Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Com'n, C-74-1320.

• Decision Date: 18 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. C-74-1320.,C-74-1320.
• Parties: The SEA RANCH ASSOCIATION, a California nonprofit corporation, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

527 F. Supp. 390

The SEA RANCH ASSOCIATION, a California nonprofit corporation, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

No. C-74-1320.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

April 7, 1981.

Judgment Vacated November 18, 1981.

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Robert M. Westberg, Reginald D. Steer, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen. of the State of Cal., R. H. Connett, N. Gregory Taylor, Asst. Attys. Gen., Roderick Walston, Daniel J. Taaffe, Patricia Sheehan Peterson, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

Helene Linker, Roger Beers, San Francisco, Cal., for Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Sierra Club.

Before DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge, and EAST and WILLIAMS, District Judges.

Judgment Vacated November 18, 1981. See 102 S.Ct. 622.

OPINION

SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge.

The parties have been here before. In the prior proceeding, Sea Ranch Association v. California Coastal Commission, 396 F.Supp. 533, aff'd, 537 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976), plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of both the permit system and vested rights exemption system under the 1972 California Coastal Zone Conservation Act.¹ This court, although aware of the hardships which could result, chose to abstain and noted: (1) federal judicial action would interfere with the state regulatory scheme; (2) tentative or premature decisions on issues of state law should be avoided when a state court decision might eliminate or minimize the federal constitutional issue(s); and (3) plaintiffs here as well as others were pressing several very similar cases in the state court. The Circuit Court affirmed the abstention "to the extent that the federal complaint alleged a vested rights exemption for the entire Sea Ranch project," but held the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of case or controversy "to the extent it alleged vested rights exemptions for individual property owners at the Sea Ranch." Id. at 1064.

Subsequent to the Circuit's decision, the California Court of Appeal, in Oceanic California, Inc. v. The North Central Coast Regional Commission, et al., 63 Cal.App.3d 57, 133 Cal.Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 431 U.S. 951, 97 S.Ct. 2668, 53 L.Ed.2d 267 (1977), held the developer of Sea Ranch did not have a vested rights exemption to complete the development, without obtaining required permits from the regional coastal commission. This interpretation by the California Court of Appeal foreclosed the claims raised in plaintiffs' federal complaint.

Plaintiffs have now filed an amended complaint which alleges that, as applied to them, the California Coastal Act of 1976 is unconstitutional in that it takes their property for public use without just compensation and denies them due process and equal protection. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

Since the parties were last before this court the Coastal Commission has taken final action on 32 permits. These applications have been approved subject to the fulfillment of certain overall conditions developed by the commission with a view toward full build-out at Sea Ranch. These conditions generally relate to (1) water supply, (2) septic tank systems, (3) internal roadways, (4) site and design limitations, (5) public access, and (6) view easements.²

Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment that two of the "final" conditions adopted by the commission—the required public access and view easements— are unconstitutional. Specifically, they urge the conditions constitute a taking of their property without just compensation because (1) no individual lot owner is able to comply with the requirements and (2) the conditions have been imposed without regard to the relationship, or lack thereof, between a particular application and the condition imposed. This court rejects both arguments and finds the challenged conditions valid for the reasons stated below. The defendants moved this court to dismiss or in the alternative to abstain. Matters outside the pleadings having been presented to the court, the motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). The court grants summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The United States Supreme Court has held that property may be regulated to a certain extent, but if that regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). Land use regulations, however, have been upheld as a proper exercise of the police power if they are reasonable and a presumption of reasonableness lies with the state or agency action. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). The reasonableness of each regulation must be evaluated on the specific facts of each case. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979).³

Much of the factual history of this dispute appears in our previous opinion. However, since our inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the governmental action as it relates to the plaintiffs, this court reviews the goals as well as the authority of the Coastal Commission under the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act before examining the challenged conditions and the methods by which the Commission has chosen to impose them.

Among the duties of the California Coastal Commission is the protection and maintenance of the public's access to and enjoyment of the California coastline.⁴ One of the basic goals for the coastal zone is to "maximize public access to and along the coast consistent with ... constitutionally protected rights of private property owners."⁵ Maximum access is to be provided and development is not to interfere with the public's right to access to the sea.⁶ Additionally, public access to the sea from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline is to be preserved and provided in new development projects.⁷

The Act follows policies set out in the California Constitution⁸ which provides that no person claiming or possessing frontage to navigable waters in this state may exclude the public's right of way to such waters when required for any public purpose.⁹ Equally relevant to this action are portions of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act which provide that the scenic and visual quality of the coastline is to be considered and protected as a resource of public importance.¹⁰ Permitted development is to be sited and designed to protect views along the coastline.¹¹

The Coastal Commission has been given the power to implement these goals through its permitting power.¹² All development in the coastal zone is subject to review by the Commission which may impose "reasonable terms and conditions" to insure compliance with the policies of the Act.¹³

With these provisions of the Act in mind, this court finds public access and aesthetic considerations constitute areas that legitimately fall within the Commission's regulatory power.¹⁴ The permitting process is the means for the Commission to enforce the power delegated to it. It is clear that the Commission would be in violation of the policies and its duties as spelled out under the Act if it had not formulated or imposed the challenged conditions. Absent imposition of these or similar conditions ten miles of the California coastline would become a private beach with many portions of it cut off from the public's view.

Conditions similar to the ones in the instant case have been upheld by the courts. In Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 94 Cal.Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), the California Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a statute authorizing cities and counties to require dedication of land or payment of fees as a condition to approval of a subdivision map. An association of developers and builders challenged the statute and the city ordinance and resolutions enacted thereunder on the grounds that the regulations violated equal protection and due process in that they deprived them of their property without just compensation. The association, like the plaintiffs in this case, argued the state was attempting to avoid the obligation of compensation for public facilities which would be enjoyed by all citizens of the city and only incidentally by subdivision residents. The association contended the future residents of subdivisions would be forced to bear the burden imposed on the subdividers and they would be required to pay for recreational facilities the need for which stemmed not from the development of any one subdivision but from the needs of the community as a whole. In an argument similar to the one advanced by plaintiffs, the association asserted the requirement could only be justified if it was shown that the need for a particular park was directly attributable to the increase in population caused by a particular subdivision.¹⁵

The California Supreme Court rejected this contention and held the dedication requirement could be upheld without a showing a subdivision directly created a need for it. The court found that in determining whether or not a condition imposed was a reasonable exercise of the police power rather than a taking, the court was not limited to consideration of the actual immediate impact of a particular subdivider or permittee. The court also looked at the "general public need for recreational facilities caused by present and future subdivisions."¹⁶ It reviewed reports indicating statewide concern over open space and public facilities and recent amendments to the state Constitution aimed at providing open space to the public. All of these factors led the court to conclude open space and public facilities for recreation were as important to the public health and welfare as sewers or streets.¹⁷ Additionally, future as well as immediate needs could be taken into consideration...