Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: WEICK, EDWARDS and KENT, Circuit
• Citation: Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 481 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973)
• Decision Date: 19 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-1926,72-1927.,72-1926
• Parties: George RAMSEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.

481 F.2d 742 (1973)

George RAMSEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.

TENNESSEE PRODUCTS AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 72-1926, 72-1927.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued February 2, 1973.

Decided June 19, 1973.

John A. Rowntree, Knoxville, Tenn., William M. Ables, Jr., South Pittsburg, Tenn., for plaintiffs-appellants; Clarence E. Walker, Chattanooga, Tenn., A. Allan Kelly, South Pittsburg, Tenn., Dick L. Lansden, Nashville, Tenn., Vivienne W. Nearing, New York City, N. Y., on brief.

Harrison Combs, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellee; Edward L. Carey, Williard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., E. H. Rayson, Knoxville, Tenn., M. E. Boiarsky, Charleston, W. Va., on brief.

Before WEICK, EDWARDS and KENT,^* Circuit Judges.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

This is the second time these two cases have been before this court on the merits. On the first occasion our court, sitting en banc, divided four to four on the question as to whether or not the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970), demanded application of the "clear proof" standard in determining whether defendants were guilty of a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970)). Ramsey v. UMW, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969). This division affirmed the District Judge, who had held that the clear proof standard was applicable and that plaintiffs had failed to prove their case. Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F.Supp. 388 (E. D.Tenn.1967).

On grant of certiorari the United States Supreme Court divided five to four and reversed. Justice White and four other Justices held that the clear proof standard (See Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970)) did not apply generally in an antitrust case against a labor union. The Supreme Court held that the clear proof standard applied only to the question of whether or not the defendant union had participated in, authorized, or ratified the acts claimed to constitute the antitrust violation. The Supreme Court also held that the preponderance of the evidence test would apply regarding the defendant's guilt on the alleged anti-trust conspiracy. The case was then remanded to this court for remand to the District Court for reconsideration under the standard as newly defined. Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302, 91 S.Ct. 658, 28 L.Ed.2d 64 (1971).

The District Judge in the first Ramsey case had held that there was neither an actual nor an implied conspiracy between the UMW and large mine owners under the clear proof standard. However, the District Judge also said:

Were this case being tried upon the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable to civil cases, the Court would conclude that the U.M.W. did so impliedly agree. Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F.Supp. 388, 412 (E.D.Tenn. 1967).

When the District Judge reconsidered the entire record in the instant second Ramsey case (referring to the language just quoted above), he entered the following findings. They are the critical findings we must now review in this appeal:

"As appears from the opinion, this conclusion was stated by the Court in connection with the discussion of the PWC and at a time when the Court was in fact weighing the evidence under the clear proof rule and not under the preponderance rule. It is accordingly proper that the Court should reconsider its previously stated conclusion with a view to determining whether it is justified when the evidence is carefully considered in light of the preponderance standard of proof. Such a reconsideration is further required by an apparently conflicting conclusion arrived at by the Court in the concluding portion of its former opinion wherein the Court stated:

`While many inferences favorable to the plaintiffs\' contentions can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, in every instance a no less equally reasonable inference can be drawn to the contrary. The latter, when coupled with the positive denial of many witnesses of any conspiracy, as well as other inferences favorable only to the defendant\'s contentions, do not permit a finding based upon clear proof of an antitrust conspiracy.\' (265 F.Supp. 388 at 432)

Apart from the plaintiff's contentions regarding the Protective Wage Clause and as hereinabove considered, there is no direct evidence in the record of a conspiratorial agreement between the UMW and the BCOA.^* As reflected by the record, every witness having personal knowledge of the negotiations and dealings between the UMW and the BCOA denied the existence of any agreement, secret or otherwise, wherein the Union conspired or committed itself to impose the wage and labor standards negotiated with the BCOA upon coal operators who were not members of the BCOA or who were not signatories to the contract negotiated with the BCOA. Making this denial were every officer and representative of the Union and every officer and representative of the BCOA who testified at the trial. Among the evidence now sought to be newly offered by the plaintiffs is the testimony of Mr. Moody. Even Mr. Moody, who as President of the Southern Coal Operators Association from 1946 to 1960 represented competitors of the BCOA in negotiations with the UMW, vehemently denies any such conspiracy. The statement in its former opinion that: `Every officer of the Union who testified, as well as every representative from the Coal Industry alleged to be in on the conspiracy, denied its existence.' (265 F.Supp. 388 at 432) remains a correct statement.

