Rangel v. Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC

• Decision Date: 04 August 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. CV 16-03743-BRO (FFMx)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Gilbert RANGEL v. BRIDGESTONE RETAIL OPERATIONS, LLC et al.

200 F.Supp.3d 1024

Gilbert RANGEL

v.BRIDGESTONE RETAIL OPERATIONS, LLC et al.

Case No. CV 16-03743-BRO (FFMx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed August 4, 2016

Carney R. Shegerian, Shegerian and Associates Inc., Santa Monica, CA, for Gilbert Rangel.

Ernest W. Klatte, III, Joseph G. Naddour, Summer Ashley Young Agriesti, Klatte Budensiek and Young-Agriesti, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC et al.

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

The Honorable BEVERLY REID O'CONNELL, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Gilbert Rangel's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Remand. (Dkt. No. 14 (hereinafter, "Mot.").) After considering the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the instant Motion, the Court deems this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument of counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This lawsuit involves an employment dispute arising from Defendant Bridgestone Retail Operations, LLC's ("Defendant") alleged wrongful termination of Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 1 (hereinafter, "Removal"), Ex. B (hereinafter, "Compl.").)

Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times was, a California resident. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendant is, and at all relevant times was, a privately held limited liability company whose sole member—Bridgestone Americas, Inc.—is incorporated in Nevada and has its principal place of business in Tennessee. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 2.) George Stylianoudakis¹ ("Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis") is, and at all relevant times was, a California resident. (Compl. ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff, a Hispanic male who is approximately forty-five years old, began working for Defendant as an automobile technician in November 2013. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis became a store manager for Defendant in early 2014 and began mistreating Plaintiff shortly thereafter. (Compl. ¶ 11.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment on April 14, 2015, after a series of work-related conflicts. (Compl. ¶ 12.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action on April 27, 2016, in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles ("Los Angeles Superior Court"), against Defendant and Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis (collectively, "Defendants"). (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff alleges the following thirteen causes of action against Defendant: (1) race discrimination; (2) race harassment; (3) retaliation for complaining of race discrimination; (4) age discrimination; (5) age harassment; (6) retaliation for complaining of age discrimination and/or harassment; (7) failure to promote because of discrimination on the basis of race and/or age; (8) failure to pay for rest breaks; (9) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (10) wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy; (11) violations of Labor Code § 1102.5 et seq. ; (12 ) defamation; and, (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). (Compl. ¶¶ 18–100.) Of these thirteen causes of action, Plaintiff alleges only the race harassment, age harassment, and IIED causes of action against Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis. (See Compl. ¶¶ 24–29, 48–53, 95–100.)

On May 27, 2016, Defendants removed the action to this Court, based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.² (Removal at 1–4.) On June 6, 2016, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as, on its face, diversity jurisdiction is lacking because Plaintiff and Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis are both California residents. (Dkt. No. 11.) On June 10, 2016, Defendants filed a response. (Dkt. No. 12 (hereinafter, "OSC Response").) After finding Defendants' OSC Response satisfactory, the Court discharged the Order to Show Cause on June 23, 2016. (See Dkt. No 13.) On June 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand, (see Dkt. No. 14), which Defendants timely opposed on July 18, 2016,³ (see Opp'n).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction and possess only that jurisdiction which is authorized by either the Constitution or federal statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Pursuant to § 1332(a)(1), a federal district court has jurisdiction over "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs," and the dispute is between citizens of different states. The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1332 to require "complete diversity of citizenship," meaning each plaintiff must be diverse from each defendant. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis , 519 U.S. 61, 67–68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996).

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that a civil action may be removed to the district court only if the district court has original jurisdiction over the issues alleged in the state court complaint. If a matter is removable solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332, it may not be removed if any properly joined and served defendant is a citizen of the forum state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).

There is an exception to the complete diversity rule for fraudulently joined or "sham" defendants. A non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined may be disregarded for diversity jurisdiction purposes. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA , 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.2009). Fraudulent joinder is a term of art and does not implicate a plaintiff's subjective intent. McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp. , 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir.1987). Fraudulent joinder exists, and the non-diverse defendant is ignored for purposes of determining diversity of the parties, if the plaintiff "fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state." Id. ; accord Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co. , 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.1998). "A merely defective statement of the plaintiff's action does not warrant removal." Albi v. St. & Smith Publ'ns , 140 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir.1944). "It is only where the plaintiff has not, in fact, a cause of action against the resident defendant, and has no reasonable ground for supposing he has, and yet joins him in order to evade the jurisdiction of the federal court, that the joinder can be said to be fraudulent." Id.

District courts may consider "the facts showing the joinder to be fraudulent." McCabe , 811 F.2d at 1339 ; see also Ritchey , 139 F.3d at 1318 (explaining that where fraudulent joinder is at issue, a district court may look beyond the pleadings because "a defendant must have the opportunity to show that the individuals joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory"). Thus, a court may consider declarations and affidavits to determine whether "discrete and undisputed facts" would preclude recovery against the non-diverse defendants. Hunter , 582 F.3d at 1044. The Ninth Circuit adopts the view that, because the party seeking removal bears the burden of demonstrating fraudulent joinder, "the inability to make the requisite decision in a summary manner itself points to an inability of the removing party to carry its burden." Id. (quoting Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. , 385 F.3d 568, 573–74 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc)).

In determining whether removal in a given case is proper, a court should "strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction." Gaus v. Miles, Inc. , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Id. The removing party therefore bears a heavy burden to rebut the presumption against removal. See id. Nevertheless, removal is proper in cases involving a non-diverse defendant where the non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined. See Gardner v. UICI , 508 F.3d 559, 561 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 340 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir.2003) ).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, who is domiciled in California,⁴ provides three principal arguments as to why the Court should remand this case: (1) Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis destroys complete diversity; (2) Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis is not a "sham" defendant; and, (3) Defendants have failed to establish that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000. (See Mot. at 1–2.) As explained below, the Court finds that Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis is not a sham defendant; thus, complete diversity is destroyed, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

A. Whether Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis is a Sham Defendant

Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that Individual Defendant Stylianoudakis, a California citizen who would destroy diversity, is a sham defendant. See Gaus , 980 F.2d at 566 (noting that a defendant has the burden of establishing that removal is proper). To support a claim that a non-diverse defendant has been fraudulently joined, the removing party must show that the plaintiff has failed to state a valid cause of action against that non-diverse defendant, and the "settled rules of the state" must make the failure evident by clear and convincing evidence. See Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp. , 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether this burden has been met, courts may look to the face of the plaintiff's complaint as well as to additional "summary judgment type evidence." Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc. , 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir.2001).

1. Race– and Age-Based Harassment Claims

California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") prohibits workplace harassment on various bases, including race and age. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(j)(1). However,...