Rancourt v. Nichols.

• Decision Date: 16 March 1943
• Citation: 31 A.2d 410
• Parties: RANCOURT v. NICHOLS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

31 A.2d 410

RANCOURT

v.NICHOLS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 16, 1943.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Cumberland County.

Forcible entry and detainer proceeding by Eva M. Rancourt against Pearl B. Nichols.An appeal was taken from the municipal court of the City of Portland to the superior court and decision was for plaintiff.On exceptions by defendant.

Exceptions overruled.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, MURCHIE, and CHAPMAN, JJ.

Gould & Shackley by C. H. Shackley, of Portland, for plaintiff.

Elton H. Thompson and Walter F. Murrell, both of Portland, for defendant.

MURCHIE, Justice.

This case comes to the Court on exceptions by the defendant to a decision in the Superior Court on process of forcible entry and detainer.The writ issued from the Municipal Court for the City of Portland on May 12, 1942, returnable a week later, and was there determined notwithstanding a plea, offered by way of brief statement accompanying the general issue, that title to the premises was “in question” and that a bill in equity was pending in the Supreme Judicial Court to determine the rights of the parties under a contract for the sale thereof from the defendant's landlord to the plaintiff, it being claimed that such contract was chargeable with a trust in favor of the defendant.

[1] Appeal was taken to the Superior Court and the decision there is here under review on eight allegations of error.One asserts that the decision was against the weight of evidence, but factual findings by a single Justice acting without the intervention of a jury are not subject to exception if supported by any evidence.Ayer v. Harris, 125 Me. 249, 132 A. 742.Decision below was on an agreed statement of facts and while the exceptions are variously worded, they present the single issue as to whether on those facts it was error in law to grant relief to the plaintiff under R.S.(1930), Chap. 108, § 1.

It is well established in law that when title to property occupied by a tenant at will is passed by either deed or lease, the tenancy is terminated.Esty v. Baker, 50 Me. 325, 79 Am.Dec. 616;Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536, 38 A. 540;Small v. Clark, 97 Me. 304, 54 A. 758;Karahalies v. Dukais, 108 Me. 527, 81 A. 1011;Bennett et al. v. Casavant, 129 Me. 123, 150 A. 319; McFarland et al. v. Chase, 7 Gray, Mass., 462.

The premises were leased to the plaintiff by defendant's landlord for a term of one year from the date of the sale agreement.The plaintiff forthwith notified the defendant of the fact and made demand that the latter vacate the premises “at once”.This was subsequent to the commencement of the equity proceedings, and defendant claims that despite the two efforts to transfer the right of possession, there has been no alienation of her landlord's title.The claim is that the contract was ineffective because its validity has not been determined in the equity proceedings, and the lease equally so because it could transfer to the plaintiff“no greater right or additional privilege of right of possession” than the plaintiff already had under the contract.“It is certain”, quoting counsel, “that on the face of it the lease is colorable and a deliberate attempt to evade the equity proceedings by forcing the issue” under the present process.It is unnecessary to consider whether or not the lease was in fact colorable.In Bennett et al. v. Casavant, supra[129 Me. 123, 150 A. 320], process of forcible entry was permitted a plaintiff claiming under a lease which had been found in equity proceedings to have been executed as “a subterfuge to accomplish the early eviction” of the defendant in possession.“The finding did not annul the lease”, the Court stated in that case, nor would it affect the rights of the parties to the present action if it could be demonstrated that like purpose induced the execution of the plaintiff's lease.The defendant's tenancy was terminated by the execution of the lease, if the purchase contract which was intended to carry the right of possession had not already accomplished that purpose.Regardless of the possessory right following the execution of the contract, or upon the filing of the equitable process, the plaintiff on April 14, 1942, which is the date of the lease and of the alleged disseisin, was entitled in law to possession of the property.As against her, the defendant is a disseisor and the remedy sought to be used an appropriate one.Baker et al. v. Cooper, 57 Me. 388;Karahalies v. Dukais, supra;Bennett et al. v. Casavant, supra.

Included among the exceptions alleged by the defendant is one wherein error is claimed because of the neglect or refusal of the Justice below to make any finding on a motion to annul the defendant's recognizance, it being recited in the bill that such a motion was submitted for consideration simultaneously with the principal case.This omission cannot constitute prejudicial error...