Randlett v. Randlett

• Decision Date: 31 May 1979
• Citation: 401 A.2d 1008
• Parties: Margaret H. RANDLETT v. Yeaton D. RANDLETT.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1008

401 A.2d 1008

Margaret H. RANDLETT v. Yeaton D. RANDLETT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 31, 1979.

Grossman, Faber & Miller by Barry M. Faber, (orally), Rockland, for plaintiff.

Eaton, Glass & Marsano by Francis C. Marsano, (orally), Belfast, for defendant.

Before WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.

DELAHANTY, Justice.

This appeal raises the question of the propriety of a declaratory judgment, to be entered during the lives of the spouses, which would decide whether a separation agreement negotiated by the parties and incorporated into their divorce decree will obligate the defendant-husband's estate to continue making alimony payments to the plaintiff-wife in the event that she survives him. Since we conclude, contrary to the rulings of the courts below, that a justiciable controversy exists, we sustain the appeal and remand the case for further consideration on the merits.

By a decree entered April 2, 1976, the District Court granted the plaintiff a divorce from the defendant on the ground of cruel and abusive treatment. The separation agreement which the parties had negotiated was made a part of the decree by reference. Paragraph 2D of the agreement obligated the defendant to pay $150.00 per week "so long as (the plaintiff) remains unmarried and alive."

On January 14, 1977, the defendant moved pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 80(j) to modify the divorce judgment to provide that his obligation to pay alimony would cease upon his death. After a hearing, the District Court, on April 1, 1977, denied the motion on the ground that "no change of circumstances (had) occurred since (the) date of (the divorce) judgment." One week later, the defendant moved pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 59(e) to alter or amend the April 1 order. Coupled with this motion and filed on the same day was a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment made in accordance with District Court Civil Rule 57 and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, codified at 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951-5963. As was true of the January 14 motion, the complaint stated that the defendant interpreted the agreement to mean that his obligation to pay alimony would cease at the time of his death. The complaint went on to state that the plaintiff had orally declared to the defendant that she interpreted the agreement differently: In her view, the obligation would survive the decease of the defendant.

After hearing oral argument, the District Court denied both the motion and the request for declaratory relief citing the following reasons:

There has been no change in circumstances of the parties since the date of the divorce judgment of April 2, 1976, and no other basis on which to base any alteration or amendment of said judgment.

There is no justiciable controversy between the parties on which a declaratory judgment may legally be issued.

Several contingencies may in the future occur to affect the legal relationship of the parties with respect to the liability of the defendant under the divorce judgment of April 2, 1976:

(1) Margaret H. Randlett may marry before the death of Yeaton D. Randlett;

(2) Margaret H. Randlett, while still unmarried, may predecease Yeaton D. Randlett (3) Margaret H. Randlett may marry after the death of Yeaton D. randlett.

The question of necessary construction of a judgment and contract (made a part of the judgment by reference) may never arise because of the noted contingencies affecting rights of the parties.

A declaratory judgment entered now would not be dealing with a current real controversay (sic).

Noting its agreement with the decision of the District Court, the Superior Court, Waldo County, denied the ensuing appeal on March 29, 1978. This appeal followed.

It is clear that by statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 5953, and rule, D.C.Civ.R. 57, the District Court is empowered to grant declaratory relief in appropriate circumstances. That established, we reach the question of whether the court could issue a declaratory judgment in this instance. It is important to note that the District Court's decree incorporated by reference the parties' separation agreement and thus transformed the agreement into a judgment of that court. See Lindsley v. Lindsley, Me., 374 A.2d 311, 316-17 (1977); Coe v. Coe, 145 Me. 71, 71 A.2d 514 (1950).

So postured, we confront the question of whether a litigant is entitled to seek declaratory relief to clarify the terms of a prior judgment. Although jurisdictions are divided over this question as a general proposition, Compare Mills v. Mills, 512 P.2d 143 (Okl.1973), And Speaker v. Lawler, 463 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Civ.App.1971), With Meeks v. Town of Hoover, 286 Ala. 373, 240 So.2d 125 (1970), Minne v. City of Mishawaka, 251 Ind. 166, 240 N.E.2d 56 (1968), And National-Ben Franklin Fire Insurance Co. v. Camden Trust Co., 36 N.J.Super. 249, 115 A.2d 589 (1955), we find that on the facts of this case declaratory relief was properly invoked.

