Randall v. Tuell

• Decision Date: 05 January 1897
• Citation: Randall v. Tuell, 89 Me. 443, 36 A. 910 (Me. 1897)
• Parties: RANDALL v. TUELL.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

36 A. 910

89 Me. 443

RANDALL

v. TUELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 5, 1897.

(Official.)

Exceptions from superior court, Kennebec county.

Action by James P. Randall against James E. Tuell. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions sustained.

This was an action of assumpsit for board and lodging furnished at the Cony House, in the city of Augusta, between April 26, 1894, and May 10, 1894. The plea was the general issue.

That the plaintiff boarded a lady at his hotel, the Cony House, in Augusta, Me., for 14 days from April 26, 1894, to May 10, 1894, was admitted. It was not in controversy that the price charged, $28, and claimed in the writ, was reasonable.

The plaintiff contended that he furnished the board under an oral contract with the defendant, whereby the defendant engaged the room, and orally promised to pay for the board and lodging subsequently so furnished.

The defendant contended that in making the contract relied on by the plaintiff he was merely the agent of the lady to whom the board was so furnished, and that the contract was hers, and not his.

The cause was submitted to the jury upon the foregoing issue, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff for the sum of $28, with interest from demand.

It was not in controversy that the Cony House, during the time covered by plaintiff's claim, was a public inn in the city of Augusta, in the county of Kennebec, and that the contract relied on was for board and lodging furnished by the plaintiff at said public inn, as an innholder. It was admitted that during the time covered by the contract the plaintiff had no license as an innholder in the city of Augusta, as required by statute.

The defendant seasonably requested the presiding justice to instruct the jury that under the foregoing facts the plaintiff could not maintain his action, and that a verdict should be rendered for the defendant.

The presiding justice declined to give the instruction so requested, and ruled, pro forma, that the action was maintainable; and to this ruling the defendant excepted.

E. W. Whitehouse and W. H. Fisher, for plaintiff.

H. M. Heath and C. L. Andrews, for defendant.

FOSTER, J. The only question presented in this case is whether an innholder, who has no license, under Rev. St. c. 27, can recover for board and lodging furnished by him in such inn.

While the statute contains no express provision declaring contracts by an unlicensed innholder to be void, it does, by section 13, expressly provide that "no person shall be a common innholder or victualer without a license, under a penalty of not more than fifty dollars."

It is the general doctrine, now settled by the great weight of authority, that where a license is required for the protection of the public, and to prevent improper persons from engaging in a particular business, and the license is not for revenue merely, a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation of the act is void.

Did the legislature, by the requirement of a license, intend to prohibit the exercise of the business without a license, or was the statute enacted for revenue purposes only?

It can hardly be contended that the statute is in any sense for mere revenue. The fee required is only one dollar. The licensee must show that he is a man of good moral character, must give bond not to violate the prohibitory law, and must allow no gambling on his premises. The legislative intent is best inferred from the language of the statute itself. The statute is explicitly prohibitory, and the license required is clearly for the protection of the public, and to prevent improper persons from engaging in a particular business.

This question has come before the courts not only in this, but in other states, and the great trend of authority is in but one direction.

The same principle was established in Harding v. Hagar, 60 Me. 340. There the plaintiff was a commercial broker, within the meaning of a statute of the United States, which provided that no person should be engaged in prosecuting or carrying on any trade, business, or profession thereinafter mentioned until he should obtain a license therefor, under a penalty. That statute contained no express provision declaring the contracts of unlicensed persons void. Like the statute under consideration, it prohibited unlicensed employments. Suit was brought to recover for services as broker, and in the course of the opinion Kent, J., says: "It is too well settled to require the citation of authorities that no party can recover for acts or services done in direct contravention of an express statute, or /or property sold and delivered. When the case develops such forbidden acts, unless protected by a license or authority, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show such license."

The same question was determined, authorities reviewed, and the principle affirmed in Harding v. Hagar, 63 Me. 515. In Stanwood v. Woodward, 38 Me. 192, an innholder without license sought to establish a lien for board upon the property of a guest committed to his charge, and the want of a license was held to be fatal to his claim.

This case falls...