Ramsey v. Squires
| Citation | 879 F. Supp. 270 |
| Decision Date | 03 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-CV-6352T.,91-CV-6352T. |
| Parties | Michael F. RAMSEY, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. SQUIRES, Cpl. Maier, Andrew P. Meloni, John Lipari, Edward J. Frattare, Lt. Amico, Lt. Wren, Edward Krenzer, Sgt. Palma, Cpl. Callitri, Cpl. Fantigrossi, Paul Marre and Glen Smith, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
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Michael F. Ramsey, plaintiff, pro se.
John Costello, Deputy County Atty., Rochester, NY, for defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights when they confined him to administrative segregation without proper hearings from January 23, 1991 to February 12, 1991, and from March 1, 1991 to December 4, 1991, respectively. Plaintiff also has claimed that the periodic denial of his privileges during these periods deprived him of his constitutional rights.
This matter was originally referred to me by Chief Judge Michael A. Telesca, by order dated February 28, 1992, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The parties subsequently executed a Consent to Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The consent was confirmed by order of Chief Judge Michael A. Telesca, dated December 3, 1992, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.
In a Decision and Order dated May 11, 1994 (Docket Entry # 69) I granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment and Substantive Due Process claims. I denied without prejudice to renewal, the summary judgment motion on plaintiff's procedural due process claims, because defendants did not address these claims. Thereafter, in accordance with the timetable set forth in the aforementioned Decision and Order, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the procedural due process claims. Plaintiff submitted his affidavit in response to the motion on June 29, 1994. Plaintiff's procedural due process claims can be placed into three categories: unlawful placement in administrative segregation; unlawful use of administrative segregation as disciplinary confinement; and, unlawful continued confinement in administrative segregation. These claims are also directed at plaintiff's loss of privileges during administrative confinement. The following is my Decision and Order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Monroe County Jail on January 18, 1991, following his arrest and arraignment on serious felony charges filed by the Rochester Police, including attempted murder. He was continuously confined there until received by DOCS to serve sentences imposed upon his conviction for attempted murder and other felonies, including attempted escape from custody. His stay at the jail was stormy. On January 23, 1991, plaintiff attempted to escape from custody during an appearance for a preliminary hearing in the Rochester City Court on the attempted murder charges. The escape attempt occurred as plaintiff was escorted to a City Court courtroom (Part # 5). The plaintiff ran from the transport deputies, jumped the rail separating the bar from the general public, and was shortly apprehended, handcuffed, and returned to the City Court holding cell behind the courtroom.
A report was submitted by a Monroe County Sheriff's deputy requesting that plaintiff he placed in administrative segregation. This request was approved in writing by defendant Jail Superintendent Robert J. Squires ("Squires") and defendant Captain Edward J. Frattare ("Frattare"). On the same day, plaintiff was given written notice of the reasons for, and the special conditions attending, administrative confinement. Squires affidavit filed June 15, 1994 (docket entry # 74), at ¶ 8, Exhibit C. Plaintiff's behavior in administrative segregation was monitored on a weekly basis, and his privileges were gradually restored. He was released to the general population by February 12, 1991, 17 days later. But he was never given a formal administrative hearing in connection with the January 23rd escape attempt. Instead, criminal charges for escape were lodged in criminal court. Plaintiff was arraigned on them and entered a plea the next day. Plaintiff claims that he was not given a hearing or an opportunity to make a statement to the responsible prison officials concerning this administrative confinement, and that he had a constitutional right to have such a hearing. The record shows, however, that he made a statement to the transport deputy, Jolly, when Jolly asked him why he tried to escape. According to Jolly's report, plaintiff said, No formal hearing was held, however.
