Randolph v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 26 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 7375.,7375.
• Citation: 333 A.2d 380
• Parties: George D. RANDOLPH, Jr., Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a municipal corporation, and District of Columbia ex rel. Mittle Randolph, Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 380

333 A.2d 380

George D. RANDOLPH, Jr., Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a municipal corporation, and District of Columbia ex rel. Mittle Randolph, Appellees.

No. 7375.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 24, 1974.

Decided February 26, 1975.

Maurine H. Abernathy, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Earl A. Gershenow, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.

Before KELLY, FICKLING and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to the provisions of D.C. Code 1973, § 3-218, the District of Columbia brought suit against George D. Randolph, Jr. for reimbursement of public assistance payments in the sum of $3,926.42 made by the District for the support of Mittie Randolph, his wife, from December 17, 1970 through November of 1972, and, in addition, for periodic contributions towards Mrs. Randolph's future support. The trial court permitted the District to recover $981 in accrued public assistance payments and ordered Randolph to make a weekly contribution of $15.00 towards future payments as well. Randolph appeals. Finding that the trial court erroneously failed to consider evidence that the appellant's duty to support his wife had been eradicated by his wife's adultery and unjustifiable desertion from the appellant and their infant son prior to her commitment to St. Elizabeths Hospital, we reverse the order of the trial court.

The record shows that by order dated September 21, 1954, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia adjudicated Mrs. Mittie M. Randolph of unsound mind and committed her to St. Elizabeths Hospital until such time as she might be safely discharged therefrom. Years later, in December of 1970, Mrs. Randolph was released by the hospital and placed in a foster home where she lived during the months here in dispute supported by public assistance payments from the District of Columbia.

The District filed its suit against Randolph on June 9, 1972.¹ It then sent Randolph a letter which informed him of the civil complaint filed against him and requested that he come to the office of the Corporation Counsel at 601 Indiana Avenue, N.W., to discuss the case. After Randolph had appeared at that office as requested and had learned the basis of the District's claim, he was served with process by a deputy United States Marshal. Before service, Randolph was told of his right to retain counsel and that he did not have to accept service in that office. The trial court later found at a hearing on Randolph's motion to quash service of process that he had willingly and knowingly accepted service of the complaint.²

In answer to the complaint Randolph admitted the marriage, but denied liability for any part of the accrued public assistance payments made by the District on behalf of his wife and his financial ability to make any contribution to his wife's support. He also submitted by affidavit a financial statement which listed a weekly take-home pay of $106.93 and expenses of $107.25.

At trial, Randolph testified that he and Mrs. Randolph were married on January 31, 1952, and lived together until the summer of 1954 when she deserted him because, as she said, "she was in love with another man. . . ." The trial court excluded further testimony relating to the circumstances of the Randolph separation in the belief that it was irrelevant to the proceedings. In the appellant's answer to the original complaint and in an affidavit submitted with a post-trial memorandum, however, it was also asserted that Mrs. Randolph claimed to be pregnant by the lover for whom she left Mr. Randolph that Mrs. Randolph refused to have anything to do with her husband or son after her desertion; that the appellant has not been in contact with his wife for eighteen years; and that he has been forced to raise their son, now 19, by himself. Mr. Randolph also testified that he had not sought a divorce during the 18 years of separation because he had been advised that divorce was impossible as long as his wife was a patient at St. Elizabeths Hospital. He did not contribute to his wife's support during her commitment to St. Elizabeths because the District Court order committing Mrs. Randolph expressly provided that

[t]he expense of the maintenance and treatment of Mittie Mae Randolph in St. Elizabeths Hospital shall be borne by the District of Columbia without prejudice to its right to claim reimbursement in full from the estate of the patient, or others, as provided by law.

Nor was Mr. Randolph notified when his wife was transferred from St. Elizabeths to a "foster home", the action which the District claims nullified the effect of the commitment order provision set out above.³

In its case the District put on its proof of past and present public assistance payments made on Mrs. Randoph's behalf. The court took the matter under advisement and, after receipt of legal memoranda, ultimately found Randolph liable to the

District. It held, however, that a judgment in excess of $981.60 for accrued public assistance payments [one-quarter of the amount due] would impose an unreasonable hardship upon him and that it was reasonable to require Randolph to contribute only $15.00 a week towards the cost of his wife's future maintenance ($170.00 per month). An order was entered consistent with these findings.⁴

The statute in question, D.C.Code 1973, § 3-218, provides:

Responsible relatives.

(a) Responsible relatives for any applicant or recipient of public assistance shall be limited to spouse for spouse and parent for a child under the age of twenty-one, and their financial responsibility shall be based upon their ability to pay. Any such applicant or recipient of public assistance or person in need thereof, or the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, may bring an action to require such financially responsible spouse or parent to provide such support, and the court shall have the power to make orders requiring such spouse or parent to pay such eligible applicant or recipient of public assistance such sum or sums of money in such installments as the court in its discretion may direct, and such orders may be enforced in the same manner as orders for alimony.

(b) The Commissioner is authorized on behalf of the District to sue such spouse or parent for the amount of public assistance granted to such recipient under this chapter or under any Act repealed by this chapter, or for so much thereof as such spouse or parent is reasonably able to pay.

(c) All suits, actions, and court proceedings under this section shall be brought in the Domestic Relations Branch of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions [now the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia], or in that court division which may subsequently exercise the jurisdiction exercised by the Domestic Relations Branch on the effective date of this Act. To the extent applicable, suits, actions, and proceedings brought pursuant to this section shall be governed by the provisions of the Act approved April 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 111), as such Act may from time to time be amended or superseded.

Randolph nevertheless questions the District's authority to sue him in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, arguing that because Mrs. Randolph's original commitment to St. Elizabeths Hospital was by order of the United States District Court, jurisdiction over any claim for contribution to her support remains in that court. We would agree with this contention insofar as it pertains to a claim under Section 21-586 of the Code for payments made while Mrs. Randolph remained at St. Elizabeths Hospital, but think it incorrect in regard to a claim by the District for reimbursement of public assistance payments made for...