Randolph v. Methodist Hospitals, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 45A03-0210-CV-371.,45A03-0210-CV-371.
• Parties: Charlotte RANDOLPH, individually And as friend and mother of Kwabene Randolph, and Richard Rupcich, Administrator of the Estate of Kwabene Randolph, Appellants-Respondents, v. The METHODIST HOSPITALS, INC., Michael A. Linton, M.D., David D. Chube, M.D., Edgar Dizon, M.D., St. Mary Medical Center, Inc., Appellees-Petitioners.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

793 N.E.2d 231

Charlotte RANDOLPH, individually And as friend and mother of Kwabene Randolph, and Richard Rupcich, Administrator of the Estate of Kwabene Randolph, Appellants-Respondents, v. The METHODIST HOSPITALS, INC., Michael A. Linton, M.D., David D. Chube, M.D., Edgar Dizon, M.D., St. Mary Medical Center, Inc., Appellees-Petitioners.

No. 45A03-0210-CV-371.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

August 13, 2003.

Glenn J. Tabor, Jeffrey S. Wrage, Blachly, Tabor, Bozik & Hartman, Valparaiso, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

James L. Hough, Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty, P.C., Merrillville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Charlotte Randolph ("Mother") and Richard J. Rupcich, administrator of the estate of Kwabene Randolph, appeal from the trial court's preliminary determination of law that their medical malpractice claim was untimely and that Rupcich, as administrator of Kwabene's estate, was not a proper party to the suit. We affirm.

Issues

Appellant raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:¹

1. Whether the trial court properly determined that claims brought on behalf of Kwabene by his representatives were barred by application of a two-year statute of limitations; and

2. Whether the trial court properly determined that Mother's derivative claims were time-barred.

Facts and Procedural History

Kwabene Randolph was born, depressed and suffering from a severe anoxic brain injury, on October 7, 1991. Both Kwabene and Mother were under the care of Drs. Linton, Chube, and Dizon, The Methodist Hospital, Inc., and St. Mary Medical Care Center, Inc. (collectively referred to as "medical care providers") at the time of Kwabene's birth. His condition did not improve, and he suffered from severe breathing difficulties and seizures until he died on May 7, 1992.

On September 7, 1997, Richard Rupcich, on behalf of Mother, filed a Petition to Appoint Administrator, for the purposes of collecting damages in a wrongful death suit based on medical malpractice on behalf of Kwabene. On September 26, 1997, Richard Rupcich and Mother, individually and as friend and mother of Kwabene, filed with the Indiana Department of Insurance their proposed medical malpractice complaint against the medical care providers. The proposed complaint alleged that the medical care providers "failed to refer [Mother] to a qualified specialist in a timely manner during Kwabene's delivery, failed to promptly diagnose the signs and symptoms of Kwabene's severe fetal distress, and failed to promptly monitor and deliver [Kwabene], thereby resulting in Kwabene's severe asphyxia, seizures, and ultimately, his premature death ..." Appellants' Brief at 4.

In July 2002, The Methodist Hospital, Inc. filed a Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Determination of Law under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, arguing that the proposed complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. In August 2002, Mother and Rupcich filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for preliminary determination of law, which was followed by a reply in support of the motion filed by the other medical care providers. In September 2002, The Methodist Hospital, Inc. also filed a reply in support of the motion. Later in September, Mother and Rupcich filed a response to the reply filed by the other medical care providers, and a hearing was held on the matter. The trial court determined that since a deceased child cannot bring a claim on his own behalf, the claim is properly brought by a personal representative on the behalf of his estate. The trial court determined that Mother was the proper party to bring an action on behalf of Kwabene, but that her claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations in the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Ind.Code § 34-18-7-1. The trial court ordered all claims to be dismissed as time-barred, and Mother and Rupcich appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

We begin by noting that the appellants claim the standard of review in this case should be the standard of review applied to summary judgment motions. However, no evidentiary material creating an issue of fact was submitted to the trial court, and the motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court based solely on determinations of law. The only affidavit presented below merely served to establish that The Methodist Hospital, Inc. was a qualified healthcare provider; it did not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we will employ the standard of review applicable to a trial court's disposition of a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The standard of review on appeal of a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is de novo. Sims v. Beamer, 757 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). We do not defer at all to the trial court's decision because deciding a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim involves a pure question of law. Id. That is, it does not require reference to extrinsic evidence, the drawing of inferences therefrom, nor the weighing of credibility for its disposition. Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. 2000). The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss turns only on the legal sufficiency of the claim and does not require determinations of fact. Sims, 757 N.E.2d at 1024. If a complaint states a set of facts which would not support the relief requested, even if they were true, we will affirm the dismissal. Id.

II. Kwabene's Claims

Appellants argue that Kwabene's claims are not time-barred because they fall under the exception provided for minors to the statute of limitations for medical malpractice. The statute reads:

A claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, except that a minor less than six (6) years of age has until the minor's eighth birthday to file.

Ind.Code § 34-18-7-1. The appellants argue that because the malpractice that formed the basis of Kwabene's claims occurred before what would have been his sixth birthday, his representatives have until what would have been his eighth birthday to file suit. The medical care providers, on the other hand, argue, and the trial court determined, that the exception provided to the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions applies only to living children. We agree with the medical care providers.

Because the issue of whether this narrow exception to the statute of limitations applies to deceased children is a matter of first impression in Indiana, we turn to the decisions of other states for guidance. First, a Pennsylvania statute provides that:

If an individual entitled to bring a civil action is an unemancipated minor at the time the cause of action accrues, the period of minority shall not be deemed a portion of the time period within which the action must be commenced. Such person shall have the same time for commencing an action after attaining majority as is allowed to others by the provisions of this subchapter.

42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5533(b)(1)(i). In Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002), Nicole Holt filed a medical malpractice action after her son was born at twenty-three weeks and died the same day. Her complaint alleged that the doctors were negligent in their treatment of her and her son, which caused her son to suffer injuries and death. Holt filed the complaint almost five years after the death of her son, but she claimed that the minority tolling statute applied to preserve the cause of action until two years after the date on which her son would have turned eighteen. The court rejected this argument, deciding that the statute "contemplates a minor plaintiff who is alive, but whose parent or guardian fails, for some reason, to bring suit on the minor's behalf prior to the minor's eighteenth birthday" and that "nothing in the statutory language... would indicate that the legislature intended that the minority tolling statute would be available to a deceased minor plaintiff." Id. at 1214.

The state of Wisconsin has a medical malpractice statute of limitations even more similar to ours. The Wisconsin statute states:

Any person under the age of 18, who is not under disability by reason of insanity, developmental disability or imprisonment, shall bring an action to recover damages for injuries to the person arising from any treatment or operation performed by, or for any omission by a health care provider within the time limitation under s. 893.55 or by the time that person reaches the age of 10 years, whichever is later. The action shall be brought by the parent, guardian or other person having custody of the minor within the time limit set forth in this section.

Wis. Stat. Ann. 893.56. In Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 181 Wis.2d 815, 512 N.W.2d 216 (1994), review denied, the parents filed a medical malpractice action almost three and a half years after the death of their seven-month-old son. On a motion for summary judgment, their claim was dismissed as being barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the parents argued that their complaint was not time-barred because it fell under the exception provided for minors to the statute of limitations when read in conjunction with another statute providing that a decedent's personal injury claims survive his death. The court looked at the plain language of the statute, attempted to discern legislative intent, and held that the statute "unambiguously applies only to a living minor[.]" Id. at 219. The court also suggested that if the legislature had intended to include deceased children under this exception, they would have used a phrase such as "by the time the minor reaches or...