Randolph v. Fiske-Carter Const. Co.

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Randolph v. Fiske-Carter Const. Co., 125 S.E.2d 267, 240 S.C. 182 (S.C. 1962)
• Decision Date: 24 April 1962
• Docket Number: No. 17902,FISKE-CARTER,17902
• Parties: Arthur RANDOLPH, Deceased Employee, and Estella L. Randolph, Wayne J. Randolph, Max Dean Randolph and Debra Ann Randolph, by their guardian ad litem, Donald Paul Randolph, Respondents, v.CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Appellants.

Page 267

125 S.E.2d 267

240 S.C. 182

Arthur RANDOLPH, Deceased Employee, and Estella L. Randolph Wayne J. Randolph, Max Dean Randolph and Debra Ann Randolph, by their guardian ad litem Donald Paul Randolph, Respondents, v. FISKE-CARTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Appellants.

No. 17902.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

April 24, 1962.

Perrin & Perrin, Spartanburg, for appellants.

Hyatt, DePass & Raman, Spartanburg, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Arthur Randolph, an employee of the respondent, Fiske-Carter Construction Company, was seriously injured in a compensable accident on May 20, 1960, and died, following a coronary occlusion, on November 6, 1960.

The only question raised on appeal is whether there was any competent evidence to support a finding of fact by the Industrial Commission that the death of the decedent was causally connected with the accident.

We have carefully considered the order of the lower court and find that it correctly disposes of the question raised and it is therefore, adopted as the opinion of this court.

Affirmed

The Order of Judge Littlejohn is as follows:

This matter came on to be heard before me at the Spartanburg County Court House as the result of an appeal by the employer and insurance carrier from an award of the South Carolina Industrial Commission affirming the award of the Single Commissioner holding that the employee, while employed as a carpenter, on May 20, 1960, and while in the course of his employment, had a brick wall fall on him resulting in a fractured skull, seven broken ribs and a punctured lung cavity, which accident resulted in his death on November 6, 1960. It was further found that the death of the employee was the result of his accidental injury of May 20th and the subsequent complications, and had a very definite bearing on his death. From these findings, the defendants have asked for a reversal on the following grounds:

'1. That the Commission erred in finding that the accident of May 20, 1960, resulted in the death of Arthur Randolph on November 6, 1960, the error being that there is no competent evidence supporting such finding.

'2. That the Commission erred in finding that 'the death of the employee occurring on November 6, 1960, was the result of his accidental injury of May 20 and the subsequent complications, and had a very definite bearing on his death', the error being that there is no competent evidence supporting such finding.'

From the facts which are basically not in dispute, it appears that the employee, while on the job, suffered an accident which resulted in a compound depressed fracture of the skull with a six-inch laceration of the scalp; fracture of seven ribs on the left with complete pneumothorax; severe bruise of left ankle and multiple abrasions of left shoulder and knee on May 20, 1960; that he was hospitalized for a period of 29 days immediately following the accident and at the time of his death on November 6, 1960, he was still under the care of Dr. Cochran and Dr. Blanton.

The questions raised by the employer, stated in their simplest terms, boil down to whether there is any testimony whatsoever in the record to support the findings of fact by the Commission. Further, the appellant, in his Brief, raised the question of the competency of Dr. Blanton to testify as an expert becaus of an admission under cross examination at the bottom of Page 21 of the testimony and continuing on Page 22 where, in answer to questions by the appellants' counsel, he stipulated that he was answering the questions not as an expert, but as a general practitioner.

As relates to this question raised by the appellants' counsel, under our law, a general practitioner is qualified to give his opinion as stated by The Supreme Court in Hill v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 204 S.C. 83, 28 S.E.2d 545, Page 555, quoting from 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 865, Page 727:

'According to the great weight of authority, a physician or surgeon is not incompetent to testify as an expert merely because he is not a specialist in the particular branch of his profession involved in the case. The fact, however, that the witness is not a specialist in the particular branch of the profession involved may be considered as affecting the weight of his testimony, but this is no ground for completely rejecting it.'

The fact that the witness, in modesty or otherwise, says that he is not an expert is not final or determinative and what he says relative to his own qualification will be helpful to the Commission in determining what weight should be given to his testimony. Our Supreme Court has applied the rule announced in the case of Cokeley et al. v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 14 S.E.2d 889; the Court said:

'Where there is a conflict in the evidence, either of different witnesses or of the same witness, the findings of fact of the Industrial Commission, as triers of fact, are conclusive. Bannister v. Shepherd [191 S.C. 165, 4 S.E.2d 7], supra; Tunnicliff v. Bettendorf, 204 Iowa 168, 214 N.W. 516; Rand v. Lafferty Transp. Co., 60 Idaho 507, 92 P.2d 786.

'The rule applicable in actions at law, and followed by analogy, here, is thus stated in Lower Main Street Bank v. Caledonian Ins. Co., 135 S.C. 155, 159, 133 S.E. 553, 555, as follows: 'The well-established rule in this state is that if there is any testimony whatever to go to the jury on an issue involved in a cause, or even if more than one inference can be drawn from the testimony, then it is the duty of the judge to submit the cause to the jury. This is true, even if witnesses for the plaintiff contradict each other, or...