On March 1, 1991, jail officials learned from a "reliable source" that plaintiff was planning another escape. Plaintiff's cell was searched. This search turned up contraband, a circular piece of metal that jail officials believed could be used in an escape. Cpl. J. Maier filed a report of the discovery and requested that plaintiff be returned to administrative segregation, with the restriction that he be handcuffed whenever he left his cell. Maier's written report/request was reviewed by Sgt. Palma, who recorded on Maier's report that plaintiff was indeed a threat to security and that he was moved to administrative segregation at 1930 hours on March 1st. Later that day, plaintiff was notified of the contraband infraction and interviewed by Deputy Passe. Plaintiff explained that he was placed in a corridor cell after he came back from a visit, and when confronted with the discovery of contraband in his cell, said, "I don't know nothing about it." Report of Deputy Passe, attached as Exhibit A of the Reply Affirmation of T. Andrew Brown, Esq. (docket entry # 66). The interview occurred within 4½ hours of plaintiff's transfer to administrative segregation. The report states that plaintiff was confined to administrative segregation "pending a hearing." It appears, however, that plaintiff was not told of the investigation which yielded his plans for escape.
Plaintiff was given written notice of the handcuff restriction on March 4, 1991. Plaintiff was served with written notice of the contraband rule infraction and the scheduled hearing date on March 6, 1991. Squires Affidavit (docket entry # 74), at ¶ 12, Exhibit D. The "Notification of Infraction" told plaintiff that Cpl. Maier filed an infraction against him, charging him with possessing contraband in violation of the Inmate Rules and Regulations. The notice also stated that it was "based on the written report attached," and that plaintiff would be given an opportunity to answer the "alleged infraction" at the hearing scheduled the next day, March 7, 1991. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal precisely what written report was attached to the notification. Cpl. Maier wrote up at least three reports in connection with the events of March 1, 1991. First, a "Report of Infraction" was prepared recording the discovery of contraband, plaintiff's statement to Deputy Passe, and the referral of the matter for a hearing. Brown affidavit (docket entry # 66) at Exh. A. Second, Maier prepared a two page "Special Report" dated March 1, 1991, to Sgts. Palma and Pereira detailing information from "reliable sources" tending to show that plaintiff was planning another escape attempt. Third, another two page "Special Report" to Sgt. Pereira was prepared on March 3rd detailing plaintiff's statements to another inmate, and conduct observed by the confidential "source" tending to confirm that plaintiff "is contemplating another attempt" to escape. Squires Affidavit (docket entry # 60), at Exh. H. The latter Report resulted in a handcuff restriction ordered on March 4, 1991. It is not clear which reports were attached to the notification of hearing delivered to plaintiff, but plaintiff claims that the escape issue never surfaced at the March 7th hearing, and defendants do not refute this. Plaintiff later learned of the special reports detailing his escape plans when defendants filed a response later that year to an Article 78 proceeding in State Supreme Court. It is therefore a fair inference — indeed there does not appear to be an issue of fact — that only the "Report of Infraction" concerning the contraband was attached to the March 6th notice.
Squires states in his affidavit that a hearing was held at 4:00 p.m. on March 7th, and that "Ramsey admitted both infractions." Squires Affidavit (docket entry # 74), at ¶ 13; Krenzer Affidavit of May 29, 1991, at ¶ 11.1 Plaintiff does not affirmatively dispute that he admitted the infractions, but he points out that the escape issue never came up. The hearing officer, defendant Deputy Edward L. Krenzer, recommended that plaintiff be given a verbal reprimand and continued administrative segregation. The recommendation was in writing and stated to be "Substantiated based on Written Report Given." Squires affidavit (docket entry # 74), at Exh. D. Again, the court presumes, that the Special Reports prepared by Maier on the escape issue were not presented to the hearing officer, because defendants do not allege otherwise.
Over the following three months, plaintiff was cited with more infractions which were sustained after hearings. Squires Affidavit ¶ 16 and Exh. E. Plaintiff makes no claim with regard to the constitutional sufficiency of these hearings under the due process clause. Instead, he contends that the charges were lodged against him as unlawful retaliation for his plans to escape, an issue defendants chose not to confront him with.
On June 1, 1991, while still confined to administrative segregation, plaintiff, with the assistance of two other inmates, attempted to escape once again. Deputy Danny Clark was escorting inmate Roy...
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