Accordingly, if a conspiracy is to be found, it must be found in the reasonable inferences to be drawn from proven facts. That is, it must be inferred from the evidence.

The Court in its former opinion considered the various inferences that might be drawn from the various facts proven in the case. For example, the circumstances leading up to the 1950 National Contract and the changes that occurred at that time in the negotiating pattern followed by the Union are believed to be fully and correctly stated in the Court's previous opinion. The plaintiffs both then and now would have the Court infer from this evidence the beginning of an anticompetitive conspiracy between the Union and the major coal operators. The Court, however, has previously concluded:

`The Court can only say that upon the evidence to this point, it can discern no evidence of an incipient Sherman Act conspiracy. Certainly the testimony of the principal negotiators for both the Union and the operators is emphatic to the contrary. To conclude inferentially otherwise on the basis of the wage scale negotiated is to engage in unwarranted speculation and is to disregard the undeniable right of the Union to seek to gear its wage scale to the ability to pay of the soundly solvent and not the marginal producer . . . The circumstances of the negotiations as outlined above give no support in reason to such a conspiratorial inference. Rather, quite to the contrary.\' (265 F.Supp. 388 at 406 and 407).

Having now reconsidered the record under the preponderance rule, the Court can see no reason for altering these findings or conclusions.

Likewise, after recounting the evidence regarding the formation of the BCOA, the collective bargaining that occurred between 1950 and 1958 and the changes that occurred in the industry in these years, including the move to mechanization, the Court had these things to say:

`That these more peaceful procedures suggest a Sherman Act conspiracy, however, is not reasonably to be inferred . . . The economic pressure created by technological advances and the competition engendered thereby do not equate to a Sherman Act violation . . . The Court being unable to infer any Sherman Act conspiracy from the record to this point, these matters must accordingly be considered subsequently in the light of the total record.\' (265 F.Supp. 388 at 408, 409 and 410).

Again, having reconsidered the record under the preponderance rule, the Court can see no reason for altering these findings or conclusions.

Passing for the moment the former discussion of the Protective Wage Clause and turning to the evidence regarding the UMW's investments in the West Kentucky Coal Company and the activities of that coal company upon the TVA market, the Court again finds its former statement of the facts to be in accord with the record when viewed in the light of the preponderance rule. The Court there stated:

`The Court concludes that the evidence fails to establish that West Kentucky Coal Company or its subsidiary, Nashville Coal Company, engaged in predatory pricing of coal upon the TVA market. It rather appears that West Kentucky and Nashville based their prices upon legitimate business considerations and were attempting at all times to meet the competition, rather than lead the market downward. Having so concluded, it becomes unnecessary to consider further the responsibility of the U.M.W., if any, for West Kentucky and Nashville\'s coal pricing policies.\' (265 F. Supp. 388 at 422)

Likewise, the Court has again reviewed the record and its former findings as they relate to the Southeastern Tennessee coal field and the actions of the UMW regarding the plaintiffs in that coal filed. After reciting the facts, the Court concluded:

`Upon this record the U.M.W. could not be held chargeable for the violence, even were the standard of proof required that of a usual civil case. . . . Clear proof does not appear, either directly or by inference, that the U.M.W. acted other than unilaterally in furtherance of its own interests and purposes in its activities in the Southeastern Tennessee coal field in the period here under review.\' (265 F.Supp. 388 at 429-430)

The former statement of facts is believed upon review to be correct. Although the conclusion reached was weighed upon the clear proof scale, upon reweighing upon the preponderance scale the Court now arrives at the same...