Ranger Ins. Co. v. Cates, No. 4093
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Writing for the Court | PARKER |
Citation | 501 P.2d 1255 |
Parties | RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant (Defendant below), Dick Lange, individually and dba Western Agency Insurance (Defendant below), v. Earl C. CATES, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Docket Number | No. 4093 |
Decision Date | 19 October 1972 |
Page 1255
Dick Lange, individually and dba Western Agency Insurance (Defendant below),
v.
Earl C. CATES, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1972.
Page 1257
David A. Scott, of Murane, Bostwick, McDaniel, Scott & Greenlee, Casper, for appellant.
Leimback, Aspinwall & Hofer and Ronald W. Hofer, Casper, for appellee.
Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN, and GUTHRIE, JJ.
Mr. Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff Cates sued the Ranger Insurance Company, alleging the issuance of a policy covering his plane, the waiver of Paragraph 5 of 'Special Provisions Endorsement' 1 by Lange, the agent for the insurance company, 2 a subsequent crash, demand for insurance benefits, and the refusal to pay. The company admitted issuance of the policy through Lange but denied both the waiver of Paragraph 5 and liability. The case was tried to a jury, which was given no written interrogatories upon issues of fact and rendered a general verdict for $9,250 (based on the market value of the plane at the time of the accident).
The significant facts are uncomplicated and for all practical purposes largely undisputed. Plaintiff, an accountant and engaged in the mineral business, in October 1969 purchased a Cessna 182 (Skylane) on which he secured insurance through Lange. His principal objective in buying the aircraft was to fly himself and personnel used in his mineral business to where they were working in the Red Desert. Lange placed the insurance application with Aviation Office of America, a corporation which functioned as managing general agent for six insurance companies, including Ranger. When Lange received the policy, which was effective November 19, 1969, he took it to Cates and they discussed Paragraph 5. Cates decided he could not accept the policy and described to Lange the areas which would be used as landing strips, i. e., that he would land out at his drilling operations, using hard-packed surface roads. According to Cates, later that day Lange phoned him to say that he had contacted Aviation Office of America, explaining that under the circumstances Cates would not accept the policy and had been told that if other aircraft were using 'the same' it would be okay. Both men agreed that a letter should be written; and the following, under date of January 3, 1970, was sent by Lange to Aviation Office of America:
'Insured wishes to have the special provisions endorsement clarified. #5 under the policy. What consitutes (sic) an airport? They use this plane for business and pleasure. They check on their business (sic) locations around Casper, Wyo. and they have hard packed approved landing strips which they use. They do not land on open range, but on landing strips built to accommodate this type of aircraft. Please indicate if policy covers. Thank you.'
Whereupon Alderman, vice-president of the corporation, responded in writing:
'If it is a surface prepared for aircraft operation there is no problem.'
Lange said he took this letter to plaintiff and that they agreed it was not 'sufficient to clarify the position we were in landing the aircraft out in the areas that he was landing.' Lange returned to his office and by telephone contacted the person whom he believed to be the one who wrote the letter, discussing the letter and telling him, inter alia, that the insured would want coverage for landing out near his drilling operation, that they had hard-packed surface roads that were straight and wide enough to accommodate an aircraft and where other planes had landed and taken off. He was told that in such a situation
Page 1258
there should be no problem. Lange said he then relayed this information to Cates, who indicated that he did not like the clause in the policy but since Lange had written the letter and also called he did not see any problem.On September 23, 1970, plaintiff flew from Casper to the west Red Desert area, landing in flat terrain on a graded hardpacked dirt road. He was there approximately four or five hours, probably leaving between 5 and 6 p. m. The weather was clear with gusty winds. According to Cates, his plane lifted off the ground, between ten and thirty feet, and he had flown three hundred feet, apparently straight, when the plane made an almost ninety-degree right turn and crashed.
Defendant's appeal is based on the following grounds:
1. That as a matter of law the plaintiff failed to prove a waiver of the exclusionary clause in question and the trial court therefore erred in not directing the verdict in favor of the appellant.
2. That the plaintiff failed to prove as a matter of law a modification of the exclusionary clause, which would have brought the road used by the plaintiff within policy coverage, and the trial court therefore erred in not directing the verdict in favor of appellant; that further, the record does not contain substantial evidence, even if believed, upon which to justify the verdict in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that said paragraph had been so modifed.
3. That the trial court erred in giving Instruction 4 relating to the doctrine of estoppel, and further, that the instruction on estoppel given did not correctly set forth said doctrine as did Instruction A offered by defendant for the purpose of correcting Instruction 4.
4. That the court erred in refusing to give defendant's Instruction B.
5. That the court erred in allowing plaintiff and his witnesses to testify, in effect, that pilots customarily landed planes on roads in the general area of the Red Desert basin.
6. That the court erred in allowing plaintiff's witness, Gary Gosney, to testify concerning his landing and taking off from the road used by Cates subsequent to the latter's accident.
While plaintiff contended at the trial and argues here...
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Allen v. Allen, No. 4541
...so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation.' (Emphasis supplied) 4 Ranger Ins. Co. v. Cates, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1255; Title Guaranty Co. of Wyo. v. Midland Mortg. Co., Wyo., 451 P.2d 798; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 10 Cir., 253 F.2d ......
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Briggs v. Wyoming Nat. Bank of Casper, Nos. 91-106
...transfer of the property into, the trust was a valid and enforceable waiver. We agree. We stated in Ranger Insurance Company v. Cates, 501 P.2d 1255 (Wyo.1972), that a waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner. The unrefuted evidence is that, before Mr. Briggs signed the written ......
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Ramirez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 4895
...(a) existing right; (b) knowledge of that right; and (c) intent to surrender or relinquish it. Ranger Insurance Company v. Cates, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1255. In this appeal, the only element of waiver whose existence is in question is whether or not Metropolitan, by its acts, can be regarded as ha......
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Loftus v. Romsa Const., Inc., No. 95-111
...to accomplish an "intentional relinquishment of a known right * * * in some unequivocal manner." See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Cates, 501 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Wyo.1972). When we couple this proposition with the affirmative assertion of the defense of "laches and estoppel," we are s......
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Allen v. Allen, No. 4541
...so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation.' (Emphasis supplied) 4 Ranger Ins. Co. v. Cates, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1255; Title Guaranty Co. of Wyo. v. Midland Mortg. Co., Wyo., 451 P.2d 798; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 10 Cir., 253 F.2d 468;......
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Briggs v. Wyoming Nat. Bank of Casper, Nos. 91-106
...transfer of the property into, the trust was a valid and enforceable waiver. We agree. We stated in Ranger Insurance Company v. Cates, 501 P.2d 1255 (Wyo.1972), that a waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner. The unrefuted evidence is that, before Mr. Briggs signed the written ......
-
Ramirez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 4895
...(a) existing right; (b) knowledge of that right; and (c) intent to surrender or relinquish it. Ranger Insurance Company v. Cates, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1255. In this appeal, the only element of waiver whose existence is in question is whether or not Metropolitan, by its acts, can be regarded as ha......
-
Loftus v. Romsa Const., Inc., No. 95-111
...by Romsa to accomplish an "intentional relinquishment of a known right * * * in some unequivocal manner." See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Cates, 501 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Wyo.1972). When we couple this proposition with the affirmative assertion of the defense of "laches and estoppel," we are satisfied th......