Rangel v. Schmidt
| Decision Date | 27 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 2:09-CV-071 |
| Parties | ADRIAN GARCIA RANGEL, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS SCHMIDT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) Defendant Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant, The Wesleyan Church Corporation, on March 14, 2011 (DE #326); (2) The Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Adrian Rangel, filed by Defendant, The Wesleyan Church Corporation, on April 15, 2011 (DE #343); (3) "Motion to Strike 'Exhibit Plaintiff's Representation' (letter) from - The Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Adrian Rangel," filed by Plaintiff, Adrian Rangel, on April 19, 2011 (DE #354); (4) The Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion to Strike "Clarified Affidavit" of Adrian Rangel, filed by Defendant, The Wesleyan Church Corporation, on April 29, 2011 (DE #365); (5) Motion for Admissions of Fact, filed by Plaintiff, Adrian Rangel, on May 18, 2011 (DE #380); and (6) Motion for Contempt of Court Against the Wesleyan ChurchCorporation, filed by Plaintiff, Adrian Rangel, on June 9, 2011 (DE #386). As explained in more further detail below, it is HEREBY ORDERED: (1) Defendant Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #326) is GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, The Wesleyan Church Corporation. (2) The Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Adrian Rangel (DE #343) is GRANTED and the Clerk is ORDERED to Strike paragraphs 21-33 of Plaintiff's Affidavit submitted as part of his response to the Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #340, Ex. 1). (3) The "Motion to Strike 'Exhibit Plaintiff's Representation' (letter) from the Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Adrian Rangel" (DE #354) is DENIED. (4) The Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion to Strike "Clarified Affidavit" of Adrian Rangel (DE #365) is DENIED. (5) The Motion for Admissions of Fact (DE #380) is DENIED. (6) The Motion for Contempt of Court Against the Wesleyan Church Corporation (DE #386) is DENIED.
The Court notes that there is another motion for summary judgment pending (filed by Defendants, Thomas Schmidt, Denise Schmidt, and The Northern Michigan District of the Wesleyan Church (DE #331)), as well as other motions associated with that motion for summary judgment. The Court will address those motions in a separate order to be forthcoming.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff, Adrian Garcia Rangel, filed his complaint against multiple defendants, including one titled "Wesleyan Church, US," (which was not the correct name), on March 23, 2009. On January 28, 2010, during a telephonic pretrial conference held before Magistrate Judge Paul R. Cherry, the Court granted an oral motion to amend the caption and complaint by inter-lineation to reflect the Defendant's proper name - The Wesleyan Church Corporation. (See DE #109.) There was no objection to this motion by Plaintiff.
The complaint is not set forth in standard paragraph fashion. The complaint asserts that on September 25, 2005, Rangel was married by Reverend Thomas Schmidt to Thomas Schmidt's daughter, Janell Elaine Schmidt, at the Schuyler Avenue Wesleyan Church. (Compl., p. 1.) It also alleges that before the marriage, Reverend Schmidt participated in premarital counseling with Rangel and Janell. Id. Rangel claims the Defendants failed to warn him before the wedding that Janell "was dependent on behaviour [sic.] controlling medication in order to control her wide ranging violent behaviour [sic.]" and he was "used as a sort of human sperm bank for Janell's pregnancies." (Id. , p. 2.) The complaint further alleges that by failing to warn Plaintiff of Janell's medication needs and violent behavior, "the defendants in individual and official capacities (the institutional defendants in failing tosupervise) have committed fraud . . ." Id. The body of the complaint does not refer to either "Wesleyan Church, USA" or "The Wesleyan Church Corporation." Plaintiff also asserts that Reverend Schmidt and his daughter, Janell, libeled or slandered Rangel in communication with the Indiana and Michigan Departments of Child Services when they tried to gain custody of Plaintiff's children. Id.
Defendant, The Wesleyan Church Corporation, filed the instant motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2011, arguing there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues contained in Plaintiff's complaint. Specifically, The Wesleyan Church Corporation contends that: (1) Plaintiff's claims for negligent counseling or alleged failure to supervise are time barred; (2) the claim of failure to supervise against The Wesleyan Church Corporation fails because it is not the employer of Reverend Schmidt; (3) any claim of fraud against The Wesleyan Church Corporation fails as a matter of law; and (4) Plaintiff's claims of libel or slander fail to state a claim against The Wesleyan Church Corporation. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on April 1, 20111, and a reply was filed onApril 15, 2011. Therefore, this motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
The Wesleyan Church Corporation also filed a motion to strike portions of Rangel's affidavit (DE #343), arguing that paragraphs 21 through 32 of Rangel's affidavit contain inadmissible conclusions unsupported by competent evidence. In response, Rangel agreed, and "requests that all his miscommunicated paragraphs in the previous Affidavit and highlighted by the Defendants . . . be dismissed as harmless error as Plaintiff is pro se and not a trained attorney or expert in legalese." (DE #350, p. 1.) As such, the motion to strike (DE #343) is GRANTED and the Clerk is ORDERED to Strike paragraphs 21-33 of Plaintiff's Affidavit submitted as part of his response to the Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #340, Ex. 1).
Plaintiff then submitted what he refers to as a "Clarified Affidavit." (DE #350, pp. 3-7.) Defendants filed another motion to strike (DE #365), this time arguing that the "clarified affidavit" is untimely, and even if considered, creates no issue of fact. This motion will be addressed in the body of this decision.
Rangel also filed a motion to strike a letter he filed with the Tippecanoe Superior Court on January 2, 2008 (DE #354; letter attached as Ex. B to The Wesleyan Church Corporation's Motion to Strike (DE #343)). Rangel then filed a Motion for Admissions of Fact, requesting that the Court find as fact that the WesleyanChurch Corporation did not provide any training or supervision of the Defendants. (DE #380.) Finally, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt of Court against The Wesleyan Church Corporation, arguing it is misleading for the Defendants to deny that it was the employer of Thomas Schmidt and Denise Schmidt (his wife), and misleading to claim it did not train or supervise Thomas Schmidt and Denise Schmidt. (DE #386.) The Wesleyan Church Corporation objects to each of these motions, and they will be addressed in the body of this decision.
DISCUSSION
The standards that generally govern summary judgment motions are familiar. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. , 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas DeOccidente, 28 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 1994).
The burden is upon the movant to identify those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits," if any, that the movant believes "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assocs., Inc. , 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989). "Whether a fact is material depends on the substantive law underlying a particular claim and 'only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'" Walter v. Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
"[A] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial." Beard v. Whitley Cnty. REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original); see also Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg. , 995 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1993). Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of an essential element on which the party bears the burden of proof attrial, summary judgment will be appropriate. In this situation, there can be "'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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