Randolph v. State

• Decision Date: 04 August 2022
• Docket Number: 20200881
• Parties: Devin RANDOLPH, Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

515 P.3d 444

Devin RANDOLPH, Appellant,

v.STATE of Utah, Appellee.

No. 20200881

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard February 7, 2022

Filed August 4, 2022

Nathalie S. Skibine, Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Jonathan S. Bauer, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, Katherine M. Filler, Salt Lake City, for appellee

Associate Chief Justice Pearce authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Petersen, Judge Brown, and Judge Howell joined.

Associate Chief Justice Pearce, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The State charged Devin Randolph with four first-degree felonies connected to an alleged sexual assault. The State filed a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to Utah Code section 77-20-1, arguing that there was substantial evidence to support the charges and clear and convincing evidence that Randolph was a substantial danger to the community and likely to flee if released on bail. The State also argued that there were no conditions of pretrial release that would ensure the public's safety or Randolph's appearance in court. The district court granted the State's motion.

¶2 Randolph contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proof under section 77-20-1 and raises four arguments. He first argues that we should apply a non-deferential de novo standard of review to a district court's bail determination. Randolph next argues that the district court misunderstood the meaning of substantial evidence in the bail context and therefore erred when it concluded that the State had presented substantial evidence to support the charges against him. He further argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the State had introduced clear and convincing evidence that he was a substantial danger to the public and likely to flee if released on bail. Randolph last argues that the district court erred when it concluded that there were no conditions of pretrial release that would ensure the safety of the public or Randolph's appearance in court.

¶3 We affirm the district court. To start, we explain that a bail determination requires a district court to make varied findings and conclusions that, in turn, require different standards of review. The question of whether substantial evidence exists to support the charge is a law-like mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Questions of whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a substantial danger or likely to flee are fact-like mixed questions to which we grant deference to the district court. Applying these standards to this case, we conclude that the district court did not err when it denied Randolph bail.

BACKGROUND

¶4 Devin Randolph matched with Katrina¹ on a dating app and the two agreed to meet at a coffee shop.² According to the statement Katrina gave to police, when Katrina arrived at the coffee shop, Randolph "jumped into the front seat" of her car, grabbed her by the neck, and ordered her to find a "more secure" parking space. Katrina drove to a parking lot. Randolph pulled down his pants. Katrina told Randolph "that she did not want to do anything with him" and "argued with him for a long time." Randolph nevertheless grabbed Katrina by the neck and forced his penis into her mouth.

¶5 When Katrina "was eventually able to get up" and continue driving, Randolph told her "to ... find somewhere secure or it would not be good for her." Katrina drove to another parking lot. When Katrina again told Randolph that "she did not want to do this," Randolph choked her. Randolph forced his penis into Katrina's vagina. Every time Katrina protested, he "squeeze[d] her neck harder."

¶6 The State charged Randolph with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, rape, and forcible sodomy. The State submitted a motion for pretrial detention pursuant to Utah Code section 77-20-1 (at times, Bail Statute). The Bail Statute permits the court to deny a defendant bail "if the [defendant] is charged with a ... felony when there is substantial evidence to support the charge and ... clear and convincing evidence that the [defendant] would constitute a substantial danger ..., or is likely to flee ..., if released on bail."³ UTAH CODE § 77-20-1(2)(c) (2020), repealed and replaced by UTAH CODE § 77-20-201(1) (2021).

¶7 The State argued that the probable cause statement containing Katrina's allegations provided the substantial evidence that the Bail Statute required. The State also argued that there was clear and convincing evidence that Randolph posed a substantial danger to the community based on the seriousness of the charges, the fact that Randolph "had never met [Katrina] in person before this incident," and law enforcement's findings that Randolph "spoke to multiple women on the app and appeared sexually aggressive in most conversations." Additionally, the State contended that Randolph was likely to flee if released on bail. Specifically, the State noted that Randolph had left Utah after the alleged incident and had to be extradited back to face the underlying charges. The State also maintained that Randolph had a driver license from, and family in, Georgia, had told others that he was from Canada, and had informed some that "he was planning to leave Utah to go to Oregon and California."

¶8 The State further argued that there were no conditions of pretrial release that would ensure the public's safety or Randolph's appearance in court.⁴ It asserted that "supervision and enforcement of such conditions [was] not available through existing pretrial supervision services" and thus "should not be considered as an alternative to pretrial detention."

¶9 Randolph opposed the State's motion. He argued that the State had not presented substantial evidence to support the charges against him. Randolph contended that "[t]he police reports and medical documents ... demonstrate[d] that there was no injury to the neck or throat of the alleged victim." Randolph stressed that Katrina's physical examination indicated "No Injury" to Katrina's neck, face, eyes, eyelids, or ears. And Katrina's sexual assault examination demonstrated "no trauma" to Katrina's neck (or head, breasts, chest, back, or abdomen). Randolph argued that this "evidence suggest[ed] that allegations of strangulation ... [were] false." Randolph claimed that this then "call[ed] into question the credibility of the other allegations."

¶10 Randolph also argued that he was not a substantial danger to Katrina or the community for three reasons. First, he had no contact with Katrina since the alleged incident. Second, he had no other violent charges on his record. And third, a court had already issued and served a protective order on Randolph on behalf of Katrina.

¶11 Randolph also sought to disprove the State's assertion that he would flee the state if released on bail. Randolph pointed to an email he sent to the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association after learning of the charges against him, in which he indicated that he was "looking to speak soon to organize a plan ... to prove [his] innocence." He also pointed to his intent to continue working at a Utah ski resort that upcoming winter. And he argued that "[he] works at other places, typically national parks, during the summers, and ... [t]hat is why he was found in California."

¶12 Finally, Randolph asserted that there existed "conditions of release such as bail, electronic monitoring and the existing protective order" that would ensure safety to the community and his appearance in court.

¶13 The parties reiterated their respective arguments at a hearing on the State's motion. The State "t[ook] particular issue" with Randolph's argument that there was no evidence of strangulation. The State argued that while Katrina's sexual assault examination showed no injury to her neck, head, breasts, chest, back, or abdomen, it did document "indicators of strangulation," including uncontrolled urination, difficulty breathing, voice changes, neck pain, headache, and uncontrollable shaking. That examination also showed "an actively bleeding injury to [Katrina's] labia." Randolph countered that the injury to Katrina's labia could have been the result of consensual sex.

¶14 The district court granted the State's motion and denied Randolph bail. It concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the charges. It also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Randolph posed a substantial danger to the community. The court reasoned that "[t]he crimes [were] all violent crimes and while the defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence, the charges here are concerning and alarming," and "all carry mandatory prison sentences." It further noted that Katrina was "essentially a stranger" to Randolph. The court then concluded that Randolph was likely to flee if released ahead of trial because he "has few ties to Utah and ... had to be brought back from California to actually face the charges." And the court found that there were no conditions of release that would reasonably ensure the safety of the public, Randolph's appearance in court, and the furtherance of justice.⁵

ANALYSIS

¶15 "[B]y inference," article I, section 8 of the Utah Constitution guarantees bail "as a matter of right." State v. Kastanis , 848 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). But section 8 also imposes limitations on that right. For example, section 8 provides that a court may deny a defendant bail if the defendant has been charged with a crime that is:

[D]esignated by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is substantial evidence to support the charge and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the [defendant] would constitute a substantial danger to any other person or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on bail.⁶

UTAH CONST . art. I, § 8 (1)(c). The Bail Statute designates all felonies as offenses for which a court may deny a defendant bail....