Ramzan v. United States, Case No. 1:17-cv-01361
| Decision Date | 06 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:17-cv-01361 |
| Citation | 438 F.Supp.3d 871 |
| Parties | Jon Walli RAMZAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Jon Walli Ramzan, Winfield, IL, pro se.
Michael Edward Rediger, Law Office of Michael E. Rediger, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
AUSA, Kathryn Ann Kelly, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
This case involves a traffic-related encounter between an officer of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and a fellow citizen on the roadways in the Chicago suburbs. Everyone agrees that Officer Joseph Jablonski turned on the emergency lights of a CBP vehicle and pulled over Jon Ramzan, the Plaintiff. But the two motorists disagree about why the officer pulled him over. The officer's story is that he believed that Ramzan was having a medical issue. Ramzan, for his part, tells a story that is decidedly less friendly. He claims that the officer honked and screamed at him. And then put a gun to his head.
Ramzan ultimately sued, claiming that the officer had committed a tort under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The United States (the sole Defendant) now moves for summary judgment, arguing that the officer did not act within the scope of his federal employment. The government basically argues that a local traffic stop was not within his range of responsibilities as a CBP officer, so the United States cannot be liable. The issue boils down to whether the United States is responsible for their encounter on the roadways of suburbia.
The two drivers have strikingly different versions of what took place. But whatever version is true, the result is the same. Defendant did not act within the scope of his employment, and thus the United States is entitled to summary judgment.
The pleadings tell different stories about their encounter. Officer Jablonski paints himself as somewhat of a Good Samaritan, trying to help a fellow citizen in need. Ramzan depicts Jablonski as something closer to a menace to society. The pleadings reflect a fundamental disagreement about what took place, and the difference is night and day.
But the facts before the Court at the summary judgment stage are narrower, and undisputed. In its summary judgment motion, the United States doesn't offer Officer Jablonski's version of the story at all. Instead, the government offers Plaintiff's version of events, and argues that he has no claim as a matter of law. That is, the government argues that under Plaintiff's story, he loses, because the officer went rogue and harassed a motorist for reasons of his own.
Ramzan does not deny that, under his own version of the encounter, the officer acted outside the scope of employment. Instead, Plaintiff argues that under Officer Jablonski's story, he gets a trial. Plaintiff contends that Officer Jablonski acted within the scope of employment if, as the officer claims, he was simply trying to help.
So, the government doesn't seek summary judgment based on Officer Jablonski's story, and Ramzan doesn't oppose summary judgment based on his own story. Instead, they do the opposite. The United States puts forward Ramzan's version, and Ramzan points to a few lines of testimony from Officer Jablonski's investigative interview.
Collectively, the parties put undisputed facts on the table. The government filed a Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts that adopted Plaintiff's version of the encounter, and Plaintiff admitted all of those facts. See Dckt. Nos. 44, 47. Plaintiff, in turn, offered a few additional facts of his own, based on Officer Jablonski's testimony, and the government admitted them, too. See Dckt. Nos. 48, 50. So, the question is whether the undisputed facts require a trial, or entitle the United States to exit the courthouse.
The run-in took place almost ten years ago. At that time, Officer Jablonski was a Canine Enforcement Officer for the CBP. See Plaintiff's Response to the United States's 56.1 Statement of Facts ("Plaintiff's Response"), at ¶¶ 2, 9 (Dckt. No. 47); Dckt. No. 44-1, at 35. He worked in the foreign mail unit near O'Hare airport. See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 37. His duties included "overseeing the flow of trade and travel entering the United States." See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 9. He "enforced customs, immigration, and agricultural laws and regulations at United States ports of entry to prevent the illegal trafficking of people, narcotics, and other contraband into the United States." Id.
It was a slow work day on February 17, 2010, so he decided to take his government vehicle for a checkup at a local dealership. See Dckt. No. 49-3, at 1 ¶ 1. He was driving a fully-marked CBP vehicle (an SUV). See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 2 (Dckt. No. 47). After service, he drove to the kennel, which took him through Carol Stream, Illinois, a suburb about 30 miles west of Chicago. See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 37.
