show Cause Order was issued compelling their appearance in the Circuit Court at 10:30 a. m. on August 15, 1977. The record indicates Ramsey was served on either the 5th or 6th of August and Stone was served on either the 8th or 10th. Trial of petitioners began at 4:15 p. m. on August 15, ran through the 16th and was completed at 4:45 p. m. on August 17.

Petitioners challenge their conviction on numerous grounds, but before reaching these contentions, we think it is appropriate to review the fundamental precepts which underlie the law of contempt. Constitutional courts of common law jurisdiction have both statutory and inherent power to punish persons guilty of willful disobedience of their lawful orders. Section 476.110, RSMo. 1969; Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005 (Mo. banc 1951) cert. den., 343 U.S. 953, 72 S.Ct. 1046, 96 L.Ed. 1354 (1952); State ex rel. Girard v. Percich, 557 S.W.2d 25 (Mo.App.1977); ⁴ Houston v. Hennessey, 534 S.W.2d 52 (Mo.App.1975). Whereas the primary purpose of civil contempt is to protect the parties to the litigation for whose benefit an order was issued, the primary purpose of criminal contempt is to protect, preserve and vindicate the authority of our courts and the power and the dignity of the law itself. Teefey v. Teefey, 533 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. banc 1976); State ex rel. Girard v. Percich, supra. "If courts could not punish those who treat with insolence their lawful orders, the judicial system would be rendered ineffective and would lose the faith of the people as the preferred means of resolving their disputes. Judgments could be accepted or rejected at whim with impunity and would be essentially advisory in nature . . . ." State ex rel. Girard v. Percich, supra at 36.

Petitioners herein were convicted of indirect criminal contempt for conduct occurring outside the presence of the court. Unlike direct contempt, which may be punished summarily, one charged with indirect contempt is entitled to reasonable notice of the charges against him and to a hearing on those charges. Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298 (Mo.App.1970). The criminal contempt is not, strictly speaking, a criminal proceeding, but rather is sui generis. Osborne v. Purdome, supra. Nonetheless, as in a criminal prosecution, the State has the burden of proving the elements of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Wendt v. Journey, 492 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.App.1973). Actual knowledge of the restraining order and willful conduct in violation of its terms are the elements that must be proved. Chemical Fireproofing Corp. v. Bronska, 553 S.W.2d 710 (Mo.App.1977); Mechanic v. Gruensfelder, supra.

There is no right of appeal from a judgment of contempt, though the validity of the judgment may be challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding. Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557 (Mo.App.1964). The duty of the court in such a proceeding is to review the evidence against the petitioner and to determine . . . whether that evidence supports the finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner acted as stated in the specifications found as to him or her. In so doing it is unnecessary to consider all the specifications found as to that petitioner. The purpose of the writ is to test the legality of the restraint. It follows that if the determination . . . is supported as to even one of the several specifications contained in the judgment . . . then that petitioner is not illegally restrained . . .. On the other hand, if not even one of the several specifications...