Rangel v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:22-cv-00553 |
| Parties | Javier Rangel, Plaintiff, v. United States of America, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants United States of America, U.S. Department of State, Antony Blinken, and Timothy Wiesnet (collectively, the “Government”) filed a motion to dismiss this suit under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) which was referred to the undersigned judge. Dkts. 12, 24. After carefully considering the motion, the response filed by Plaintiff Javier Rangel, Dkt. 22, the Government's reply Dkt. 23, and the applicable law, it is recommended that the Government's motion be granted.
This case addresses allegations that the U.S. Department of State (the “Department”) subjected a passport application to heightened scrutiny because the applicant is of Mexican descent and his birth was attended by a midwife.
According to the complaint, Rangel applied for a U.S. passport by completing the required form and submitting to the Department a fee, photo, and certified birth certificate issued by the Texas Bureau of Vital Statistics. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 10, 26-28, 37, 49. The Department requested further documentation to corroborate Rangel's birth in Baytown, Texas. Id. ¶ 38.
Rangel asserts that the Government held him to a “higher evidentiary burden than a typical applicant for a U.S. passport and demanded that Plaintiff furnish a litany of additional documents as well as disclose extensive private personal and family information.” Id. ¶ 5. Rangel contends that he provided numerous documents that demonstrate his parents' continuous residence in the United States to support the legitimacy of his birth certificate. Id. ¶ 39. The Department responded that the birth certificate was insufficient because it did not list the individual who registered his birth certificate or the place Rangel was born, and the Department required a sufficient birth certificate within ninety days. Id. ¶ 40.
Rangel, through counsel, responded by resubmitting the birth certificate, which Rangel asserts did in fact indicate who registered the birth and where he was born. Id. ¶ 41. The Department then sent a letter from its Charleston office, signed by Wiesnet, requesting more information because the midwife who attended Rangel's birth was suspected of submitting false birth records. Id. ¶ 42. Wiesnet also requested that Rangel complete Form DS-5513. Id.
Rangel resubmitted all his prior evidence allegedly substantiating his birth in Baytown, Texas, along with certified copies of his birth certificate and his younger sister's birth certificate. Id. ¶ 43. But Rangel refused to complete the Form DS-5513. Id. Wiesnet acknowledged receipt of these records and informed Rangel that the Department had not received the DD-5513. Id. at ¶ 44. Rangel mailed a reply stating that the form DD-5513 is voluntary and that he did not want to divulge personal information. Id. ¶ 45. He insisted that the documents he had already provided establish that his parents had continuously lived in Baytown, Texas, prior to and since his birth. Id.
On February 26, 2021, the Department sent Rangel a final letter, signed by Wiesnet, declining to issue a passport because Rangel did not submit “‘sufficient early public records'” to show he was born in the United States. Id. ¶ 46. According to the complaint, this denial indicated that his evidence “was not sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that [Rangel] was born in the United States.” Id.
Rangel filed this suit against the Department, the U.S. Secretary of State, the Director of the Department of State Charleston Passport Center (Wiesnet), and the United States. Id. at 1. He asserts claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for due process and equal protection violations. Id. ¶¶ 64-101.
With regard to the APA, Rangel claims that the following conduct was arbitrary and capricious in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D): the Government's (1) refusal to accept his birth certificate as primary evidence of citizenship, citing 22 C.F.R. § 51.42; (2) holding him to a higher burden by requiring him to submit private personal information on Form DS-5513; (3) failure to provide a reasoned explanation as to why the evidence he submitted was insufficient; and (4) refusal to issue his passport because his birth was attended by a “suspicious” midwife and he was perceived to be of Mexican ancestry. Id. ¶¶ 66-69. He also asserts an APA claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), challenging the refusal to issue his passport without a completed Form DS-5513, when 22 U.S.C. § 211a “does not expressly or implicitly authorize [the Government] to refuse to issue a passport unless and until the applicant complies with every request for information ....” Id. ¶¶ 74-76.
With regard to the alleged Fifth Amendment due process violation, Rangel asserts that the court has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to issue a declaratory judgment and injunction if an agency action violates the U.S. Constitution, and that the Court may do so pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). Id. ¶ 79. Rangel contends that The Government violated his right to due process for all the reasons they allegedly violated the APA and because the denial of his passport infringes his right to travel internationally. Id. ¶ 86.
For his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim, Rangel claims that the Government wrongfully subjects applicants of Mexican ancestry whose births were attended by midwives to heightened scrutiny and evidentiary standards than similarly situated individuals “who acquired U.S. citizenship by being born within the United States.”[1] Id. ¶ 93. He contends that this practice “discriminates against Plaintiff on the basis of race and national origin of his parents, both facially and as applied ....” Id. ¶ 94.
Rangel seeks a declaration and an injunction. He invokes the Declaratory Judgment Act and 8 U.S.C. § 1503, requesting that the Court declare that the Government deprived him of the rights and privileges as a citizen of the United States within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1503 and that its practice of imposing a heightened evidentiary burden to those of Mexican ancestry whose birth was attended by midwives, among other things, violates due process, equal protection, and the APA. Id. ¶¶ 100-01. Additionally, he requests the court to permanently enjoin the Government from continuing the challenged practice of demanding that individuals of Mexican heritage whose births were attended by midwives divulge personal information on the DS-5513 form if the Department does not articulate how the provided evidence fails to support the passport application. Id. at 25.
The Government moved to dismiss all of Rangel's claims except his request under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 for a declaratory judgment of U.S. citizenship against Antony Blinken, in his official capacity as Secretary of State. Dkt. 12 at 1. Rangel responded, Dkt. 22, and the Government filed a reply, Dkt. 23.
The Government seeks dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is ‘properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate' the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). The plaintiff bears the burden to establish that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id. “Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found in the complaint alone, the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts as evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of the disputed facts.” Id. at 287.
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The Government first asserts that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Rangel's claims except for the one asserted against Secretary Blinken under § 1503(a). Dkt. 12 at 1. The Government argues that (1) § 1503(a) precludes the APA claims; (2) there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for the constitutional claims; (3) the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief exceed Congress's narrow remedy for claims relating to denial of a passport; and (4) the “Little Tucker Act” does not provide the remedy Rangel seeks. Id. at 3-6. The Court addresses each of these assertions in turn.
With respect to Rangel's APA claims, the Government contends that the APA only waives sovereign immunity when no other judicial remedies are available, and here 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) provides Rangel a remedy for the denial of a passport. Dkt. 12. Rangel responds that the purpose of the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity is to “‘broaden the avenues of judicial review of agency action by eliminating the defense of...
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