That's where he crossed paths with Plaintiff Jon Ramzan. See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 1 (Dckt. No. 47). Ramzan stopped at a yellow light "due to the presence of traffic cameras." Id. So Jablonski "honked at him." Id.
At the "next light," Jablonski upped the ante. Id. at ¶ 3. Jablonski got out of the SUV, walked up to his car, and "began pounding on [Ramzan's] driver side door window with his fist." See Dckt. 44-1, at 10. He "asked Ramzan if he knew how to drive." See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 3 (Dckt. No. 47). Jablonski then instructed him to pull over into a parking lot. Id. at ¶ 4. Ramzan did not oblige. Instead, he kept driving, and went through a yellow light to get away. Id. "I just thought it was some security guy," he later explained. See Dckt. No. 49-1, at 4, 12:20-21.
Jablonski wouldn't let it go. Things began to escalate. He caught up to Ramzan and turned on the emergency lights of his CBP vehicle. See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 5 (Dckt. No. 47). This time, Ramzan pulled over, driving into a nearby parking lot. Id. For the second time, Jablonski got out of his vehicle. Id. He approached Ramzan's car, "drawing his gun and yelling at him." Id.
Fortunately for everyone, two Carol Stream police officers happened to be at the scene. Id. at ¶ 6; Dckt. No. 44-1, at 14 (). They saw Jablonski pull Ramzan over, and they witnessed Jablonski exit his SUV and approach Ramzan's vehicle. See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 6 (Dckt. No. 47). But they did not see Jablonski brandishing a weapon.1 Id. at ¶ 7.
The police officers defused the situation. They asked Jablonski why he had pulled Ramzan over. He gave an explanation that is a common denominator of all-too-many traffic-related run-ins: Ramzan had "flipped him off." See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 8 (Dckt. No. 47).
Jablonski offered a more charitable explanation of his conduct a few weeks later during an interview with an investigator from CBP's internal affairs unit. He "worried that Ramzan was in trouble, as he was behaving abnormally." Id. at ¶ 8; see also Dckt. No. 44-1, at 37. Jablonski claimed that he "thought the driver was in need of help or medical attention." Dckt. No. 44-1, at 36. "I was asking the gentleman if he was alright and if he need[ed] any help." Id. ; see also United States's Resp. to Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 Additional Statement of Facts, at ¶ 3 (Dckt. No. 50); id. at ¶ 5 ().
The situation deescalated. The police officers talked with each of the two drivers. See Dckt. No. 49-3, at 2 ¶¶ 4-6; Dckt. No. 44-1, at 10, 2:39-41; Dckt. No. 44-1, at 26, 2:51-52; Dckt. No. 44-1, at 31, 2:43-52. The police reports say nothing about a driver with a medical issue. Jablonski didn't call for medical attention for Ramzan, and he didn't ask the police officers to make that call, either. See Dckt. No. 49-3, at 2 ¶ 6. Apparently, no one at the scene – three law enforcement professionals, counting Jablonski – thought that Ramzan actually needed medical attention. (Otherwise, presumably someone would have called for some.)
The police told Ramzan that Jablonski was with the CBP, and they said that he could file a complaint. See Dckt. No. 44-1, at 10. Ramzan ultimately gave a statement to investigators from the CBP, and to the local police department. Id. at 9-11, 15-16.
A few years later, after an investigation, the CBP reprimanded Jablonski for "Use of Position for Other than Official Purposes." See Dckt. No. 49-2, at 1. According to the letter, "Officer Zalak [from the Carol Stream Police Department] stated the reason you gave him for the traffic stop was because you were given the ‘finger.’ " Id.
Meanwhile, Ramzan advanced a timely claim to the CBP under the Federal Torts Claim Act. He brought this action after exhausting his administrative remedies. See Plaintiff's Response, at ¶ 10 (Dckt. No. 47); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
A District Court "shall grant" summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see Jajeh v. County of Cook , 678 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court's role is "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 656, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014). The Court should not "weigh conflicting evidence ... or make credibility determinations." Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. , 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The Court must "constru[e] the facts and mak[e] reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant." H.P. by & Through W.P. v. Naperville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #203 , 910 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
If the party moving for summary judgment shows that there is no disputed issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the...
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