Randall v. State

• Decision Date: 27 October 1892
• Parties: RANDALL v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

132 Ind. 539

32 N.E. 305

RANDALL

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 27, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Huntington county; J. B. Kenner, Judge pro tem.

David Randall was convicted of larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.George A. Topst and B. M. Cobb, for appellant. Wm. A. Branyan, for appellee.

McBride, C. J.

The appellant was tried on a charge of petit larceny, and convicted. He asks a reversal upon the ground that the court erred in overruling a motion to quash the information, and in overruling his motion for a new trial. Other errors are assigned, but not discussed. The information is as follows: “William A. Branyan, prosecuting attorney in and for the twenty-eighth judicial circuit of Indiana, now gives the Huntington circuit court to understand and be informed that David Randall, on the 31st day of April, A. D. 1892, at and in said county and state aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously steal, take, and carry away six dollars in money, of the value of six dollars, then and there, and being then and there the personal goods, money, and chattels of William Powers. And the said Randall was heretofore convicted of petit larceny in the Wells circuit court, in Wells county, in said state, as William Powers has complained upon oath. [Signed] William A. Branyan, Prosecuting Atty.” The appellant insists that the information is insufficient to charge a public offense, because it contains no allegation of “the kind of money which it is claimed was stolen.” This counsel argues, is necessary to a description of the alleged stolen property, and that without it there is no description. The bill of rights (article 1 of the constitution; section 58, Rev. St. 1881) guaranties to those accused of crime the right “to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” This constitutional provision requires that one accused of larceny be informed by the indictment or information of what property the larceny is alleged to have been committed. A statute which should attempt to dispense with any description whatever of the property alleged to be stolen would be void, and an indictment or information purporting to charge larceny, that contained no description of the alleged stolen property, would not charge a public offense. Section 1750, Rev. St. 1881, prescribes that in indictments and informations it shall be sufficient to describe money, bank bills, notes, United States treasury notes, etc., “simply as money, without specifying any particular coin, note, bill, or currency.” The information before us complies with this statutory requirement, and is sufficient. While it is not competent for the legislature to dispense with all description, it is competent for it to prescribe rules for the description of property in such cases, and to declare what shall be a sufficient description. Riggs v. State, 104 Ind. 261, 3 N. E. Rep. 886; Lewis v. State, 113 Ind. 59, 14 N. E. Rep. 892; Graves v. State, 121 Ind. 357, 23 N. E. Rep. 155; McCarty v. State, 127 Ind. 223, 26 N. E. Rep. 665.

The accused called one J. F. France as a witness for the defense, who, having testified to acquaintance with the accused, was asked the following question: “You may state if you are acquainted with his character for honesty, and the proper respect for the property rights of others in that locality where he formerly lived?” The witness answered: “I think that I was at the time he resided there.” In answer to the question as to what that character was, whether good or bad, he answered: “It was good, as far as I know.” The witness was cross-examined at considerable length, and, among other things, testified to having heard of the arrest of the accused once on a charge of surety of the peace, and once on a charge of housebreaking. He was then asked if he had not heard that he had previously been arrested in another county on a charge of malicious trespass. The question was answered in the affirmative, over reasonable objection made by the accused; the witness further testifying in that connection that he had learned that the accused had been convicted, fined, and...