Randall v. Carpenter

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STINESS, C. J.
• Citation: Randall v. Carpenter, 25 R.I. 641, 57 A. 865 (R.I. 1904)
• Decision Date: 05 February 1904
• Parties: RANDALL v. CARPENTER.

57 A. 865

25 R.I. 641

RANDALL

v. CARPENTER.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 5, 1904.

Assumpsit by Josephine A. Randall against John F. Carpenter, executor. Heard on demurrer to replication. Demurrer sustained.

Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and DOUGLAS, JJ.

Dexter B. Potter and Donald G. Perkins, for plaintiff.

George H. Huddy, Jr., for defendant.

STINESS, C. J. The plaintiff sues in assumpsit for services. The defendant's fourth plea sets up a former judgment in the superior court of Connecticut alleging that under a rule of said court, enacted by authority of the judiciary department of the state under the practice act, a plaintiff failing to show an alleged agreed price may recover a reasonable price in an action for goods sold, "and the like rule shall prevail in actions for work done," and that said former action was brought to recover compensation for the same services as those set forth in this declaration. To this plea the plaintiff replies that, though the rule was as stated, though the judgment is final and was on the merits of the case and between the same parties, yet the cause of action was not the same as in this declaration; that the single and sole issue tried therein was whether the plaintiff had a specific contract with Jonathan C. Randall, in his lifetime, to pay to this plaintiff a specific sum of $20,000; that no evidence was submitted on any other issue, or as to the value of the plaintiff's services, and that said former action was not brought to recover for the same services set forth in the present action, To this replication the defendant demurs on the ground that, the cause of action being the same, the plaintiff is estopped from again asserting the same cause of action against the defendant.

We do not set out the pleadings in full, the foregoing statement being sufficient to bring out the points involved; but it should be added that there were two issues in the former suit, based upon the defendant's denial of the first two counts in the complaint, viz.:

"(1) On or about October 1, 1894, said Jonathan C. Randall entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff whereby he agreed to give and pay to the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand dollars, in consideration that the plaintiff would during the fife of said Randall make her home with him as a companion and housekeeper, and render services to him as business correspondent and clerk, and nurse him when sick, and the plaintiff agreed to the same.

"(2) From the date of the said agreement until the death of said Randall, the plaintiff fulfilled the terms of said agreement on her part, and fully performed said contract, and there became and was due to her from the said Randall, under the said agreement, at the time of his death, the sum of $20,000."

Both of these counts were denied by the defendant.

The plaintiff's claim now is that in the former action the only issue was whether there was an express contract for a specific sum, and that in this action the question is on an implied contract for what the services were worth, and that these are distinct causes of action.

The defendant invokes the rule that the plaintiff is estopped as to all matters which were or might have been decided in the former action. We know of no better statement of the rule than that by Mr. Justice Field in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195, as follows: "There is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. Thus, for example, a judgment rendered...