Randall v. Packard

• Decision Date: 10 April 1894
• Citation: 142 N.Y. 47,36 N.E. 823
• Parties: RANDALL v. PACKARD (two cases).
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

142 N.Y. 47

36 N.E. 823

RANDALL

v.PACKARD (two cases).

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 10, 1894.

Appeal from common pleas of New York city and county, general term.

Action by Samuel H. Randall against George W. Packard for professional services rendered defendant, as attorney. From a judgment of the general term (20 N. Y. Supp. 716) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, and from a judgment of the general term (20 N. Y. Supp. 718) affirming an order denying a motion for new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Finch, J., dissenting.

Wheeler H. Peckham, for appellant.

Samuel H. Randall, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

This action was brought to recover the sum of $23,000, as a balance claimed to be due to the plaintiff for professional services rendered to the defendant in the capacity of his attorney at law. The answer admitted the employment of the plaintiff, but denied that his services were worth more than the sum of $2,000, which had been paid to him. Upon the trial the nature of the services rendered was testified to. It appears that the defendant had subscribed the sum of $125,000 to the capital stock of the Perry Stove Company (a corporation organized in Albany, N. Y.), and in part payment of his subscription had transferred to the company certain foundry property, at a valuation of $45,000, and had given to it his promissory note for $10,000, which was held by a bank under discount. He was being pressed for the payment of the balance of his subscription, and, becoming dissatisfied with the project, was desirous of being relivered of his agreement, and of getting out of the matter entirely. To accomplish his release, he employed the plaintiff as his attorney; and, negotiations for an amicable settlement failing, the latter commenced an action in equity for his client, to set aside the subscription, and to compel a recoveyance of the foundry property and the return of the note. The complaint was based upon charges of fraud and deceit in procuring the defendant to join in the corporate enterprise. Answers were made to the complaint, putting its allegations in issue, but before the cause came on for trial a compromise was effected between the parties. It is fair to infer from the evidence that it was made because of the delay which would ensue in organization, and of the cloud which would or might be cast over the enterprise. The interests of the company were deemed better subserved by a settlement than by a protracted litigation. As the result of the compromise, this defendant received back from the company his foundry property and his note; he subscribed the sum of $5,000 to the same corporate enterprise, but with a capitalization of $300,000 instead of $500,000; and the equity action he had instituted, and the action at law against him to compel the payment of the balance of his subscription, were discontinued. The plaintiff's own evidence as to the promise of the defendant to pay him $25,000 in the event of a successful result was flatly contradicted by the defendant, and the evidence of lawyers examined by him upon the question of the value of the services he had testified to performing for the defendant was as flatly contradicted by that of lawyers examined in behalf of the defendant. As to the parties litigant, the question of an agreement to pay the sum of $25,000, or any fixed sum, depended upon the credibility to be attached to their several statements, while the question of the value of the plaintiff's services, under the circumstances detailed, was apparently not much helped in its solution by the irreconcilable evidence of the expert witnesses. The jury, after being charged by the trial judge, rendered a verdict of $10,000 for the plaintiff, being less than half of the plaintiff's claim. Whatever our opinion might still be as to the amount awarded by the jury, upon the evidence before them, we are concluded from any expression by their verdict; and, if there was no error committed upon the trial, the judgment must stand.

At the conclusion of the charge the defendant's counsel excepted ‘to that part of the charge in which the court charged that the main element of value is result.’ That exception is the sole error urged by the appellant as ground for reversal of the judgment below. The precise language of the trial judge, to which the exception related, was this: ‘But the main element, after all, in determining the value of a lawyer's services, is the result of his labor.’ If this statement had stood alone, and without anything which could be regarded as qualifying it, it would have been distinctly erroneous and misleading, as to the law, and the defendant would have been entitled to a reversal of the judgment. The result of a lawyer's services is an element in determining their value, and it is, unquestionably, a very important one. Had the learned trial judge said that the result was one of the main elements, he would have been right. There are serveral other elements which must be equally considered in determining the amount of an attorney's compensation; and unless the jury were instructed as to the importance of their consideration, or if they were so instructed concerning the importance of the result attained for the client as to mislead them into the belief that they were at liberty to base their estimate entirely or principally upon that result, there would have been distinct error. The general rule is that an attorney, in the absence of an agreement, deserves compensation according to the reasonable worth of his services. Of that the jury are the sole judges, and, to arrive at their value, they may consider the nature of the services rendered; the standing of the attorney in his profession, for learning, skill, and proficiency; the amount involved; and the importance to his client of the result. The reason why the result is one of the important factors in the consideration must be obvious. It not only is some evidence of the usefulness of the services, but, for its effects upon the situation of the client, relatively to what it had been, it must be conceded a degree of influence, in fixing the amount of the attorney's compensation, which is measured by the nature and incidents of the result, in connection with the other considerations adverted to. The trial judge, in the previous portion of his charge, said to the jury that ‘several circumstances must enter into the computation’ in estimating value, and he proceeded to state them; reviewing, in connection with their statement, the evidence in the case. He had said that the professional reputation of the lawyer for ability and integrity; the difficulty and importance of the case; the amount of work and labor performed; the amount involved, and the pecuniary ability of the client,-were to be considered; and it was after a rather general discussion of these considerations that he stated that ‘the main element, after all, in determining the value of a lawyer's services, is the result.’ Despite what had been said by the judge, I should still hesitate to say that the jury may not have been seriously misled by the undue emphasis laid upon the result as a...