We note that recent decisions of this Court demonstrate that decrees attempting to regulate the future conduct of parties often reveal themselves to be susceptible to varying interpretations. Where an honest disagreement as to the meaning of a decree surfaces, the aggrieved party frequently turns to the rendering court and asks for a clarification of the decree. By doing so, the party does not seek to retry the facts of the case or to reverse the court's decision. This can only be accomplished by appeal or under M.R.Civ.P. 59. Rather, the party merely wants to know what is expected of him under the court's decree. In such cases, allowing a court the power to render a clarification would appear to be sound public policy since the only other way a litigant could test the meaning of a decree would be to proceed on his chosen course of action at the risk of being held in contempt.

The recent decisions alluded to above indicate that a court has the authority to make clear the meaning of a prior decree where necessary to guide the conduct of the parties. Thus, in Boothbay Harbor Condominium I v. Whitten, Me., 387 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1978), where a disagreement arose over the question of whether the defendant had properly complied with a Superior Court equity decree, we affirmed the Superior Court's subsequent clarification of its decree citing the principle that "(a) court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to construe its judgments . . . ." Similarly, in Knight v. Knight, Me., 387 A.2d 603, 604-05 (1978), we held that the Superior Court could competently declare the rights of the parties under an ambiguous District Court decree. Although in the Boothbay Harbor and Knight cases the moving parties selected somewhat different procedural avenues from the one pursued in this case, we see nothing inappropriate in the defendant's selection here of the declaratory remedy. ¹ Indeed, other jurisdictions have given their sanction to the practice under similar circumstances. Putnam v. Putnam, 51 Cal.App.2d 696, 125 P.2d 525 (1942); Roberts v. Roberts, 90 Ill.App.2d 184, 234 N.E.2d 372 (1967); Beach v. Beach, 57 Ohio App. 294, 13 N.E.2d 581 (1937).

The District Court denied relief in this case on the ground that there existed "no justiciable controversy between the parties on which a declaratory judgment may legally be issued." It is clear that the court based its decision on the principle that a party seeking declaratory relief must establish that his case constitutes an "active dispute of real interests between the litigants." Berry v. Daigle, Me., 322 A.2d 320, 325 (1974); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lyons, Me., 400 A.2d 349 (1979); Maine Turnpike Authority v. Brennan, Me., 342 A.2d 719, 723 (1975); Shapiro Brothers Shoe Co. v. Lewiston-Auburn Shoeworkers Protective Ass'n, Me., 320 A.2d 247, 251 n.7 (1974). We find that the case at bar presents an "active dispute."

Preliminarily, we note that under 14 M.R.S.A. § 5951 the courts are directed to interpret and construe the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (the Act) "(so) as to effectuate (its) general purpose to make uniform the law of those states (enacting the Act)." In that connection, it is significant that the majority of cases that have considered the justiciability of this type of claim have held the granting of declaratory relief proper. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 941 (1961).

In Roberts v. Roberts, supra, the plaintiff made use of the Act to attack the provisions of a settlement agreement, later incorporated into the parties' divorce decree, which called for weekly installment payments on a lump sum in lieu of alimony. The plaintiff contended that a term of the agreement/decree which provided that the defendant could stop payments in the event of the plaintiff's death or remarriage violated a state statute as well as public policy. Although, as the court put it, the plaintiff made "no allegation that (she) is contemplating remarriage (or) that she is suffering from an incurable terminal disease . . . ," it nevertheless upheld the granting of declaratory relief. 90 Ill.App.2d at 187, 234 N.E.2d at 374.

We believe that there is an actual controversy in the instant case. There are adverse legal interests. Although no wrong has yet been committed, such is not necessary to obtain declaratory relief. The mere existence of a claim, assertion or challenge to plaintiff's legal interests, in which the ripening seeds of litigation may be seen and which cast doubt, insecurity, and uncertainty upon plaintiff's rights or status damages plaintiff's pecuniary or...