Randall v. Stager

Decision Date25 November 1946
Docket Number3566
Citation355 Pa. 352,49 A.2d 689
PartiesRandall et vir, Appellants, v. Stager et al
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued October 2, 1946

Appeals, Nos. 138 and 139, March T., 1946, from judgments of C.P., Cambria Co., March T., 1945, No. 103, in case of Anna Randall et vir v. Philip Stager et al. Judgments affirmed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before GRIEFFITH, J.

Verdict in the sum of $15,000 for plaintiff wife and in the sum of $2,106.18 for plaintiff husband. Judgments n.o.v. entered for defendants, before McCANN, P.J., and GRIFFITH, J., opinion by GRIFFITH, J. Plaintiffs appealed.

Judgments affirmed.

Morton Meyers , with him Graham, Yost, Meyers &amp Graham, for appellants.

George Y, Meyer , with him Thomas A. Swope, Philip N Shettig and Shettig & Swope , for appellees.

Before MAXEY, C.J., DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE DREW

On July 19, 1943, plaintiff, Anna Randall, was a gratuitous guest passenger in an automobile owned by one of defendants, Philip Stager, and operated by his son, Neal Stager, the other defendant. She had accepted an invitation of Mrs. Philip Stager and her husband to accompany them on a trip to Flint, Michigan, for the purpose of bringing back Neal Stager. The party was returning to Cambria County, Pennsylvania, where all the parties resided, when the automobile in which they were riding collided with a truck and serious damages resulted. Immediately prior thereto, the car was being operated in a general easterly direction on a three-lane concrete highway approximately eight miles east of the City of Toledo, in the State of Ohio. It was travelling at a speed of about forty-five miles an hour on a straight dry highway in broad daylight. The only other vehicle at the time near the point of the accident was a large truck, which was being operated in the opposite, or westerly direction along the northern lane of traffic. As the two vehicles approached each other, and, when the Stager car was about seventy-five feet from the truck, it suddenly turned left, ran across the intervening, or central lane of the road, and collided with the truck, which was then as far over on its side of the highway as it was possible to get. Mrs. Randall was asleep in the rear seat of the car at the time and was painfully and permanently injured. She and her husband brought this suit to recover their damages. After verdicts in their favor, the learned court below, on defendants' motion, entered judgment n.o.v. for defendants, on the ground that plaintiffs were required by the law of Ohio to show defendants were guilty of "wilful or wanton misconduct", and this they had failed to do. In passing on plaintiffs' appeals we shall consider the evidence in the light most favorable to them and resolve all doubts and inferences in their favor: Chidester v. Pittsburgh , 354 Pa. 417, 47 A.2d 130.

The law of the State of Ohio, the lex loci delicti, governs this case: Mackey v. Robertson , 328 Pa. 504, 506, 195 A. 870. Section 6308-6 of the Motor Vehicle Laws of Ohio (Throckmorton's Annotated Code of Ohio, 1934) provides: "The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle ." (Italics added).

The known facts concerning this accident are such that a jury could not properly infer from them "wanton misconduct". In Universal Concrete Pipe Company v. Bassett , 130 Ohio State, 567, 200 N.E. 843, it was said: "Wonton misconduct is such conduct as manifests a disposition to perversity, and it must be under such surrounding circumstances and existing conditions that the party doing the act or failing to act must be conscious, from his knowledge of such surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will in all common probability result in injury."

In the instant case there is not a scintilla of evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Neal Stager was "conscious", from his knowledge of the surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct would in all common probability result in injury to anyone. In addition to the facts herein set forth, he was an experienced driver. Plaintiff, Mrs. Randall, testified that he was a careful driver. Neal Stager's father, who was sitting next to him at the time...

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