Rancour v. Detroit Edison Co.
| Decision Date | 18 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | 78532,Docket Nos. 78056 |
| Citation | 47 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1284,150 Mich.App. 276,388 N.W.2d 336 |
| Parties | Oscar R. RANCOUR, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, v. The DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. 150 Mich.App. 276, 388 N.W.2d 336, 47 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1284 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[150 MICHAPP 278] Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson by Michael L. Pitt, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee cross-appellant.
Stanley H. Slazinski and Jessiephine W. Summerville, Detroit, for defendant-appellant cross-appellee.
Before BEASLEY, P.J., and J.H. GILLIS and KELLY, JJ.
This case presents a first impression issue regarding the nature and extent of an [150 MICHAPP 279] employer's duty to accommodate a handicapped employee under the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. Sec. 37.1101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(101) et seq.
We must decide whether the act imposes a duty upon employers to accommodate employees who have become permanently disabled in the course of their employment and can no longer perform the job for which they were hired by (1) placing or attempting to place injured employees in jobs compatible with their limitations, (2) assigning injured employees to other jobs on conditional or probationary terms where necessary, and/or (3) maintaining injured employees on employment status even where no work is available to enable them to apply as "insiders" for positions that may become available in the future. For reasons stated below, we hold that the duty of an employer to accommodate handicapped employees under the handicappers' act is limited to (1) the alteration of physical structures to allow access to the place of employment and (2) the modification of peripheral duties to allow job performance. The duty to accommodate imposed under the handicappers' act does not extend to new job placement and/or vocational rehabilitation efforts.
Plaintiff was hired as an automotive mechanic by Detroit Edison in 1975. In July and in October of 1978, plaintiff suffered two separate work-related knee injuries, which required surgery on two different occasions in 1979. As necessitated by the injuries and operations, plaintiff was classified temporarily disabled, qualifying him for temporary light duty assignments. Plaintiff returned to his normal duties in October or November of 1979 but [150 MICHAPP 280] underwent a third operation in March of 1980. Again, plaintiff was classified as temporarily disabled but at that time there was no light duty work available. Until May or June of 1980, plaintiff received full salary and benefits in the form of workers' compensation benefits plus a company supplement. After that, plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits only.
In August of 1980, plaintiff was classified permanently disabled and it is undisputed that he was completely unable to perform the duties of an automotive mechanic. While it was defendant's policy to place temporarily disabled employees in light duty assignments where available, permanently disabled employees did not qualify for such temporary assignments. Pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between defendant and plaintiff's union and pursuant to company policy, the superintendent of the motor transportation division looked within his division for another position to which plaintiff might be transferred. Upon learning that nothing was available in his immediate division, the superintendent sent a memo dated August 28, 1980, to the employment director requesting a company-wide search for available positions compatible with plaintiff's limitation. Only one job opening for a position referred to as "Special Clerk-Trombley Warehouse" matched defendant's physical qualifications but an ad hoc committee formed solely to consider plaintiff's placement in this position decided that he did not meet two of the five requisite qualifications. Specifically, the committee concluded that plaintiff did not possess the ability to "communicate effectively both orally and in writing" or the ability to "work effectively" with personnel at different levels throughout the company. On September 17, 1980, plaintiff was informed [150 MICHAPP 281] that there were no available positions and, because he was unable to perform his job as automotive mechanic, his employment relationship with defendant was terminated.
Plaintiff filed a grievance with his union which he eventually pursued to arbitration with no success. It was during these grievance proceedings that plaintiff first learned of the Special Clerk-Trombley Warehouse opening. Plaintiff subsequently filed this circuit court action under the handicappers' act and, after a four-day jury trial, obtained a judgment of $115,000 in damages, plus an interest award of $51,770. Plaintiff moved for reinstatement as an employee and for attorney fees. The trial court denied reinstatement and refused to award attorney fees under the act, although attorney fees of $3,750 were awarded under the mediation penalty provision of Wayne County Circuit Court Rule 403.16. Defendant appeals the verdict as of right and plaintiff cross-appeals the order denying reinstatement and attorney fees under the act.
Defendant's primary argument is that the jury verdict rendered in this case is not supported by law. Our review of the record, however, convinces us that plaintiff proceeded at trial on two distinct theories of recovery, only one of which is not supported by any legal basis. Plaintiff generally argued that defendant violated the accommodations provision of the handicappers' act by failing to make reasonable efforts at placing plaintiff in another position within the company. According to plaintiff, reasonable efforts would have included assigning plaintiff to the Special Clerk-Trombley Warehouse job on a probationary basis or maintaining plaintiff's employment status in order that [150 MICHAPP 282] he might apply for future openings in the company as a member of the collective bargaining unit.
Plaintiff's second theory of recovery is that the specific decision made by defendant not to offer plaintiff the position of Special Clerk-Trombley Warehouse was solely attributable to his handicap, which is unrelated to his ability to perform that particular job. The precedential significance of this opinion, however, is our consideration of plaintiff's first theory of recovery regarding the nature and extent of the employer's duty to accommodate and we address that issue first.
Article 2 of the handicappers' act governs the employment context and provides:
[150 MICHAPP 283] "(f) Fail or refuse to hire, recruit, or promote an individual when adaptive devices or aids may be utilized thereby enabling that individual to perform the specific requirements of the job.
"(g) Discharge or take other discriminatory action against an individual when adaptive devices or aids may be utilized thereby enabling that individual to perform the specific requirements of the job." M.C.L. Sec. 37.1202(1); M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(202)(1).
We note that subsections (f) and (g) impose an accommodation duty requiring the use of adaptive devices or aids where to do so would enable the individual to perform a particular job. The parties agree that this is not the type of accommodation obligation at issue in this case.
Article 1 of the act imposes a more general duty of accommodation and applies not only in the employment context but to the areas of public accommodations, public services, education and housing as well. Section 102(2) provides simply:
"A person shall accommodate a handicapper for purposes of employment, public accommodation, public service, education, or housing unless the person demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship." M.C.L. Sec. 37.1102(2); M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(102)(2).
This provision of the handicappers' act was adopted by 1980 PA 478, Sec. 1 and became effective on January 20, 1981, several months after plaintiff's termination in September of 1980. Prior to the 1980 amendment, however, article 2 of the act contained a separate provision governing the accommodation duty in the employment context:
"Nothing in this article shall be interpreted to exempt a person from the obligation to accommodate an employee or applicant with a handicap for employment unless the person demonstrates that the accommodation[150 MICHAPP 284] would impose an undue hardship in the conduct of the business." formerly M.C.L. Sec. 37.1207; M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(207), repealed by 1980 PA 478, Sec. 1.
As explained in Carr v. General Motors Corp, 135 Mich.App. 226, 232-233, 353 N.W.2d 489 (1984), lv. granted, 422 Mich. 936 (1985), the 1980 ame...
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