Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs

• Decision Date: 19 July 1999
• Citation: 998 S.W.2d 207
• Parties: James N. RAMSEY, District Attorney General, Seventh Judicial District, Appellee, v. TOWN OF OLIVER SPRINGS, A Municipal Corporation under the Law of Tennessee, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

998 S.W.2d 207

James N. RAMSEY, District Attorney General, Seventh Judicial District, Appellee, v. TOWN OF OLIVER SPRINGS, A Municipal Corporation under the Law of Tennessee, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.

July 19, 1999.

James M. Webster, Oak Ridge, TN, for Appellants.

John Knox Walkup, Attorney General & Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General, Nashville, TN, for Appellee.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the City Court for the Town of Oliver Springs, which sits in Roane County, Tennessee, may properly adjudicate a criminal case in which the offense was committed in Anderson County.

The District Attorney General for Anderson County brought this declaratory judgment action against the Town of Oliver Springs seeking a judgment that the town's policy and practice of prosecuting Anderson County cases in Roane County is illegal. Portions of the Town of Oliver Springs are located in three different counties, Anderson, Roane, and Morgan, but Oliver Springs' city court is physically located in Roane County.

The Chancellor held that the city court was authorized to adjudicate such cases pursuant to 1994 Tenn. Priv. Acts, ch. 137, § 1, provided that a defendant waives the constitutional right to be tried in the county where the offense is committed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant does not have an unqualified right to waive venue and that the Town of Oliver Springs' application of the Private Act impeded the District Attorney General's duty to prosecute crimes committed in Anderson County.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Town of Oliver Springs' policy and practice pursuant to the Private Act is unconstitutional as applied in this case because it impedes the District Attorney General's constitutional and statutory obligation to prosecute offenses committed in Anderson County. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. We therefore do not reach the issue of a defendant's right to waive venue under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The Court of Appeals' judgment is therefore affirmed, but upon the single ground stated herein.

BACKGROUND

After the declaratory judgment action was filed, a hearing was held before the Chancellor in which the parties stipulated to the following:

That the Town of Oliver Springs includes portions of Anderson, Roane and Morgan Counties.

That the physical location of the City Court for Oliver Springs is in Roane County.

That the duly elected Judge of the City Court for Oliver Springs is Defendant Joseph Van Hook. That the duly elected District Attorney General for Anderson County, which is the Seventh Judicial District, is Plaintiff James N. Ramsey.

That Defendant Grant Lowe is Police Chief for the Town of Oliver Springs and Chief Lowe brings persons charged in the Anderson County portion of Oliver Springs before Judge Joe Van Hook sitting as a Court in Roane County.

That Joseph Van Hook as Judge of the City Court for Oliver Springs has presided as a Judge with General Sessions Court for sic criminal jurisdiction sitting in Roane County over criminal charges which arose in the Anderson County portion of Oliver Springs over the objection of the Plaintiff District Attorney for Anderson County.

That waivers of venue have not been obtained from all of the Defendants charged with committing crimes in Anderson County who appeared before Court. That the Court now requires a "waiver of venue" before accepting guilty pleas.

That the Defendants, absent a ruling from a Court of competent jurisdiction, intend pursuant to 1994 Tenn. Private Acts, Ch. 127sic to continue exercising the criminal jurisdiction for a Sessions Court in the City Court of Oliver Springs located in Roane County over charges of crimes committed in Anderson County.

In the hearing, James Ramsey, the District Attorney General for the Seventh Judicial District, objected to the prosecution of offenses committed in Anderson County in the City Court sitting in Roane County. He argued that offenses committed in Anderson County must be prosecuted in Anderson County, and that the policy and practice followed by the Town of Oliver Springs impeded his ability to discharge the responsibilities of his office. The District Attorney General also argued that a defendant does not have an unqualified right to waive venue.

The Town of Oliver Springs responded by relying upon 1994 Tenn. Priv. Acts ch. 137, § 1, which states in part:

(d) The City Judge shall be vested with concurrent jurisdiction with courts of general sessions for violations of criminal laws, and shall try all offenses against the peace and dignity of the town of Oliver Springs.

(e) The City Judge shall also have jurisdiction in and over all cases arising under the state laws and ordinances of the town of Oliver Springs and all cases relative to the violation of such laws and ordinances and offenses against the state or the town of Oliver Springs.

Id. Oliver Springs defended its practice under the Private Act and argued that a defendant may properly waive the right to venue under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The Chancellor agreed and upheld the practice of trying Anderson County cases in the city court in Roane County under the Private Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that the Private Act was constitutional on its face. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that a defendant does not have an absolute right to waive venue¹ and that prosecuting Anderson County cases in the city court located in Roane County impinged upon the District Attorney General's obligation to discharge the function of his office by prosecuting offenses committed in his district.

We granted the Town of Oliver Springs' application for permission to appeal.

ANALYSIS

A District Attorney General is an elected constitutional officer whose function is to prosecute criminal cases in his or her circuit or district. E.g., State v. Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tenn.1994). The Tennessee Constitution states in part:

An Attorney for the State for any circuit or district, for which a Judge having criminal jurisdiction shall be provided by law, shall be elected by the qualified voters of such circuit or district.... In all cases where the Attorney for any district fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according to law, the Court shall have the power to appoint an Attorney pro tempore.

Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5.

The legislature has codified many of the District Attorney General's duties and responsibilities. Foremost among them is that "each district attorney general ... shall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district attorney general for that purpose." Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) (Supp.1998). The District Attorney General's discretion to seek a warrant, presentment, information, or indictment within its district is extremely broad and subject only to certain constitutional restraints. Superior Oil, 875 S.W.2d at 660; Dearborne v. State, 575 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tenn.1978); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995).

The District Attorney General and only the District Attorney General can make the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution for an offense committed within his or her district. As we observed in Superior Oil:

There are no statutory criteria governing the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion traditionally vested in the officer in determining whether, when, and against whom to institute criminal proceedings. Indeed, it has been often recognized that "prosecutorial discretion in the charging process is very broad." So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense, the decision whether to prosecute, and what charge to bring before a grand jury generally rests entirely within the discretion of the prosecution ....

Id. at 660 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Dearborne, the office of District Attorney General was described as follows:

The District Attorney General is

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