Ramsey v. UNITED MINE WKRS. OF AM. WELFARE & RETIRE. FUND

• Decision Date: 16 July 1964
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4082,4294.
• Citation: 231 F. Supp. 909
• Parties: George RAMSEY, d/b/a Ramsey Coal Company v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND et al. Marshall MEEKS, d/b/a Marshall Meeks Coal Company v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

231 F. Supp. 909

George RAMSEY, d/b/a Ramsey Coal Company v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND et al.

Marshall MEEKS, d/b/a Marshall Meeks Coal Company v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND et al.

Civ. A. Nos. 4082, 4294.

United States District Court E. D. Tennessee, S. D.

July 16, 1964.

Ables & Ables, South Pittsburg, Sizer Chambliss, Chattanooga, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

Kramer, Dye, McNabb & Greenwood, Knoxville, Tenn., Charles L. Widman, Val J. Mitch, Harold H. Bacon, Washington, D. C., for defendants.

FRANK W. WILSON, District Judge.

These cases are before the Court upon motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. The defendants' motions raise identical issues in both cases.

The plaintiff, George Ramsey, d/b/a Ramsey Coal Company, filed an original complaint against the defendant trust upon April 8, 1963, seeking to recover certain monies alleged to have been illegally paid unto the defendants. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy. It is alleged that the monies were paid by reason of force of arms and duress, that the payments were not made pursuant to the terms of a contract entered into by the parties in good faith and that the contract would not satisfy the requirements of Section 302(c) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c) (5). Although the nature of the contract referred to in the complaint is not specified, it is undisputed that the contract is the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the National Wage Agreement) executed by the United Mine Workers of America and the plaintiffs.

The defendant, by affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment, has filed a photocopy of the National Wage Agreement entered into by and between the plaintiff, George Ramsey, and the United Mine Workers of America, under the terms of which contract, it is contended, all payments were made to the defendant, the Welfare and Retirement Fund. By further affidavits the defendant seeks to establish that the plaintiff, Ramsey, ratified the National Wage Agreement by making periodic payments and also seeks to establish that Washington, D. C., would constitute the proper forum for determining the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff has filed no counter-affidavits and the factual matters set forth in the defendants' affidavits are therefore not disputed in the record.

The plaintiff, Marshall Meeks, d/b/a Marshall Meeks Coal Company, filed a complaint upon April 10, 1964, containing allegations quite similar in all respects to those in the Ramsey case. In the Meeks case the defendants' motion for summary judgment merely refers to the briefs and affidavits in the Ramsey case and there has been no showing that Meeks executed the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950. The plaintiffs, however, in their brief admit that the issues raised by both motions are the same and the motions will therefore be decided upon that basis.

The following contentions are made in the defendants' motions for summary judgment:

(1) The agreement was not entered into by reasons of duress by the United Mine Workers of America, but should the Court find duress sufficiently alleged in the complaint it conclusively appears that the agreement was subsequently ratified.

(2) The alleged duress by the United Mine Workers of America is not a bar to defendant trustees' recovery of royalties accrued, nor a basis for plaintiff to recover back such payments.

(3) The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 and the declaration of trust contained therein meet the requirements of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.

(4) The plaintiffs' actions are barred by the appropriate statute of limitations.

The plaintiffs have conceded that the defendant is correct in its second contention, in that under the holding of the Court in the case of Lewis v. Benedict Coal Co., 361 U.S. 459, 80 S.Ct. 489, 4 L.Ed.2d 442 (1960), the Welfare Fund would not be affected by any duress of the United Mine Workers in the execution of the contract and no right of recovery of funds so paid unto the Welfare Fund would exist because of any such duress. In view of this concession, the Court need not decide the merit of the defendants' first contention as stated above. The plaintiffs, however, asserted in their brief their respective right to recover upon the alternate contention that the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, and the declaration of trust contained therein, do not meet the requirements of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. The plaintiffs also resist the defendants' contention that the statute of limitations has run against any portion of their respective claims.

Turning to the third proposition asserted by the defendants in their motion, the question raised is whether or not the National Wage Agreement is in violation of Section 302(c) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C.A. 186(c) (5). Section 302 allows employers to make payments to employee representatives for a trust fund upon certain conditions, one of those conditions being the following proviso or limitation in sub-section (c) (5) of Section 302:

"(P)rovided, That * * * (5) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon * * *." (Emphasis supplied).

The declaration of trust in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, as amended, after providing for the appointment of trustees in a manner that accords with Section 302(c) (5), provides as follows:

"It is further agreed that the detailed basis upon which payments from the Fund will be made shall be resolved in writing by the aforesaid Trustees at their initial meeting, or at the earliest practicable date that may by them thereafter be agreed upon."

The defendants contend that the provision of the National Wage Agreement satisfies the above-quoted requirement of the Act; the plaintiffs assert that it does not.

The issue therefore presented for decision of the Court is whether the provisions of the National Wage Agreement for the appointment of trustees with further provisions that the trustees shall in turn agree in writing upon the detailed basis for making payments from the Fund satisfies the statutory requirement that "the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer". The defendant has cited unto the Court a number of cases which it contends establish the legality of the Welfare Fund provisions in the National Wage Agreement. The plaintiff on the other hand relies almost wholly upon the legislative history of the statute and its wording as support for the plaintiffs' contention that the Welfare Fund provisions of the National Wage Agreement do not comply with the statute.

The defendant has cited numerous reported and unreported cases in which beneficiaries of the Welfare Fund have sought to enforce their rights as being material to the issue here presented.¹ The defendants seek to have the Court draw the conclusion that these enforcement actions are proof that a valid trust was established. The plaintiff likewise has cited reported and unreported enforcement actions by beneficiaries,² but seeks to have the Court draw the conclusion that these enforcement actions are proof that an improper use of trust funds has been effected. It is difficult for the Court to see where the enforcement action cases cited either by the defendant or by the plaintiff contribute to the solution of the problem here confronting the Court, as no issue was raised in the cited cases with respect to the legality of the Welfare Fund provisions of the National Wage Agreement. To the extent that such cases are cited as factual proof of the existence or non-existence of a detailed plan adopted by the trustees, this appears to the Court to be a circuitous and unsatisfactory way of establishing any factual issue believed by the parties to be necessary to a decision of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It would...