Randolph v. State

• Decision Date: 06 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 05-03-00793-CR.,05-03-00793-CR.
• Citation: 152 S.W.3d 764
• Parties: Christopher Dean RANDOLPH, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

152 S.W.3d 764

Christopher Dean RANDOLPH, Appellant v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 05-03-00793-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

December 6, 2004.

Robert Udashen, Kevin B. Ross, Sorrels & Udashen, Dallas, Nathan Kight, Irving, for appellant.

John R. Roach, Collin County District Attorney, Katharine K. Decker, McKinney, for the State.

Before Justices FITZGERALD, RICHTER, and LANG.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice LANG.

Christopher Dean Randolph appeals his conviction, after a bench trial, for driving while intoxicated, claiming error in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.Appellant brings two issues on appeal: (1)the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police officer entered appellant's garage without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States ConstitutionandArticle 1, § 9 of the Texas Constitution;¹ and (2)the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because, under article 14.03(a)(4) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the police officer had no statutory authority to enter appellant's garage and seize him.

The resolution of this appeal requires us to analyze a patchwork of facts.The story begins with Stacy Randolph's complaint to the police that appellant, her husband, assaulted her and that he left the house intoxicated, driving his Porsche automobile.When appellant returned home, the investigating officer confronted appellant in his garage as he left his car and headed into his house.It was at that point the officer smelled alcohol on appellant's breath and he began investigating the driving while intoxicated charge.Appellant's motion to suppress claimed that the officer unlawfully entered his garage and the driving while intoxicated investigation was unlawful.We conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress.Accordingly, appellant's issues are decided against him and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to his wife, Stacy Randolph, appellant came home intoxicated.Ms. Randolph did not want him to go out again because she was seven and one-half months pregnant, she thought that if he left he might not return, and she was concerned about him driving while intoxicated.Consequently, she tried to hide his car keys.In response, appellant attempted to kick down the door of the room where his wife went with the car keys, causing Ms. Randolph to call 9-1-1.After her 9-1-1 call was answered, Ms. Randolph hung up the telephone without speaking.Appellant entered the room, hit his wife in the back of the head, and took the car keys.Afterward, Ms. Randolph heard her husband leave.Officer Quillin of the Plano Police Department received a dispatch regarding the 9-1-1 hang-up call originating from appellant's residence and arrived at the house approximately five minutes later.When Officer Quillin arrived at the Randolphs' house,²he knocked on the front door, but no one answered.As a result, Officer Quillin decided to check for signs of a struggle or any other problem.To do so, he inspected the perimeter of the residence and walked through the porte-cochere that leads to the back of the house and the garage.As Officer Quillin passed through the porte-cochere and reached the side door in the rear of the residence, he shined his flashlight into the house and saw Ms. Randolph walking in the hallway.Ms. Randolph saw the officer and let him into her house.

Ms. Randolph told Officer Quillin about the incident, that her husband was drunk, and that he had left to purchase drugs.Ms. Randolph provided Officer Quillin with a written statement and descriptions of appellant's attire and the silver Porsche he was driving.In addition, Officer Quillin asked Ms. Randolph whether she needed medical attention for her injuries, and she responded that she did not.No photographs were taken of her.Officer Quillin also advised Ms. Randolph that she had the right to obtain an emergency protective order and gave her information on how to procure one.

Meanwhile, Officers Cavin and Pfahning were dispatched to find the silver Porsche because of the 9-1-1 call regarding the assault and because the driver was believed to be intoxicated.The officers drove around the vicinity, checking area restaurants and bars.

After obtaining Ms. Randolph's written statement, Officer Quillin drove down the street and parked near the Randolphs' house.There, he wrote his offense report and watched for appellant's possible return.Approximately 45 minutes after the initial 9-1-1 call, Officer Quillin was completing his offense report when he observed a silver Porsche turn onto appellant's street and pull into appellant's driveway.The silver Porsche was not moving erratically or weaving.Officer Quillin returned to the house so that he could speak with appellant about the assault.He parked in front of the house.Through the passenger seat window of his patrol car, he looked through the porte-cochere and observed appellant maneuvering the silver Porsche into the garage.Officer Quillin exited his patrol car and walked through the porte-cochere where he observed appellant standing near the silver Porsche inside the garage.

Calling appellant by name, Officer Quillin identified himself as a police officer and told appellant that he wanted to speak with him.At that point, appellant, who was still standing near his Porsche inside his garage, turned around and acknowledged the officer's presence.Then, appellant turned around slowly and started walking toward the back of the garage and the door to the house.Officer Quillin entered the garage, made contact with appellant, smelled a strong odor of alcohol on appellant, and observed that appellant was staggering.Appellant was advised by Officer Quillin that he was "detaining"appellant for the assault and he escorted appellant out of the garage.Once out of the garage, for his own safety and because he was the only officer present, Officer Quillin handcuffed appellant.Then, he walked appellant to the front of the house to wait for his back-up.Contrary to the State's contention that at this stage appellant was detained, appellant claims he was, under the facts, arrested.

Officers Cavin and Pfahning arrived at appellant's house approximately three or four minutes after Officer Quillin walked appellant to the front of the house.Upon their arrival, the officers removed the handcuffs and advised appellant that he was not under arrest.Officers Cavin and Pfahning gave appellant the field sobriety tests.Based upon their observations during the field sobriety tests, Officers Cavin and Pfahning arrested appellant for driving while intoxicated and transported him to the jail.

Appellant was charged by information with the offense of driving while intoxicated.Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained respecting appellant's intoxication after Officer Quillin entered his garage.Officer Quillin was the only witness to testify at the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress.The trial court denied appellant's motion.During the trial, appellant's motion to suppress was reargued, and the trial court again denied his request to suppress the evidence obtained respecting the driving while intoxicated charge after Officer Quillin entered his garage.After the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law,³ but amended them after reconsidering the issue at trial.

At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found appellant guilty of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.Appellant was sentenced to ninety days of confinement in the county jail and fined $1,600.The trial court suspended the sentence and ordered that appellant be placed on two years of community supervision.Appellant appeals his conviction claiming the errors that are described above in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A bifurcated standard of review is applied to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence.This standard of review gives almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts and applies a de novo review of a trial court's application of the law to those facts.SeeGuzman v. State,955 S.W.2d 85, 89(Tex.Crim.App.1997).A trial court is the sole trier of fact, the judge of witness credibility, and the determiner of the weight given to witness testimony.State v. Ross,32 S.W.3d 853, 855(Tex.Crim.App.2000).

When a trial court rules on a motion to suppress evidence, its application of the law of search and seizure is reviewed de novo.Walter v. State,28 S.W.3d 538, 540(Tex.Crim.App.2000).A trial court's determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are also reviewed de novo.Ornelas v. United States,517 U.S. 690, 696-99, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996);accordGuzman,955 S.W.2d at 87;see alsoState v. Crawford,120 S.W.3d 508, 510(Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).If a trial court's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the decision will be sustained.Ross,32 S.W.3d at 855-56;see alsoSingleton v. State,91 S.W.3d 342, 346(Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).

III.CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OFFICER'S ENTRY INTO APPELLANT'S GARAGE

Initially, the State and appellant address the issues of whether Officer Quillin's confrontation of appellant was a detention or an arrest and whether appellant's garage with its door open is a constitutionally protected area.⁴In order to resolve appellant's points on appeal, we need not decide these issues.We will assume without deciding that Officer Quillin arrested appellant, rather than simply detaining him, and the garage was a constitutionally protected area.Now, we address appellant's central claim that the evidence obtained by Officer Quillin should...